

NAA: A1838, 173/11/23 PART 1

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 173/11/23 PART 1

Barcode: 589296

Number of pages: 194

Title: Iraq - Foreign policy - Relations with Syria - Including Federation Proposal 1949

Copies of this record are provided for research or study purposes. Before making use of the material for other purposes (for example publication) please refer to information on copyright obligations and citing archival records available on our website at www.naa.gov.au.

Page 1



DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE

STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 OF THE ARCHIVES ACT
1983

CRS: A1838/ 272

ITEM: 173/11/23 P11

TITLE: *Iraq. Foreign policy - relations with Syria
(including Federation proposals, 1949)*

DECISION: The folios listed below are wholly/partially exempt under sub-sections
33(1)(a) and (b) of the Archives Act 1983

35, 97, 129, 140-141, 171-172, 182-189, 190-196, 207,

208-209, 210, 211, 212-213, 215, 222 A+B, 224-225, 229-230,

263, 268-269, 273, 274-275, 276, 277-278

FACTS ON WHICH THIS DECISION IS BASED:

The exempted folios contain :

- ✓ - information provided in confidence by a foreign government, the disclosure of which would constitute a breach of that confidence.
- the identity of an overseas intelligence agency/agent. The country concerned has requested that the Australian Government not release this identity in this context.
- ✓ - intelligence/information the release of which could cause damage to : the security of the Commonwealth/international relations

REASONS FOR THE DECISION:

Section 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act 1983 states that a record is exempt if it contains information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth.

The foreign government has asked that the information receive continuing protection. Release could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Australia's international relations.

Section 33(1)(b) of the Archives Act states that a record is exempt if it contains information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a foreign government, an authority of a foreign government or an international organisation to the Government of the Commonwealth, to an authority of the Commonwealth or to a person receiving the communication on behalf of the Commonwealth or of an authority of the Commonwealth, being information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would constitute a breach of that confidence.

International relations are dependent upon the adequate flow of information between one country and another. If disclosure would lessen the confidence of another country in the Government of Australia, that is sufficient ground for a finding that disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage international relations.

**STATEMENT OF REASONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 40
OF THE ARCHIVES ACT 1983**

Details of Exemption:

Exemption is claimed in respect of the following:

<u>ITEM:</u>	173/11/23 Part 1.
<u>SERIES:</u>	A.1838/272
<u>TITLE:</u>	Iraq: Foreign Policy - relations with Syria (including federation proposal, 1949)
<u>FOLIO:</u>	258-256; 254-253; 252-251; 250-248; 245-243; 242-241; 235-233; 232-231; 170-168; 147-146; 139-137; 120-119; 117-116.

STATEMENT:

This information is exempt under paragraph 33 (1) (a) and / or (b) of the Archives Act 1983 in that its disclosure could impair the degree of trust and confidence placed in the Australian Government by foreign governments and so could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the international relations of the commonwealth.

REASONS FOR THE DECISION.

Disclosure of this information could inhibit the Government's capacity to plan for the future and so could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth.

4.3.96 Folios: 290

Australian Archives
DOCUMENT REMOVAL ADVICE

25, 97, 116-7, 119-20, 129, 137-91
146-7, 166-72, 182-96, 207-13
215-6, 222A-8, 224-5, 229-35
241-45, 248-54, 252-8, 263
Folio/s numbered 2689, 273-78
has / have been removed from this item.

Series/Accession No.: A1838 | 272 Item No.: 173 | 11 | 23 Pt 1

Document description: Memo Jan 52, memo 20.3.62, report 20.7.62, report 6.9.62, papers: 18.2.63, 25.7.63, 27.7.63, 21.6.63
22.8.63, 12.10.63, 29.9.63, 8.11.63, 10.11.63, 5.11.63, 28.11.63, 1.12.63, 25.11.63, 9.12.63, 9.12.66, 24.8.68, 25.9.68, 10.1.69
7.2.69, 9.2.69, 8.5.69, 14.4.69, 21.5.69, 26.6.69, 10.1.73, undated, 17.4.75, 24.4.75, 6.5.75, 14.4.75

Reason for removal: 33(1)

A copy/expunged copy has been inserted in place of folio/s —

Number of folios removed: 81

Removed documents now controlled as: —

Removed by: [Signature] Position No. 30921 Date 20/5/96

Pink - Item copy Yellow - Document copy Blue - Register copy



DO NOT REMOVE

This acid-free mask contains 2 cm folios
with the date range 1966-75

The contents of the mask are:

☐ Exempt from public access under
paragraph(s) of the *Archives
Act* 1983. You have a statutory right to seek
a review of the exemption.

☒ Not in the open period as defined
by the *Archives Act* 1983.

Date mask applied: 20/8/96

NAS 1061 (JUNE 1995)



National Archives of Australia



NAA: A1838, 173/11/23 PART 1

216
173/11/23

UPI-256

U R G E N T

BEIRUT, APRIL 28 (UPI)--DAMASCUS RADIO SAID TODAY THE SYRIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE HAS DECIDED TO ABROGATE THE MILITARY UNITY PACT SIGNED BY THE BAAHIST GOVERNMENTS OF SYRIA AND IRAQ SIX MONTHS AGO.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT CAME ON A DAMASCUS RADIO BROADCAST MONITORED HERE.

THE PACT HAD PROVIDED FOR THE AMALGAMATION, IN EFFECT, OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO ARMIES. THE FIRST RESULT OF THE PACT WAS THE JOURNEY OF SYRIAN ARMY UNITS TO IRAQ TO HELP FIGHT KURDISH REBELS THERE.

SOME OBSERVERS HAD SEEN THE MILITARY PACT AS THE FIRST STEP IN A POSSIBLE MOVE TOWARDS POLITICAL UNITY BETWEEN THE TWO MIDEAST NATIONS.

JB549P



214

173/11/23

UPI-152

AMMAN, JORDAN, DEC. 2 (UPI)--AN IRAQI ARMY DELEGATION
ARRIVED HERE TODAY FOR TALKS WITH SYRIAN OFFICERS ON DEVELOPING
A JOINT STAND AT THE FORTHCOMING CAIRO CONFERENCE OF ARAB
ARMIES.

THE DELEGATION WAS LED BY MAJ. GEN. ABDEL KADER HUSSEIN,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, AND INCLUDED THREE OTHER IRAQI OFFICERS.

THE IRAQI CONTINGENT WILL BE JOINED BY THREE SYRIAN OFFICERS
FOR THE CAIRO CONFERENCE, WHICH OPENS DEC. 9, TO DEBATE A
UNIFIED STAND TOWARD ISRAEL'S PLANS TO DIVERT THE WATERS OF THE
JORDAN RIVER.

THE SYRIAN ARMY HELD A MEETING TODAY WITH SYRIAN
OFFICERS MAJ. GEN. MUHAMMAD HAFIZ, WHO ALSO IS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE SYRIAN ARMY.

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

3/3/1

Memo No. 1720

6th November, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Syria and Iraq - Unity Proposals
(Your file 173/11/23)

Please refer to paragraph 6 of our memorandum
No. 1714 of 4th November, 1963.

2. The following telegram from the U.K. Embassy in
Baghdad reports the substance of the Air Attache's
conversation with Tikriti:

"Tikriti has informed the Air Attache that he is
now Commander-in-Chief of combined Syrian-Iraqi Air
Forces. He said that the new Air Force would be known
as the United Arab Air Force, and a public announcement
to this effect would be made in the next week.

Tikriti admitted that much work had yet to be done
on the organisation of his new command. However, his
plan was to base the Air Force on the RAF pattern and
to form two tactical groups backed by a flying training
group and a supply and maintenance group, each group
having its own small headquarters staff. He would
continue, however, to keep his own headquarters in
Baghdad and reside there himself, paying frequent fly-
ing visits to Damascus.

Tikriti went on to say that for the time being each
region would continue to finance its own regional Air
Force. However, he expected that the new unified force
would have its own budget in three or four months. When
asked by the Air Attache whether this meant that
political unity was envisaged in that time scale, he
answered with an unqualified yes.

Tikriti said that he had already dissuaded the
Syrians from purchasing Czech trainer aircraft in which
they had hitherto shown considerable interest. Instead,
he intended that the Syrian flying school should have
jet Provosts. He put his firm requirement for this
aircraft as twenty of the armed version for Iraq, with
the option of a further ten armed aircraft for the
Syrian region. Contract signature is expected to take
place in the next seven to ten days."

3. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Cairo.

Lance Joseph
(Lance Joseph)
for Acting Senior External Affairs Representative

*Amv.
H.A.
Copy to D.C. to be
in 10 to return.*

CONFIDENTIAL



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No. 3/3/1

Memo No. 1714



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON. W.C.2.

4th November, 1963.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Syria and Iraq - Unity Proposals
(Your file 173/11/23)

In paragraph 4 of our memorandum No. 1603 of 14th October 1963, we reported the meeting in Damascus of the Sixth International Congress of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party.

2. The Congress lasted for almost three weeks, from 5th to 23rd October, and the following telegram from the British Embassy in Damascus highlights the main points of the communique -

" A Communique was issued today on the Sixth National Conference of the Ba'ath Party, which lasted from October 5-23.

The communique emphasizes the policy of collective leadership and "democratic centralisation". It came out plainly in favour of labourers, peasants intellectuals and small businessmen against the bourgeoisie; land reform and economic planning were mentioned as objectives.

On foreign affairs, the communique proclaimed the principle of establishing a political union of Syria and Iraq on a basis of federal union and, taking into account the factual circumstances in the two regions (without giving details), supported Algeria against Morocco and declared the Party's policy to be one of non-alignment combined with friendship for the "socialist camp". It drew attention to the threat presented by diversion of the Jordan waters, which would be resisted by force."

3. Speaking to Clark of the Foreign Office about the Congress, we were informed that the most significant point of note was the new emphasis on the Marxist strain in the Ba'ath ideology. Hitherto the Ba'athists have been somewhat ambivalent in their attitude towards the merchant class. Now they have taken to defining the bourgeoisie as natural allies of neo-colonialism, although they do concede that the revolutionary conscious elements of the small trader, together with peasants, workers, and the Army, have a constructive role to play.

4. Clark said this stress on domestic Marxism, and the section in the communique aligning Ba'ath sympathies with Algeria in the current Syrian frontier dispute, and that

SAHARAN

..2/ threatening

threatening retaliation should Israel pursue her intention to divert the Jordan waters, is viewed in Whitehall as part of a programme designed to outbid Nasser's appeal to the Arab masses and to usurp Egypt's position as the focal point of Arab unionist aspirations.

5. With respect to union between Syria and Iraq, Clark said the consensus of the Damascus meeting suggests that progress towards this goal might be gradual, the military union already declared to be followed by cultural, economic, and political fusion in that order.

6. On the other hand, Clark explained, the Foreign Office last week received a report from Baghdad that, during discussions with the United Kingdom Air Attache, Tikriti, the Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Air Force, had said that political unity between Iraq and Syria was envisaged within four months. (In passing, Clark commented that any Syria-Iraqi state is likely to be a de-centralised Federal union with each region enjoying considerable autonomy. This was because Ba'ath leaders calculate that for the Union to succeed, and so that it may serve as a magnet to other Arab States, it must be tolerant of regional diversity and avoid excessive control from the centre.) Clark said that this "disclosure" arose during a conversation with Tikriti concerning the military union between the two countries. Apparently, it is intended to merge the Syrian and Iraqi air commands into a new Air Force to be known as the United Arab Air Force.

7. One interesting point mentioned by Clark was that it had been agreed at the Damascus Congress that, where in power, the Ba'ath should not permit the operation of other political parties, at least in the short run. Paradoxically, it is the U.A.R.'s insistence on the single-party state which is at the heart of the Ba'ath's dispute with Nasser over Arab union. The conclusion, of course, is that Ba'ath ideology is to a great extent geared to opportunism, and that their main concern is to ensure retention of their current grip on power.

8. Regarding paragraphs 8 and 9 of memorandum 1603, the Foreign Office now advise that the two Iraqi brigades sent to Syria are actually engaged in military operations against the Kurdish rebels.

9. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Australian Embassy in Cairo.

Lance Joseph

(Lance Joseph)
for Acting Senior External Affairs Representative.



203
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

173/11/23

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2

In reply quote No.

3/12/42

Memo No. 1722

6th November, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Jordan

In paragraph 10 of our memorandum No. 1603 of 14th October, 1963 we reported King Hussein's concern that the Baath governments in Syria and Iraq represent a considerable threat to his regime.

2. We have now seen a report from Amman to the Foreign Office to the effect that the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires and the Syrian Ambassador were summoned by King Hussein on 28th October and told that attacks on Jordan by Baghdad and Damascus radios must moderate within two weeks or Jordan would reply in kind.

3. According to the Iraqi Charge, who passed the above information to the British Ambassador, there is little chance of Iraq and Syria agreeing to call off their propaganda campaign and he therefore fears a rapid deterioration in relations.

4. Our informant at the Foreign Office said that, in line with Jordan's current tactics of rapprochement with Nasser, there is some indication that King Hussein will shortly replace the current Sherif Hussein government by one with a more reformist outlook.

5. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Cairo.

(Lance Joseph)
for Acting Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

OF LETTER FROM ²⁰²
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

173/11/23

29th October, 1963

File No. 606/10

Memorandum No. 1710/63

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

U.A.R.: Iraq: Syria: Relations

We attach a copy of a Note and its attachment,
received from the Permanent Mission of Syria, concerning relations
between Syria and the U.A.R. and Iraq.

D O - H.

Permanent Representative

ACM/ps

Mr. Humphries
Dig on 214/11/20
1/6



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

No. 509/63.

405 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK 17
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

TELEPHONE 3-6001, 3

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Permanent Missions of the United Nations and has the honour to enclose herewith the statement issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Damascus, on October 10, 1963.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic would appreciate if the Permanent Missions to the United Nations would forward this statement to their Government.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Missions to the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 10 October 1963.

The Foreign Ministry of the Syrian Arab Republic issued the following Statement on 10th October, 1963:

On 17th April, 1963, representatives of the governments of the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and the United Arab Republic signed a charter for a tripartite federal union among them. The Charter embodied the principles and the bases on which the union should be founded.

The representatives of the three Governments agreed on two transitional periods:

The first lasting five months after which a plebiscite would be held on the constitution of the new federal state.

The second period lasting twenty months during which each of the three countries would complete the formation of its local institutions while the new state completes its federal institutions.

Shortly after the signing of the charter, however, certain negative and serious attitudes became discernable. Instead of consolidating the unionist ranks, some so-called unionist elements set off to break them up. They did not content themselves with withdrawing from the government in Syria, but launched a violent campaign against the revolution of 8th March and the revolution of 14th Ramadan organising open resistance against both. This destructive resistance culminated on 18th July in the attempt by those elements to use arms against the regime. Their movement was nipped in the bud since it could not stand in the face of the tenacity and faith of the people.

On the 22nd July, 1963, President Jamal Abdul Nasser, in a speech in Cairo, announced the withdrawal of the United Arab Republic from the tripartite union charter. After that Syria and Iraq made several attempts, separately and jointly, to persuade the Cairo government to change its negative attitude, specially as there was no justification for such an attitude so fraught with national historical responsibilities and with consequences detrimental to the causes of the Arab people who view the establishment of this nucleus of Arab unity as a step in the direction of complete Arab unity.

Faced with the persistent refusal of one of the countries concerned to seek common grounds, Syria and Iraq had no alternative but to meet to study the situation arising from Cairo's withdrawal from the proposed union. They found that the circumstances that favoured the establishment of a tripartite union also favoured a bilateral union between Syria and Iraq pending the return of the United Arab Republic to the Union.

On 2nd September, 1963, and following the visit of President Abdul Salam Aref at the head of an Iraqi delegation to Syria, a joint statement was issued declaring that the two parties had agreed to establish a complete economic union between them. The two governments followed this by announcing, on 8th October, 1963, a military and defence union merging the armies of the two countries and placing them under one command and one Defence Council which would include three members from each country.

The military union will not be confined to the armies of the two countries but will be open to the army of the United Arab Republic in particular and the army of any other Arab government whose Arab and foreign policies are in harmony with those of Syria and Iraq so that such a union could form the nucleus of an Arab military defence force ensuring peace and security in the area and guaranteeing its stability. Identity of view and attitude in Arab defence against Zionist and imperialist threats from without

and reactionary and secessionist dangers from within will make it possible to repel and prevent, in accordance with the charters of the U.N. and the Arab League, any aggressive attempt aiming at the disturbance of peace and security and safeguard Arab Freedom and national independence in this part of the world.

198
CONFIDENTIAL

17.3/11/23

ARAB UNITY

It was apparent last March and April that there were many factors working against a successful federation of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Ever since the three countries declared their intent to federate on 17th April, their conflicting ambitions prevented the federation from materialising. From the very outset of the unity discussions there were major points at issue amongst the three countries. The most important of these was that neither Iraq nor Syria would agree to President Nasser's wish for the abolition of parties and the creation of national front governments similar to that in Egypt. Syrian purges of pro-Nasser elements in the government and army wrecked any chances of the tripartite federation coming into being.

By last August the Syrians had been urging on their Iraqi neighbours the possibility of some form of union between the two. Both countries are governed by the Ba'ath Party - a socialist party with branches in many Middle Eastern countries, and the original exponent of Arab unity. At discussions between the two countries in Baghdad (6th-9th August) Iraq was not enthusiastic about the possibility of some form of Syrian/Iraqi union. It was decided, therefore, to send President Aref of Iraq, who is known to be sympathetic towards President Nasser, to Cairo for another round of discussions with him. President Aref's unsuccessful attempts to save the tripartite federation left the way open for some form of co-operation between the two Ba'athist regimes. Following his visit to Cairo, President Aref called at Damascus and it was there announced on 2nd September that Syria and Iraq would co-operate on economic and military matters.

This tentative move towards closer relations between the two countries firmed somewhat during September and October. On 28th September it was announced that the two countries were to unite to form a democratic socialist state, but no date for the inauguration of the new state was given. Then, on 8th October, military unity between Iraq and Syria was announced. The Iraqi Defence Minister became Commander-in-Chief of the joint forces, and units of the Syrian Army are now involved in fighting for the Iraqi regime against rebel Kurdish tribesmen in northern Iraq. Later, during October, the Ba'athist International Congress met in Damascus, and issued a Party statement calling for the establishment of a federal union between Iraq and Syria open to "other Arab countries, especially the U.A.R., on the basis of equality, democracy and collective leadership". Once again, no date for the formation of the union was given.

It is one thing to create a joint military command; but it is quite another successfully to federate or join two countries. The Ba'ath Party as the original exponent of pan-Arabism is obviously obliged to give effect to its philosophies. And, in the eyes of the regimes in Syria and Iraq there is an undoubted attraction in a unified military command. Iraq has gained support for its battle against the

P.I.B. 21
1/11/63
CONFIDENTIAL

197
CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Kurds, and stands to achieve a long-professed ambition to place her troops along Israel's borders. Syria is concerned about Israel's plans to divert part of the Jordan River and should welcome additional military backing for her protestations. Further, any union of the two countries would serve to strengthen the position of the Ba'ath Party domestically, in other countries, and in its dealings with other Middle Eastern governments.

Despite these attractions, there are many real problems in the way of any union. Iraq's fears of Syrian business domination; the differing pace of socialism in the two countries; Syria's suspicion of the concept of union following the disastrous experiment with Egypt of 1958; and Iraqi reluctance to share oil revenues all caution against precipitate action. It is significant that the Ba'athist have refrained from setting any date for the union until public reaction to the proposal has been gauged.

One likely consequence of closer relations between Syria and Iraq would appear to be a tentative drawing together of Jordan and the U.A.R. There have been some slender signs that more harmonious relations are developing between these two countries. Their anti-Ba'ath attitudes provide some common ground from which to attack any "fertile crescent" proposal.

CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/23 181

DRAFT

ARAB UNITY

It was apparent last March and April that there were many factors working against a successful federation of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Ever since the three countries declared their intent to federate on 17th April, their conflicting ambitions prevented the federation from materialising. From the very outset of the unity discussions there were major points at issue amongst the three countries. Neither Iraq nor Syria would agree to President Nasser's wish for the abolition of parties and the creation of national front governments similar to that in Egypt. Syrian purges of pro-Nasser elements in the government and army wrecked any chances of the tripartite federation coming into being.

By last August the Syrians had been urging on their Iraqi neighbours the possibility of some form of union between the two. Both countries are governed by the Ba'ath Party - a socialist party with branches in many Middle Eastern countries, and the original exponent of Arab unity. At discussions between the two countries in Baghdad (6th-9th August) Iraq was not enthusiastic about the possibility of some form of Syrian/Iraqi union. It was decided, therefore, to send President Aref of Iraq, who is known to be sympathetic towards President Nasser, to Cairo for another round of discussions with him. President Aref's unsuccessful attempts to save the tripartite federation left the way open for some form of co-operation between the two Ba'athist regimes. Following his visit to Cairo President Aref called at Damascus and it was there announced on 2nd September that Syria and Iraq would co-operate on economic and military matters.

This tentative move towards closer relations between the two countries firmed somewhat during September and October. On 28th September it was announced that the two countries were to unite to form a democratic socialist state, but no date for the inauguration of the new state was given.

Draft P.18.
H. 29/10.

180

Then, on 8th October, military unity between Iraq and Syria was announced. The Iraqi Defence Minister became Commander-in-Chief of the joint forces, and units of the Syrian Army^{are} now involved in fighting for the Iraqi regime against rebel Kurdish tribesmen in northern Iraq. Later, during October, the Ba'athist International Congress met in Damascus, and issued a Party statement calling for the establishment of a federal union between Iraq and Syria open to "other Arab countries, especially the U.A.R., on the basis of equality, democracy and collective leadership". Once again, no date for the formation of the union was given.

It is one thing to create a joint military command; but it is quite another successfully to federate or join two countries. The Ba'ath Party as the original exponent of pan-Arabism is obviously obliged to give effect to its philosophies. And, in the eyes of the regimes in Syria and Iraq there is an undoubted attraction in a unified military command. Iraq has gained support for its battle against the Kurds, and stands to achieve a long-professed ambition to place her troops along Israel's borders. Syria is concerned about Israel's plans to divert part of the Jordan River and should welcome additional military backing for her protestations. Further, any union of the two countries would serve to strengthen the position of the Ba'ath Party domestically, in other countries, and in its dealings with other Middle Eastern governments.

Despite these attractions, there are many real problems in the way of any union. Iraq's fears of Syrian business domination, the differing pace of socialism in the two countries; Syria's suspicion of the concept of union following the disastrous experiment with Egypt of 1958; and Iraqi reluctance to share oil revenues all caution against precipitate action. It is significant that the Ba'athists have cautiously refrained from setting any date for the union until public reaction to the proposal has been gauged.

BEIRUT, OCT. 27 (UPI)--THE BAATH PARTY TONIGHT ISSUED A STATEMENT CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL UNION OF IRAQ AND SYRIA OPEN TO +OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THE U.A.R. ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY, DEMOCRACY AND COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP.+ THE APPEAL, BROADCAST BY DAMASCUS RADIO, CAME AS A POLICY STATEMENT REACHED AT THE BAATHIST INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS THAT ENDED IN THE SYRIAN CAPITAL LAST WEDNESDAY.

THE STATEMENT APPROVED THE +POSITIVE ASPECTS+ OF UAR PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSERS POLICES BUT ADDED,+ THE UAR WOULD PARTICIPATE AS A PARTNER AND ITS REGIME WOULD NOT BE THE BASIS FOR UNION.+

THE ORIGINAL THREE-STATE ARAB UNION OF IRAQ, SYRIA AND THE UAR MAPPED OUT IN CAIRO LAST APRIL, HAS FALTERED OVER BITTER HASSLES BETWEEN NASSER AND THE BAATH PARTIES WHICH CONTROL THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH IRAQ AND SYRIA.

IRAQ AND SYRIA ALREADY HAVE MERGED THEIR MILITARY FORCES UNDER A SINGLE SUPREME COMMANDER AND SYRIAN UNITS WERE REPORTED HERE TO BE AIDING IRAQI GOVERNMENT FORCES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST REBEL KURDISH TRIBESMEN IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

OBSERVERS HERE SAID THAT SINCE NASSER INSISTS HIS ARAB SOCIALIST UNION IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR ARAB UNION, THE BAATH CONDITIONS WERE LIKELY TO RULE OUT ANY HOPE OF THE UAR JOINING AN IRAQI-SYRIAN UNION.

THE BAATH PARTY STATEMENT DID NOT RECOMMEND ANY DATE FOR SUCH A UNION, BUT OBSERVERS HERE SAID IT WAS UNLIKELY TO BE FORMED IMMEDIATELY.

THE STATEMENT URGED ALL ARAB STATES--PARTICULARLY SYRIA, IRAQ AND EGYPT--TO PREVENT ISRAEL'S PLANS TO DIVERT THE JORDAN RIVER WATERS +BY FORCE IF NECESSARY.+

THE PARTY ALSO DENOUNCED +MOROCCAN AGGRESSION AGAINST ALGERIA,+ URGING ALL POSSIBLE ARAB AID TO ALGERIA. IT SAID THE BAATH SUPPORTS NON-ALIGNMENT INTERNATIONALLY BUT +THIS SHOULD NOT HALT THE PARTY FROM STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST CAMP.+

MG1104A

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

CONFIDENTIAL



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

In reply quote No.

Memorandum No. 1087/63

24 OCT 1963

16th October, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

c.c. Cairo
c.c. Tel Aviv
c.c. London

SYRIA AND IRAQ

We refer to your memo 871 of 30th September (your file 173/11/23). Mr. Killgore (O.I.C. Iraq/Jordan Affairs) said 16th October that there were considerable pressures on the Baathists in Syria and in Iraq to do something about unity, particularly in view of their ideology and also the developments over the past few months leading to the collapse of the Federation between Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The Syrian Baathists were pressing for unity much harder than the Iraqi Baathists, mainly because the Syrian Government was not so well established as the Iraqi Government, and also because the Syrian economy was much weaker than that of Iraq. It was doubtful whether unity would advance much beyond the Joint Command in the short term.

2. It was not possible to predict the outcome in the long term.

3. It was not clear at this point how far the Joint Command had been implemented. A Brigade of Syrian troops were in the Mosul region, presumably to assist the Iraqi Army against the Kurds. No Iraqi troops had been sent to Syria in exchange. No reports had been received on whether any meaningful action had been taken to establish the Joint Command headquarters in Damascus and whether the Iraq Minister of Defence was, in fact, operating as Joint Minister of Defence for both countries.

4. The Joint Command did not alter the balance of military power in the Middle East in any way and thus had no adverse affect on Israel.

5. Nasser was confined to attacking the Joint Command by propaganda means because he had no capacity to take military action against the Joint Command.

A. J. Melhuish
First Secretary.

CHECKED

173/11/23

BEIRUT, OCT. 20 (UPI)--BAGHDAD RADIO TONIGHT INDICATED SYRIAN TROOPS WERE INVOLVED IN FIGHTING FOR THE IRAQI REGIME AGAINST REBEL KURDISH TRIBESMEN IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

OBSERVERS HERE SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST INDICATION THAT THE RECENT MILITARY UNION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE UNION MERGED IRAQ'S AND SYRIA'S ARMED FORCES UNDER A JOINT COMMAND.

THE REPORT SAID IRAQI PRESIDENT ABDUL SALAM AREF WAS TOURING NORTHERN IRAQ WHERE HE INSPECTED UNIFIED ARMY UNITS COMPRISING SYRIAN AND IRAQI SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS.

IT SAID AREF HAILED THE MILITARY UNION AS A PRELUDE TO COMPREHENSIVE ARAB UNION. IT SAID AREF INSPECTED THE SYRIANS AT DHAWK AND ZAKHO, BOTH INSIDE THE FIGHTING ZONE.

JB932A



RESTRICTED 176

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

3/3/1

Memo No. 1603

14th October, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

Syria and Iraq - Unity Proposals
(Your file 173/11/23)

Please refer to your memorandum No. 592 of 30th September, 1963.

2. You will have received our memorandum 1549 reporting Craddock's preliminary views on the Damascus announcement of impending Syrian-Iraqi political union. Unfortunately, Craddock is now on leave, but we did manage last week to have a brief discussion with Figg, the other assistant in the Eastern Department.

3. Figg said that events since the 28th September Damascus statement indicated there was more in the unity proposals than was first believed to be the case. He referred specifically to the continuing dialogue between Syrian and Iraqi Ministers which culminated, on 8th October, in the simultaneous announcement in Baghdad and Damascus of the decision to unite the armed forces of both countries under the command of General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, the Iraq Defence Minister. Figg said that it was understood that the Iraqi and Syrian Ministries of Defence will be amalgamated into a joint organisation with headquarters in Damascus.

4. Figg mentioned also a conference of Baathists now being held in Damascus (and attended by delegates from all over the Arab world) and commented that the Foreign Office expects some further dramatic announcement of Syrian-Iraq unity (most likely a common market) to follow the conference's termination.

5. Unlike Craddock (whose views were, in any case, only preliminary), Figg thought that the dangers for the Syrian and Iraqi Baathists in each going-it-alone, far outweighed any reticence they may have about becoming involved in each others problems. Neither regime had substantial popular support and, in order to maintain their positions, it was useful to be able to demonstrate positive achievements towards Arab unity. At the same time, both Baghdad and Damascus recognised that association, by broadening the base of support for each regime, would be a valuable insurance policy militating against their violent overthrow. In a negative sense, the aspiring revolutionary will now have to think twice before taking on the combined power of both established governments.

6. In reply to our question, Figg said that the Baathists in both countries were maintaining their positions better than originally expected. Recent reforms in the administration had probably acted to enhance the Baathist popularity. In Syria, in particular,

...2

RESTRICTED

175
RESTRICTED

- 2 -

it appears that many of the experienced officials, earlier dismissed to make way for party faithfuls, have now been reinstated, with a resulting improvement in business confidence. More important than economics, however, is the comparative success the Baathists have achieved in building up the national guard (a type of home-based militia). They thus have a second string to their bow should the regular army (which, in any case, is now dominated by Baathist officers) decide to revolt. This is particularly important in the Middle East where power tends to reside in the hands which hold the rifle.

7. Reverting again to the 8th October announcement of military union, Figg said that, as in previous similar statements, it was linked with an offer for the UAR to participate. And, as before, this brought forth only a violent and bitter attack - carried by the Egyptian press and Cairo Radio - on Baathist infamy. Not, of course, that the Baathists expected any other response. But they are continuing to play the game of public adherence to the spirit of the April unity manifesto, at the same time implying that any blame for lack of progress towards union must be placed at Nasser's doorstep.

8. One task Egyptian propaganda has recently adopted is to imply British "involvement" in the move towards Iraqi-Syrian cooperation. The line was first developed in a speech delivered by President Nasser on 11th August, but it has been a recurrent theme of UAR propaganda ever since. The latest illustration was a lead story in last week's Ahram - to the effect that two brigades of the Syrian army were sent to Habbanna on 2nd October to release Iraqi troops required to take part in an offensive against the Kurds before the winter sets in - when it was suggested that London had been informed well in advance in order "to assure the British that the move represented no threat to British interests in the Gulf". The story also implied that Iraq's recent recognition of Kuwait was designed to appease the British. The Ahram report then went on to speculate about the reaction of Arab public opinion when the circumstances are revealed in which the two Baathist governments struck their "bargain" with the imperialists.

9. Figg commented that, though the implications of the report had no substance, (indeed the Baathists have as often as not looked for support among the Communists), there is reason to believe that two brigades of Syrians had, in fact, been sent to Iraq in early October, some days before the declaration of the military union, the motive being primarily to test the reaction of the local Iraqi population to the notion of foreign troops being stationed on their soil.

10. Asked what significance should be placed on last month's meeting in Paris between King Hussein and Mohammed Heikal, Figg said this had obviously taken place on the former's initiative. It therefore tended to lend credence to the suggestion that Hussein is keen to mend his fences with Nasser in order to oppose what he sees as a greater threat to his regime in the Baathist governments of Syria and Iraq. Figg commented that, in his opinion, Hussein's fears were largely imaginary. The Baath underground represents no threat in Jordan, and the chances of outright invasion by the Baathists from Iraq and Syria are negligible.

11. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Washington and Cairo.

Lance Joseph
(Lance Joseph) RESTRICTED
for Acting Senior External Affairs Representative

174

173/11/23

UPI-128

DAMASCUS, OCT. 14 (UPI)--IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER GEN. SALEH MEHDI AMMASH ARRIVED BY AIR TODAY TO SET UP HEADQUARTERS FOR THE NEWLY MERGED IRAQI-SYRIAN ARMED FORCES.

HE SAID AS COMMANDER HE WAS NOW PREPARING TO DISCUSS WITH SYRIAN OFFICIALS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT SUPREME DEFENSE COUNCIL TO FUNCTION UNDER HIM AS THE FORCES HIGH COMMAND.

Mr. Cummings

173
173/11/23

UPI-127

DAMASCUS, OCT. 9 (UPI)--THE NEWLY UNIFIED SYRIAN AND IRAQI ARMED FORCES +WILL HAVE THEIR SAY IN THE EVENT OF THE DIVERSION OF THE RIVER JORDAN BY ISRAEL+ SYRIAN INFORMATION MINISTER ~~BOGAMI~~ JUNDI TOLD NEWSMEN TODAY.

+OUR UNIFIED ARMY WILL NOT ALLOW ANY INFRINGEMENTS ON THE NATIONAL ARAB CAUSE AND WILL HAVE ITS SAY IF THE RIVER IS DIVERTED,+ HE SAID.

ISRAEL HAS BUILT AN IRRIGATION SYSTEM MEANT TO DRAW ITS WATER FROM THE JORDAN WHICH, WITH LAKE TIBERIAS, FORMS ITS BORDERS WITH JORDAN AND SYRIA. IT HAS NOT YET TAPPED THE JORDAN.

A MILITARY SPOKESMAN ADDED THE JOINT ARMIES SOON WOULD CONTACT OTHER ARAB FORCES.

JUNDI DENIED THE MERGER WAS DESIGNED TO AID IRAQ AGAINST KURDISH REBELS IN THEIR NORTHERN PROVINCES AND SAID THE +ARMY WAS STRONG ENOUGH ALONE TO CRUSH THE INSURRECTION.+

HE SAID NO IRAQI TROOPS HAD BEEN POSTED TO SYRIA ALTHOUGH SYRIAN FORCES ON THE BORDER WERE NOW UNDER THE COMMAND OF CHIEF GENERAL SALEH AMMASH OF IRAQ WHO WAS EXPECTED HERE SHORTLY TO SET UP THE NEW, JOINT HEADQUARTERS.

JUNDI SAID THE PRESENT MILITARY UNION WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A POLITICAL UNION WHICH WILL BE BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE THROUGH CAREFULLY STUDIED STEPS.

HE ADDED THE ARAB SOCIALIST BAAATH PARTY WHICH RULES IRAQ AND SYRIA HAS BEEN HOLDING A NATIONAL CONFERENCE HERE SINCE THURSDAY UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL AND FOUNDER MICHAEL AFLAK.

EGYPT HAS ALSO BEEN INVITED TO JOIN THE ARAB MILITARY UNION, JUNDI SAID, AND IT WILL REMAIN OPEN TO MEMBERSHIP FOR ALL LIBERATED ARAB NATIONS.

LEBANESE PRESS REPORTS OF A RECENT ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON GEN. AMIN HAFEZ, CHAIRMAN OF THE SYRIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WERE TOSSED ASIDE BY JUNDI WHO ALSO SCOFFED AT REPORTED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HAFEZ AND KEY MILITARY COMMANDERS IN HIS OWN FORCES.

Mr. *de* *←*
Mr. *luminous* *←* (signature) *pls*



CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/23

167

CONFIDENTIAL



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO

In reply quote No. 221.5.1.1

Memorandum No. 656

10th October, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Joint Iraqi-Syrian Military Command

When the Iraqi Minister for Municipal Affairs came to Cairo recently no communique was issued on the purpose of his visit, and we were left to assume that it was to obtain U.A.R. agreement, or at least a U.A.R. "non obstante", to further bilateral steps between Syria and Iraq to implement the federation agreement of April 17 last. Field Marshal Aref has now stated publicly that this is what happened, and that the delegation specifically discussed the proposed new joint command. (As you know, Iraq and Syria have recently exchanged a number of military units as a corollary to the agreement).

2. The U.A.R. Government has now given an official commentary on these proceedings which, although it first appeared in "Al Ahram", has issued from the Ministry of National Guidance.

3. The commentary says that the Iraqi delegation did not discuss military union between the three countries, that the Iraqis themselves had hitherto been opposed to a unified military command, that Cairo for its part could neither now, nor in the future, adhere to such a measure while the present situation continued in Syria and Iraq, and that the U.A.R. Government believed the present announcement had been made merely to cover up the Iraqi-Syrian exchange of troops. The U.A.R. Government, it said, regarded these manoeuvres as designed merely to serve the political ends of the two other countries, and to obscure the Palestine problem.

4. The Cairo press, in addition to elaborating on this guidance, has alleged widespread opposition to the new command inside both Iraq and Syria.

Francis Stuart
(Francis Stuart)
Ambassador

→ *AF* *15/10/63* *ME*

copy on 214/11/30

CONFIDENTIAL



173/11/23
CONFIDENTIAL

166

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,

GARDEN CITY

CAIRO

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply quote No. 221.5.1.1

Memorandum No. 623

2nd October, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Arab Union

In my memorandum 606 of 25th September I reported that September 17th, when the Arab federation was to have been promulgated, passed off here and in Damascus with only a few tepid statements to mark the occasion. September 28th, on the other hand, the day of the dissolution of the former UAR, has been noticeable for a much greater degree of mutual vituperation and, in the case of the UAR, for a major press campaign against the Baath party in Iraq as well as in Syria.

2. The Cairo press has merely paraphrased the 17th September theme, and nothing of what it says is worth repeating; of some significance however is a statement put out by what is described as the Arab Socialist Union of Syria, a body with headquarters in Beirut and presumably the beginning of the "Comintern" hinted at by President Nasser in his original denunciation of the Syrian leadership on July 22nd last. This statement charged the Baath not only with sabotaging the plans for federation this year, but also with being responsible for the original secession in 1961. "The criminal always returns to the scene of his crime" it picturesquely puts it, charging that on the anniversary of the secession, when the Baath party should have been conscious only of shame and disgrace for its participation in the break up of the union, it had the temerity to issue a public statement admitting it had entertained its reprehensible policies from the beginning. The main purpose of the declaration however was to denounce the Party's supposed new plan for an early bilateral union between Syria and Iraq.

3. This plan can only be inferred in very general terms from what the Syrians have said to date, but it seems to emerge from a party command statement on September 27th that they now have something of the sort in mind. This statement must have caused considerable misgiving in Cairo. After traversing the negotiations for federation early this year, claiming that on 22nd July President Nasser "stabbed your expectation in the heart (sic)" by proclaiming his withdrawal from the federation, and after long denunciations of the "autocratic regime in Cairo", the statement gives a probably not inaccurate account of Egyptian attempts to overthrow the Syrian Government. "They tried armed demonstrations in a number of Syrian towns, they financed these demonstrations through the UAR Embassy in Beirut, they persuaded a number of officers in the Syrian army to overthrow the

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Orig on 214/11/20
1/10

185
CONFIDENTIAL

2.

revolutionary regime". The statement says that the Command then reached the conclusion that the Baath party, in both Syria and Iraq, (described as "the revolutions of 8th March and 14th Ramadan") must take practical steps at once to put the April 17 Charter into practice. If the leadership in any one of the three countries party to the Charter abandoned it the other countries were not obliged to follow suit; on the contrary they should move towards union with increased determination. 17th September was thus a suitable day to announce "the Arab people's determination to overcome the setback caused by the secession on 22nd July, 1963, and to pursue their unionist and socialist struggle".

4. The stage therefore seems set for discussion of some form of political union between Iraq and Syria, at this month's Baath Party congress. Recent press comment here on this possibility has assumed a somewhat more pessimistic tone from the UAR point of view than has hitherto been the case. In the past, there has been some tendency in Cairo, in both official and press circles, to discount the likelihood of anything approaching the "fertile crescent" coming to fruition, but now it seems to be generally accepted that some kind of political union between Iraq and Syria will emerge, even if it does not last. Nasser eddin El Nasshashibi, writing in "Al Gomhouria" on 21st September, summed up the trend in the last paragraph of an article headed "What will happen if they unite....?" when he said:-

"It would be easy for Syria's Baath to set up, or even fabricate, some kind of federation between Syria and Iraq, but we challenge the existence of such a federation against the millions' will. And time will decide on this."

(Francis Stuart)
Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL



173/11/23
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1549

1st October, 1963.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

IRAQ - KURDS: ARAB UNITY.

Craddock (Assistant-Foreign Office) today confirmed recent press reports that the Iraqi Army is doing much better against the Kurds than previously. (In a two-fronted campaign they have managed to penetrate deep into the territory of the Barzani tribe and almost to the Turkish and Iranian borders). Craddock said that the tactics adopted by the Army had much to do with this. These were essentially to try and starve the Kurds into obedience by ruthlessly destroying villages and crops. The Army had also had some success in rooting out caches of arms and ammunition.

2. On the other hand, Craddock pointed out, in mounting their attacks, the Iraqi Army's lines of communication had been dangerously over-extended. And, though the Army may control the main roads and well defined tracks, their lack of domination of the countryside laid them open to successful guerilla attacks. Certainly the war was not over yet and, eventually, there may be required a political settlement to end it.

3. Craddock said that, with the onset of the winter rains, the Iraqi Army can be expected to withdraw to the main garrison centres though, for reasons of prestige, they will probably try to keep a few outposts in the newly won territory.

4. The Foreign Office had no evidence to suggest that the Kurds were receiving material support from outside. Craddock thought that Soviet attention was too much engrossed with its relations with China to interest itself in what must, after all, be classified as a secondary matter. Craddock, however, warned against assuming that the Kurdish cause had been abandoned altogether. There had, in fact, been some association recently between the Kurdish movement in exile and the extreme left-wing opposition to the present Iraq Government. At least active diplomatic support could always be switched on again if necessary.

5. Asked to comment on the weekend statement by the Syrian Ba'ath that discussions were to commence shortly between Iraq and Syria aimed at uniting the two countries, Craddock said he thought this was unlikely to lead to anything concrete. Perhaps there would be scope for military and economic co-operation - the two fields so far mentioned by the governments concerned - but this would almost certainly stop short of complete union. The two regimes were basically still suspicious of one another. Neither wished to be involved in the other's internal problems, and there were a host of minor factors (Iraqi fears of Syrian business dominance; differing pace of socialisation; Syrian suspicion of the concept of union following the disastrous experiment of 1958; Iraqi reluctance to share oil revenues; etc.) all cautioning against precipitate action.

6. Craddock cautioned, however, that the eventual union of Iraq and Syria should not be ruled out altogether. Unity was the professed aim of the Ba'athists and, in this particular case, it represented a means of carrying the attack to the U.A.R. The Ba'athists, particularly those in Damascus, believe that if they can show that Syria and Iraq are leading,

CONFIDENTIAL

.. / and the

CONFIDENTIAL 163

and the U.A.R. following, the vanguard of Arab Unity, then they will be able to destroy Nasser's influence in the Arab world.

7. In Craddock's opinion, the Ba'athists may, in fact, have been having the better of the deal with Nasser. He thought that Cairo Radio's frantic diatribes and crude appeal to the masses to smash the Ba'ath's "fascist rule" suggested sterility of ideas rather than a deal from strength.

8. Continuing, Craddock speculated that Ba'athist ideology had probably had a fair deal of success in capturing the support of Arab intellectuals. He thought that one particular attraction was the Ba'ath's appeal to nationalism as well as unity. Unlike Nasser, whose trumpet-call for Arab Unity, and insistence on a one-party state, means in practice Egyptian satellisation of the merged countries, the Ba'athists, being loosely organized, with no real formal structure or rigidly enforced party discipline, stress "national democracy", implying that merger need not, and should not, mean submission of an historic or recently acquired national identity. And, Craddock said, in this difference, lies the Ba'athists' strength; since, though Arabs have sufficient in common to make them desire unity, they are also sufficiently different to make them wish to preserve their local idiosyncracies unlevelled by any federal hegemony. It is the Ba'ath, and not Nasser, who promises to give this recognition of the "personality" of the various countries involved in any Arab Union.

9. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Washington and Cairo.

(Lance Joseph)
for Acting Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL



173/11/23
162
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO

In reply quote No. 221.5.1.1
606
Memorandum No.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

25th September 1963.

Arab Union

1. September 17th, the date set for the formal inauguration of the Arab Federation, has come and gone; it has been marked in the UAR by no more than a singularly turgid and uninspiring statement put out from the offices of the Arab Socialist Union, putting blame for failure to have the Federation going on the Syrian Baath. The statement said that unity between the three nations had constituted "the highest hope of the struggling Arab peoples throughout their homeland". It added that this cherished objective had been dashed by the actions of the Syrian Baathists. It accused the Baath Party of aiming solely at establishment and consolidation of a fascist separatist regime which was a fundamental betrayal of the principles of unity. The Baathists, in fact, "had never wanted unity" which was diametrically opposed to fascism. The imprisonment and slaughter of the unionists, said the statement, had "sunk Syria in a sea of blood". Even the slogan of Socialism had held no meaning for the Baathists, who had vacillated in their interpretation of the word and betrayed its principles from the start. Apart from a few editorials echoing this statement there has been no reaction at all, and Egyptian interest in the federation project appears to be negligible, except for a pious reference to ultimate union in Nasser's Revolution Day message yesterday to Sallal.

2. The Syrian government for its part marked the day with a communique reviewing the events of the past five months, and accuses Nasser of having torpedoed the federation project by withdrawing from the tripartite declaration and having plotted against the "revolutionary Syrian government" in order to enhance his personal prestige. "In announcing on 22nd July that he was pulling out of the union and that he refused to cooperate or co-exist with the revolutionary regime headed by the Arab Socialist Baath Party, President Nasser struck the Arab cause to the heart and reduced to dust the hopes of the Arab nation". The communique concluded that all Cairo's attempts to put responsibility on the Syrians would be vain and that history would judge July 22nd in the same way it had judged September 28th, 1961 when the first Egyptian-Syrian union came to an end.

3. There are also indications from Damascus, and to a lesser extent from Baghdad, that the governments of Syria and Iraq are now feeling bolder about moving towards some sort of bilateral federation; in this they are going well beyond the loose plans for economic and cultural cooperation which,

Origin 214/11/20
H/30

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 161

they said a few weeks ago, was as far as they intended proceeding for the time being. According to these reports while the Syrian/Iraqi union would ostensibly be based on the tripartite declaration of April 17th and would theoretically envisage the adhesion of Egypt at a later date, it would in fact amount to a first concrete realisation of the fertile crescent project. Opinion generally holds that such a development is still premature, but I am increasingly tempted to think that this time there might be something in it.

4. An unpredictable factor is the attitude of Jordan. The fertile crescent without Jordan would not make much sense, and would deprive Jordan of what is possibly its only hope of a viable future. On the other hand the recent Iraqi initiative in reviving the project of an independent Palestine, which would have been built principally out of that part of Palestine at present incorporated in Jordan, has not endeared the Iraqi Government to King Hussein. Jordan and the UAR might thus find a common interest in opposing the suggestion.

5. On present showing the idea will be given a public hearing at the Baath Party Congress, to be held either in Damascus or Baghdad, in October.

(Francis Stuart)
Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

160
173/11/23

30th September, 1963.

871

The Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

SYRIA AND IRAQ

We have seen a press release of an announcement made in Damascus that Syria and Iraq are to unite in a democratic Socialist State. We would be grateful for any information you could let us have about this proposal.

2. A copy of this memo has been sent to London.

CL
(Charles Lee)
for the Secretary

159
23
173/11/38
592

30th September, 1963.

The Senior External Affairs Representative,
Australia House,
The Strand,
LONDON.

SYRIA AND IRAQ

We have seen a press release of
an announcement made in Damascus that Syria and
Iraq are to unite in a democratic Socialist State.
We would be grateful for any information you could
let us have about this proposal.

2. A copy of this memo has been sent
to Washington.

CL
(Charles Lee)
for the Secretary



BLTN 33

28.9.63

173/11/23.
31 SINGAPORE AT 004

It's been announced in DAMASCUS that SYRIA and neighbouring IRAQ are to unite in a Democratic Socialist state.

The Ruling BAAATH Party statement gave no date for the birth of the new state.

The statement marked the second anniversary today of SYRIA'S breakaway from her union with EGYPT in the UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

The new state would be open to other ARAB countries in general and EGYPT in particular.

....

71

For Lee



173/11/23
CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply quote No. 221.5.1.1

Memorandum No. 539

5th September 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Arab Unity

It seems that when President Aref of Iraq came to Cairo he did so in the genuine hope that he might be able to prevent a complete disappearance of the April 17 project and that, after considerable ups and downs, he obtained a sufficiently positive response from President Nasser to pursue with the Syrians the possibility of reviving some sort of tripartite negotiations. The proposal he put to Nasser was that there should be a cessation of polemics between Cairo and Syria, and Nasser said he would agree to this, provided the Baathists in Damascus would release the major "unionist" (meaning Nasserist) personalities still held in gaol, and re-shuffle the cabinet to allow for pro-Nasser personalities to return to it.

2. On information obtained indirectly, and largely through Beirut, we understand that the Syrians agreed to the first of these points, but categorically refused to the second. As a result the propaganda attacks on Syria from Cairo continue, and, in a speech to a further contingent of returning troops from the Yemen at Port Said yesterday, Nasser repeated his now familiar denunciations of the Syrian Baathists as deviationists and fascists with whom any agreement was impossible.

3. As usual it is difficult to piece together a more or less true account, or more accurately an account more or less likely not to be misleading, than is usually the case from the many versions and from the clouds of deliberately coloured interpretations of what has taken place since I last wrote. It seems however that Aref, up to the moment of his return to Baghdad, was still hoping something could be retrieved of the 17th April understanding, if not of the Agreement itself.

4. The auspices have all along been poor. When Aref left Cairo for Damascus on August 26th, Heikel produced a Friday article in "Al Ahram" which was less a commentary on his visit than an obituary. Heikel said he had been looking for a miracle: there had been none. Aref had certainly tried hard but he had failed. This was a plain indication of how Nasser viewed their meeting, but Aref himself maintained a courageous and a commendably cool attitude throughout the subsequent Damascus visit, saying on arrival that the United Arab Republic would be established after all (he made this sweeping claim in a public address from the balcony of the guest Palace) and assuring the Syrian leaders in private that Nasser would after all be prepared

Orig on 214/4/20
44
63.

CONFIDENTIAL

to open negotiations with them if his point was met about the reinstatement of Nasserists. Aref went so far in his attempt to maintain a correct attitude towards his late hosts in Egypt as to rebuke interjectors in Damascus who called out against Nasser at one of his public meetings; Aref exclaimed with apparent emotion that it was wrong to display sentiments disloyal, as these sentiments were, to the whole Arab cause. But the net effect was very much as expected before Aref arrived in Damascus, and if anything the visit has seemed to have worsened the cause he had taken up rather than to have improved its prospects. There is little point in going into detail; the Syrian Government seems now to have nailed its colours to the mast and to have decided on complete opposition to Cairo, come what may. This also seems to be the UAR policy and, again without going into detail, (because everything he said is repetitive), Nasser's address yesterday repeated almost word for word the attacks on the Syrian Baath made in his recent speech at Alexandria, and indicated his continued refusal to have any truck with them.

5. In the end it looks as though Aref found himself with no further cards to play, and resigned himself to accepting the alternative put forward by his Syrian colleagues of a close bilateral understanding between Iraq and Syria. On September 2nd, in the joint communique issued at the end of his visit, Iraq and Syria agreed to establish what is described as "complete economic unity" and to set up a military committee to coordinate defence arrangements between the two countries, something which is deliberately presented as an alternative to a bipartite substitute for the April 17th union, but which must in fact seem to the Egyptians perilously like the fertile crescent in a lusty if still adolescent form. The communique repeated the phrases current recently on the necessity of "clearing the Arab atmosphere" and preparing better conditions for new union which "would face the Israeli danger", set out to mend bridges with the Soviet Union by gracious references to the Soviet role during the recent Security Council debate on the Israeli/Syrian frontier incidents, and reaffirmed the danger of Israeli expansionism. The nub however is in the reaffirmed determination on economic and military cooperation, and once more in the wearisome kaleidoscope of Arab affairs Egypt seems to be voluntarily isolated from the Arab East.

6. Nasser has agreed to go to Baghdad to return Aref's visit, and this is expected to take place in October. It will not be surprising if he went through with this visit, which would have the effect of keeping the lines open between Cairo and Baghdad; unless the bilateral Iraqi/Syrian arrangements mentioned above take spectacular form between now and then, and so introduce a new element into the situation, I should expect he would. But generally Aref seems to have failed in his mission, and the Syrians seem to be the sole gainers.

(Francis Stuart)
Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/23 155

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

3/3/1

Memo No. /421

4th September, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Arab Unity

We have discussed events leading up to Nasser's jettisoning of the Arab Union and the subsequent efforts by the Iraqis to paper over differences, with the Foreign Office (Figg, Eastern Department).

2. Figg said that since the signing of the April unity manifesto, the Baathist forces in both Syria and Iraq had indulged in machinations designed to purge government and army of Nasserist supporters. This represented the outward manifestation of an internal struggle between the two groups over the approach Syria and Iraq should adopt towards a constitution for the Arab Union. Unlike the Nasserists, the Baath considered it essential that the federation constitution should firmly entrench a considerable degree of state autonomy, and that the unitary state required by the UAR should be resisted. This was not to say that "state-rights" formed a particular tenet of the Baathist platform, but it was felt that, otherwise, Nasser would be able to impose his own special brand of political philosophy with an inevitable loss-of-identity of the Baathist movement in favour of the single national-front Arab Socialist Union.

3. Figg went into some detail to stress that the disagreement between the Baath and Nasser was not ideological. Nasser's rallying-cry hardly differs from the Baathist's: Unity - Socialism - Democracy. These Baath abstractions accord with the points on which the Egyptian officers agreed in July, 1952. Arab unity was explicitly affirmed in the first Egyptian constitution after the revolution which proclaimed Egypt as part of the "Great Arab Nation". Socialism has been an increasingly important part of Nasser's policy; the socialist laws of July, 1961 were the immediate cause of Syria's succession from the UAR. As for democracy, Nasser has never ceased to affirm that what he wants is the fullest and completest democracy for Egypt and all the Arabs. He insists, however, that, at its present state of development, the Arab world cannot afford political parties and a free press. And, it is at this point that the issue is joined by the Baathists. Antedating Nasser's call to unity by several decades, the Baathists are not prepared to surrender hegemony on this matter, and are certainly not willing to cast themselves into the political oblivion required by Nasser's no-party state.

4. Nevertheless, the Baathists in both Syria and Iraq were keen on some form of political union with the UAR. Not only was this required by ideology, but there were sound practical reasons necessitating evidence of some visible progress towards unity. These stemmed from the

Orig on 214/11/20
H 11
3
62

CONFIDENTIAL...2

CONFIDENTIAL 154

- 2 -

emotional appeal that pan-Arabism had for all sectors of the population and the danger for the new Baathi governments, therefore, if they could not demonstrate concrete measures to bring this unity about. There was also the consideration that, in both Syria and Iraq, the Baathists lacked truly widespread popular appeal, and it was therefore natural for them to seek to obtain support from the only possible solid source - the UAR.

5. The irony of the situation was that, in pressing for unity with the UAR, the Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq ran the risk of being swallowed in the process. Hence, however, their seemingly ambivalent attitude in proclaiming devotion to the principles of the 17th April manifesto, while concurrently adopting an attitude to the Nasserists at home which could not help but result in alienation of the UAR. In short, Iraqi and Syrian tactics have been to try and manoeuvre the UAR into a position of guaranteeing the continued existence of the Baath (through state constitutional rights) and simultaneously, by adopting a public stand of sweet-reasonableness, pinning any blame for a break-up of the Union on to Cairo.

6. Figg said that the conflict between Nasser and the Baath party over political organisation had deeper significance for the former than many had given it credit for. The survival of the Baath, and consequently of other political parties, as independent forces in a federal union would be a constant danger to Nasser's position. Not only would it mean that Syria and Iraq had rejected the form of democracy which he had devised, not for Egypt alone, but for all "liberated" Arab countries, but, more seriously, it would mean that Egyptian representatives in a federal assembly would be confronted with the spectacle of an operating party system and the free expression of conflicting opinions. In the long run this might undermine the political structure of Egypt itself.

7. If there had been any lingering doubts about whether Nasser was going to torpedo the proposed Arab Union, these were quickly dissipated following the 18th July attempted coup d'etat in Damascus, and the subsequent blood-letting. In announcing his decision on 22nd July, Nasser pointedly remarked "I believe in unity with Syria; I do not believe in unity with the Baathist Party".

8. Referring briefly to events since the 22nd July speech, Figg said that the rift between Syria and the UAR had widened into a gaping chasm. He said that information received from British posts indicated that the recent visit to Cairo by President Arif had achieved nothing and that Nasser refuses to contemplate any reconciliation, or even dealings, with the Syrian Baathists. This might have been possible were it not for the anger occasioned by the executions and arrests of Nasserists which followed the 18th July attempted coup. Previous Syrian revolutions had been virtually bloodless.

9. Figg said that, until now, UAR criticism of the Baath in Iraq had been relatively restrained (at least in comparison with Egyptian diatribes against Syria). He thought that this probably owed something to President Arif who was not regarded in Cairo as a Baathist. Figg considered, however, that Nasser's continued forbearance will be contingent on future Iraqi relations with Syria.

..3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 153

- 3 -

In this connection, he thought that there was a risk of the veneer of friendliness wearing thin now that Syria and Iraq have announced their intention of bilateral economic and military cooperation.

10. Figg did not wish to comment on the significance of last week's Iraqi-Syrian agreement until he had received further information. His initial reaction was to be sceptical. Certainly he did not believe that the Syrians and Iraqis would go it alone and set up a bilateral union representing the fertile crescent. He thought that Iraqi suspicions of Syrian instability, and Syrian reluctance to become involved in the war against the Kurds, would prevent this.

11. Asked about the recent incidents on the Israel-Syria border, Figg said that he did not believe that these were precisely timed or planned. He thought rather that the shooting of the two Israeli farmers was the work of an over-zealous, trigger-happy, army squad. Figg admitted, however, that the frontier brush had not been unwelcome in Damascus. It had served as a stratagem against UAR publicity; Cairo was forced to halt its diatribes exposing the "fascist" Baathist regime, and provide sure-fire support for the Syrians in their role as the front line defence against Israel.

12. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Washington and Cairo.

(Lance Joseph)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

BY RAY MOLONEY

173/11/23
152

BEIRUT, LEBANON, SEPT. 2 (UPI)--SYRIA AND IRAQ CALLED TODAY FOR THE CREATION OF +NEW AND SUITABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE REALIZATION OF ARAB UNITY+ AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF PLANS TO FEDERATE THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH EGYPT.

THE CALL CAME IN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE BROADCAST BY DAMASCUS RADIO AT THE END OF A ONE WEEK VISIT TO SYRIA BY IRAQI PRESIDENT COL. ABDUL SALAM AREF. HIS VISIT FOLLOWED TALKS IN CAIRO WITH UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER WHICH FAILED TO SALVAGE THE PROPOSED THREE-NATION FEDERATION.

IRAQ REITERATED ITS PLEDGE TO HELP SYRIA AGAINST NEIGHBORING ISRAEL IF NECESSARY AND THE TWO SIDES ANNOUNCED AGREEMENT TO FORM A +JOINT MILITARY COMMITTEE DESIGNED TO DEVELOP MUTUAL DEFENSES.+

THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO ANNOUNCED AGREEMENT OF SYRIA AND IRAQ TO +ESTABLISH FULL ECONOMIC UNITY WITH THE CREATION OF A JOINT ECONOMIC COUNCIL OPEN FOR OTHER ARAB STATES TO JOIN AS THE FIRST STEP.+

IT SAID THAT AT IRAQ'S SUGGESTION, SYRIA AGREED TO CEASE RADIO AND PRESS ATTACKS AGAINST NASSER'S U.A.R. +AS A FIRST POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS HALTING THE DETERIORATION OF THE ARAB SITUATION.+

ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL, THE COMMUNIQUE SAID THAT ARAB SOLIDARITY WAS NECESSARY +IN VIEW OF THE INCREASING ISRAELI DANGER.+

IT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE +SINCERE SOVIET STAND IN SUPPORT OF JUSTICE+ IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECENT U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION IN WHICH RUSSIA OPPOSED AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RESOLUTION CENSURING SYRIA FOR RECENT BORDER CLASHES.

DU4:17A

~~ME~~

Can beine

173/11/23.151

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Robey

No. 860

August 10, 1963



FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

D. 3.25 p.m. August 10, 1963

R. 4.16 p.m. August 10, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 860 of August 10.
Repeated for information to : Cairo Damascus and Beirut

(1) My telegram No. 858.

The communiqué is a rather damp squib, presumably bearing little relation to what was actually discussed.

2. While it is too early to forecast the consequences, the United States Ambassador was told by a very well-informed source that the Syrians had been anxious for early action in the direction of bipartite unity but that the Iraqis had held back. It was, therefore, decided to try for another round of discussions with Nasser and to send President Arif, but with Hazim Jawad as watchdog, to Cairo for this purpose. The story about Arif, though surprising, has been heard from other sources.

3. This morning I called on the new Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry and asked him what was likely to happen. He said that he had not seen his Minister since the conference, but thought that the meeting had decided to try to heal the breach with Egypt, which otherwise would go on widening. "Someone", the Under-Secretary thought, might go to Cairo. From conversation on other subjects, however, it was clear that he expected no changes on September 17; indeed he seemed anxious to be reassured that Her Majesty's Ambassador would be returning at the end of his leave.

4. I will report further in the light of the week-end's reactions. But one factor which may have affected Iraqi tactics has been nervousness (quite acute in the last few days) about the state of public opinion.

Foreign Office pass Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut as my telegrams Nos. 79, 82 and 154 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

SSSSS

CONFIDENTIAL

Cushwa

150

FROM BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

Mr. Robey

No. 858
August 9, 1963.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

D: 6.48 p.m. August 9, 1963.
R: 9.25 p.m. August 9, 1963.

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 858
of August 9

Repeated for information to Damascus
Cairo
Beirut

My telegram No. 850.

The joint Iraqi/Syrian communiqué issued today on the departure of the Syrian delegation reads as follows.

2. In accordance with the invitation from the Government of the Republic of Iraq a delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic reached Baghdad on the afternoon of the 6th of August, 1963, under the leadership of Sayid Salahuddin Al Bitar, the Prime Minister.

3. A number of meetings were held between the Syrian/Arab delegation and the Iraqi Government delegation under the presidency of Staff Field Marshal Abdul Salam Mohammad Arif, President of the Republic, in the course of which the two sides studied the brotherly relations binding the two regions and the Arab situation, especially the situation arising from the crisis which has struck the Charter of April 17, concerning tripartite unity and the great harm to the nationalist case which has resulted from it.

4. There was complete agreement concerning the need to stop the deterioration in the Arab situation arising out of this crisis. As regards the great dangers threatening the Arab nation the most important were the increasing Israeli danger, the feverish activity which Arab reaction is now exercising in the East and the West, illustrated in particular by the imperialist reactionary aggression in the Yemen, the widespread imprisonment inflicted upon the liberal Arabs and the persecution directed against the popular progressive movement in some of the Arab countries.

/ 5. The

Baghdad telegram No. 858 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. The two sides affirmed complete solidarity between the two Arab revolutions of the 14th of Ramadan and the 8th of March and the necessity for their complete meeting together with the Arab revolution in the United Arab Republic, Algeria, the Yemen and in all areas of the Arab homeland. Similarly they deplored the conspiracies against the revolutions of the 14th of Ramadan and the 8th of March and the Iraqi side reaffirmed its distress concerning the conspiracy of the 18th of July which had as its objective the destruction of the revolution of March 8.

6. The two sides renewed the undertaking of the two Governments to persevere continuously in working for the victory of the Arab motherland in liberating occupied Palestine and in freeing all Arab regions from imperialist domination. The two sides expressed their complete support of the Yemen revolution and their absolute disapproval of imperialist reactionary aggression against it.

7. The two sides studied the international situation and expressed their support of the nuclear test ban on land, sea and in the air, which they considered to be a step towards reducing international tension and strengthening peace throughout the world.

8. The Syrian delegation addressed an invitation to Staff Field Marshal Abdul Salam Mohammad Arif, President of the Republic to visit Syria and he replied to the invitation stating his hope to make such a visit as soon as possible.

uuuuu

UPI-120

173/11/23 205/4/30 148
CAIRO, AUG. 10 (UPI)--SYRIAN AND IRAQI LEADERS TODAY ANNOUNCED +COMPLETELY IDENTICAL VIEWPOINTS+ ON PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE PROPOSED NEW UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR) OF SYRIA, IRAQ AND EGYPT; THE MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) REPORTED.

MENA SAID THE ANNOUNCEMENT CAME IN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING THE AUG. 6-9 TALKS IN BAGHDAD BETWEEN SYRIAN PRIME MINISTER SALAH BITAR AND IRAQI LEADERS. SAID THE COMMUNIQUE WAS BROADCAST TODAY BY BOTH BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT RADIOS.

THE SYRIAN PREMIER AND MICHAEL AFLAK, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE SYRIAN BAAATH PARTY, HAVE NOW RETURNED TO DAMASCUS FOLLOWING THE TALKS WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT ABU SALEM AREF AND OTHER OFFICIALS, MENA REPORTED.

THE COMMUNIQUE SAID THAT IN THE BAGHDAD TALKS, SYRIAN AND IRAQI LEADERS +EXAMINED CORDIAL RELATIONS+ THE SYRIAN TWO COUNTRIES+ AND THE ARAB SITUATION +CREATED+ THE CONCERNING THE APRIL 17 TRIPARTITE UNION MANIFESTO CRISIS (MORE)

MG715A

ADD ARABS CAIRO (UPI-120) X X X MANIFESTO.+

THE APRIL 17 MANIFESTO, ISSUED IN CAIRO, GOVERNED PLACED THE PROPOSED THREE-NATION UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

BUT DISPUTES APPARENTLY BETWEEN THE BAAATH LEADERS OF SYRIA AND EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER HAVE HELD IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERATION.

IN SYRIA THE BAAATHISTS, WHO ARE THE MAIN PROPONENTS FOR AUTONOMY, HAVE GRADUALLY TAKEN OVER POWER AFTER ARRESTING OUSTING FROM KEY POSTS THE OUTRIGHT SUPPORTERS OF NASSER. THE BAAATHISTS ALSO ARE IN CONTROL IN IRAQ.

MENA REPORTED THE JOINT SYRIAN-IRAQI COMMUNIQUE DENOUNCED +LARGE-SCALE ARRESTS AND SUPPRESSION OF PROGRESSIVE POPULAR MOVEMENTS IN SOME ARAB COUNTRIES+ AS ONE OF THE FOREMOST FACTORS FACING THE ARAB WORLD.

IT SAID THE DELEGATIONS AGREED ON THE NEED TO ALIGN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS OF IRAQ, SYRIA AND THE UAR (EGYPT) WITH THOSE OF THE YEMEN AND ALGERIA.

THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO EXPRESSED THE SUPPORT OF SYRIA AND IRAQ FOR THE EAST-WEST PARTIAL NUCLEAR TEST BAN AGREEMENT SIGNED IN MOSCOW, MENA SAID.

IT SAID THAT IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT FIELD MARSHAL ABDEL HAKIM AMER HAD ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT SYRIA.

IN ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT, MENA REPORTED THAT GEN. LOUAI ATTASSI, OUSTED JULY 27 AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SYRIAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, HAS BEEN EXPELLED FROM SYRIA AND LEFT YESTERDAY FOR EXILE IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

MG723A

145

UPI-11

BEIRUT, AUG 6 (UPI)--A HIGH LEVEL SYRIAN DELEGATION, INCLUDING PREMIER SALAH BITAR AND BAAHIST PARTY LEADER MICHEL AFLAK, LEFT FOR BAGHDAD TODAY FOR TALKS WITH IRAQI LEADERS, RADIO DAMASCUS REPORTED.

THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST IRAQI-SYRIAN CONTACT SINCE EGYPT'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PROPOSED TRI-PARTITE ARAB FEDERATION LAST MONTH. THE TRIP ALSO FOLLOWED A TELEPHONE CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT BETWEEN PRESIDENT ABDUL SALAM AREF OF IRAQ AND SYRIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL PRESIDENT AMIN AL-HAFEZ.

THE BAGHDAD TALKS WERE BELIEVED AIMED AT COORDINATING THE TWO NATIONS FUTURE POLICIES IN FACE OF THE CURRENT NASSERITE PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE AGAINST THEM. THE PLANS FOR A PROPOSED GENERAL BAAHIST CONFERENCE ARE LIKELY TO BE ANOTHER TOPIC OF THE DISCUSSIONS, OBSERVERS HERE THOUGHT.

DU12:37A

MT

UPI-139

WITH SYRIA

QCFL

AY MOL

RESTARTING

UPI-139

WITH SYRIA

BY RAY MOLONEY

BEIRUT, AUG. 5 (UPI)--IRAQI AND SYRIAN BAAHIST REGIMES, ALREADY PURSUING UNITED POLICIES IN SOME CASES, ARE NOT EXPECTED TO ENTER A FORMAL BILATERAL FEDERATION NEXT MONTH AS PLANNED, OBSERVERS SAID HERE TODAY.

THE FEDERATION WAS SET UP IN THE APRIL 17 CAIRO TRIPARTITE UNIFICATION AGREEMENT WORKED OUT WITH U.A.R. PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER.

NASSER LAST MONTH, HOWEVER, DELIVERED A STINGING DENOUNCEMENT OF BAAH PARTY ELEMENTS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND SAID HE COULD NOT ALLY WITH THEM.

SYRIAN STRONGMAN GEN. AMIN HAFEZ, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND IRAQI VICE PREMIER SALEH SAADI HAVE INSISTED THE APRIL 17 AGREEMENT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED.

OBSERVERS HERE, HOWEVER, HAVE SAID THEIR STATEMENTS WERE ONLY FOR THE RECORD.

THE RECENT APPOINTMENT OF AN IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO LONDON, FOR INSTANCE, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT IRAQ DOES NOT BELIEVE UNIFICATION OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AS CALLED FOR IN THE CAIRO AGREEMENT IS LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED.

IT WAS RECALLED HERE THAT THE BAAH PARTY HAS REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT BILATERAL UNITY IS UNTHINKABLE, ON GROUNDS IT WOULD DIVIDE THE MIDDLE EAST EVEN FURTHER INTO BAAHISTS AND NASSERITES.

(MORE)

MG1018A

UPI-140

ADD UNITY BEIRUT XXX SPLIT.

IT IS FELT HERE THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC FOR A BILATERAL UNION WITH IRAQ, POSSIBLY SINCE THE LATTERS OIL WEALTH IS GREATER AND ITS INCOMPARABLY STRONGER BAAHIST PARTY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DOMINATE THE SYRIAN BAAHISTS.

IN ADDITION, THE SYRIAN ECONOMY IS AT A STANDSTILL FOLLOWING HARVEST FAILURES OF TOBACCO, COTTON AND GRAIN. IT IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY THAT IRAQ IS WILLING TO SHOULDER ANY BURDEN OF FINANCIAL AID WHICH SYRIA IS LIKELY TO NEED THE OBSERVERS SAID.

IRAQ ALSO HAS THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE BITTER CONFLICT WITH THE KURDS IN ITS NORTHERN PROVINCE. AS LONG AS THIS WAR CONTINUES IT IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY THAT IRAQ IS WILLING TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY NEW MAJOR FOREIGN ADVENTURES.

THE OBSERVERS SAID NASSER AND NASSERISM REMAIN ABOUT THE MOST POTENT FACTORS THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MAJOR QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER IRAQ AND SYRIA ARE LIKELY TO GO INTO A FEDERATION BUT WHETHER THEIR BAAHIST REGIMES ARE ABLE TO RETAIN POWER LONG ENOUGH TO EVEN CONSIDER SUCH A MOVE SERIOUSLY.

DESPITE EXECUTIONS IN SYRIA, OBSERVERS AGREE THAT NASSER RETAINS A MAJOR FOLLOWING THERE--INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE ARMY DESPITE THE OUSTER OF NASSERITE OFFICERS--AND THAT ANY SYRIAN-IRAQI UNIFICATION MOVES ISOLATING EGYPT ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO LEAD TO SERIOUS RIOTING.

SYRIAN PREMIER SALEH BITAR DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN A NEWS CONFERENCE DECLARATION WHICH SAID "UNITY IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT NASSER."

POWER PEACEFULLY REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 173/11/23 PART 1

WITH SYRIA

BY RAY MOLONEY

BEIRUT, AUG. 5 (UPI)--IRAQI AND SYRIAN BAATHIST REGIMES, ALREADY PURSUING UNITED POLICIES IN SOME CASES, ARE NOT EXPECTED TO ENTER A FORMAL BILATERAL FEDERATION NEXT MONTH AS PLANNED, OBSERVERS SAID HERE TODAY.

THE FEDERATION WAS SET UP IN THE APRIL 17 CAIRO TRIPARTITE UNIFICATION AGREEMENT WORKED OUT WITH U.A.R. PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER.

NASSER LAST MONTH, HOWEVER, DELIVERED A STINGING DENOUNCEMENT OF BAATH PARTY ELEMENTS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND SAID HE COULD NOT ALLY WITH THEM.

SYRIAN STRONGMAN GEN. AMIN HAFEZ, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND IRAQI VICE PREMIER SALEH SAADI HAVE INSISTED THE APRIL 17 AGREEMENT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED.

OBSERVERS HERE, HOWEVER, HAVE SAID THEIR STATEMENTS WERE ONLY FOR THE RECORD.

THE RECENT APPOINTMENT OF AN IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO LONDON, FOR INSTANCE, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT IRAQ DOES NOT BELIEVE UNIFICATION OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AS CALLED FOR IN THE CAIRO AGREEMENT IS LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED.

IT WAS RECALLED HERE THAT THE BAATH PARTY HAS REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT BILATERAL UNITY IS UNTHINKABLE, ON GROUNDS IT WOULD DIVIDE THE MIDDLE EAST EVEN FURTHER INTO BAATHISTS AND NASSERITES.

(MORE)

MG1018A

UPI-140

ADD UNITY BEIRUT XXX SPLIT.

IT IS FELT HERE THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC FOR A BILATERAL UNION WITH IRAQ, POSSIBLY SINCE THE LATTERS OIL WEALTH IS GREATER AND ITS INCOMPARABLY STRONGER BAATHIST PARTY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DOMINATE THE SYRIAN BAATHISTS.

IN ADDITION, THE SYRIAN ECONOMY IS AT A STANDSTILL FOLLOWING HARVEST FAILURES OF TOBACCO, COTTON AND GRAIN. IT IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY THAT IRAQ IS WILLING TO SHOULDER ANY BURDEN OF FINANCIAL AID WHICH SYRIA IS LIKELY TO NEED THE OBSERVERS SAID.

IRAQ ALSO HAS THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE BITTER CONFLICT WITH THE KURDS IN ITS NORTHERN PROVINCE. AS LONG AS THIS WAR CONTINUES IT IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY THAT IRAQ IS WILLING TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY NEW MAJOR FOREIGN ADVENTURES.

THE OBSERVERS SAID NASSER AND NASSERISM REMAIN ABOUT THE MOST POTENT FACTORS THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MAJOR QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER IRAQ AND SYRIA ARE LIKELY TO GO INTO A FEDERATION BUT WHETHER THEIR BAATHIST REGIMES ARE ABLE TO RETAIN POWER LONG ENOUGH TO EVEN CONSIDER SUCH A MOVE SERIOUSLY.

DESPITE EXECUTIONS IN SYRIA, OBSERVERS AGREE THAT NASSER RETAINS A MAJOR FOLLOWING THERE--INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE ARMY DESPITE THE OUSTER OF NASSERITE OFFICERS--AND THAT ANY SYRIAN-IRAQI UNIFICATION MOVES ISOLATING EGYPT ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO LEAD TO SERIOUS RIOTING.

SYRIAN PREMIER SALEH BITAR DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN A NEWS CONFERENCE DECLARATION WHICH SAID +UNITY IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT NASSER.+

WHETHER NASSER IS PREPARED TO ALLOW THE BAATHISTS TO RETAIN POWER PEACEFULLY REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

FREQUENT IRAQI EXECUTIONS--150 SINCE THE FEB. 8 COUP, INCLUDING 60 LAST MONTH ALONE--APPEAR TO INDICATE THE BAATHISTS ARE WELL AWARE THERE IS A STRONG OPPOSITION AGAINST THEM, OBSERVERS SAID.

MG1024A

① 173/11/23.
HE

INWARD SAVINGRAM

LJH.

I. 20375.

DATED: 30TH JULY, 1963.

FROM:

REC'D: 31ST JULY, 1963.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

SAV. 921. CONFIDENTIAL.

PASS CAIRO, TEL AVIV.

COPIES TO LONDON, U.N. NEW YORK AND OTTAWA.

YOUR MEMORANDUM 598.

KURDS IN IRAQ.

1. STATE DEPARTMENT DOUBTED 30TH JULY WHETHER RUSSIA WOULD PUSH KURDISH QUESTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND LIKEWISE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT MONGOLIA WOULD FOLLOW UP THIS ITEM IN UNGA BECAUSE ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND MOST OF THE AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES SUPPORTED IRAQ.

2. THERE HAD BEEN A LOT OF SPECULATION WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE MOTIVES OF THE RUSSIAN AND MONGOLIAN ACTIONS IN THE U.N.

A CONSENSUS OF THE VARIOUS VIEWS WAS AS FOLLOWS-

(A) RUSSIA WANTED TO GET THE PRESENT IRAQ GOVERNMENT OUT OF POWER AND WAS CREATING UNREST AS A MEANS TO THIS END.

(B) RUSSIA HOPED TO EMBARASS THE WEST, PARTICULARLY BY ALLEGATIONS THAT TURKEY AND IRAN WERE HELPING THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO SUPPRESS THE KURDS.

(C) RUSSIA WANTED TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION OF SUPPORTING "NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" PARTICULARLY, IN VIEW OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT.

(D) RUSSIA WANTED TO BUILD UP GOODWILL AMONG THE KURDS FOR FUTURE PURPOSES.

3. IT WAS THOUGHT MOST UNLIKELY THAT RUSSIA WOULD COME TO THE POINT OF BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

LIKEWISE, IT WAS THOUGHT VERY DOUBTFUL THAT RUSSIA WOULD CUT DOWN ON ITS PROGRAMME OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ.

4. THE GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST THE KURDS WAS NOT GOING WELL.

5. THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WAS WELL ENSCONCED AT THE PRESENT TIME BUT ITS ABILITY TO SURVIVE IN THE LONG TERM WAS DOUBTFUL AND THE BAATHISTS MIGHT LIVE TO REGRET THE DAY THEY BEGAN TO EXECUTE THEIR OPPONENTS.

6. IN VIEW OF THE CONFUSION LEFT AS A RESULT OF KASSIM'S RULE, IT WAS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHETHER THE BAATHISTS WOULD BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES SUCCESSFULLY AND PROVIDE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT SIMILAR TO THAT OF NASSER.

IRAQ HAD SUBSTANTIAL NATURAL RESOURCES AND ITS MAIN NEED WAS FOR TRAINED PERSONNEL, AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT CAPITAL.

..12.

① 173/11/23

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM¹, 20375.

LJH.

7. BOTH IRAQ AND SYRIA WOULD PROBABLY BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MERGING THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH SEEMED AN UNLIKELY PROSPECT.

NASSER WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT AND DIRECTED MOST OF HIS IRE AGAINST THE BAATHISTS IN SYRIA.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.

A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

1st August, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC FAS(1,2,4) S&SEA DL INT UN AMSP PACAM EAF&ME E
AFME@ INF
CAIRO TEL AVIV

UPI-158

DAMASCUS, JULY 12 (UPI)--THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY
DAY REJECTED A SOVIET WARNING TO STAY OUT OF THE IRAQI-KURDISH
FLICT AND SAID SUCH INTERVENTION HAD NOT BEEN UNDERTAKEN
BY SYRIA.

THE SYRIAN STATEMENT SAID +SYRIA REGARDS THE BARAZANI
(KURDISH) MOVEMENT AS A MUTINY AGAINST THE RULING AUTHORITIES
IN IRAQ AND A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY THERE.
SYRIA REGARDS THE HANDLING OF THIS LOCAL MOVEMENT THE SOLE
PREROGATIVE OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND THAT ANY FOREIGN
INTERVENTION WOULD THREATEN THE PEACE OF THE AREA AND INTERVENTION
OF FOREIGN POWERS IN IRAQ'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS MUST COME TO
AN END.+

THE SOVIET CHARGE WAS AIMED AT SYRIA, TURKEY AND IRAN AND
PUBLISHED TODAY IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER IN MOSCOW,
PRAVDA.

JB110P

173/11/23. ME

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA



CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 967

12th June, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Syrian/Iraqi Relations

The British Embassy, Baghdad, sent the following telegrams to the Foreign Office on 8th June:

Telegram No. 611 - Visit of Syrian Delegation.

"The main points in the joint Syrian-Iraqi communique issued on June 7 at the termination of the visit were as follows:

- (a) The two sides emphasised their determination to press on towards tripartite Federal unity to the execution of the Cairo Agreement in the spirit as well as the letter and to the holding of a plebiscite as scheduled.
- (b) They stressed the necessity of direct contacts between the revolutionary commands in Egypt, Syria and Iraq in order to facilitate the study of all questions concerning unity and to surmount any difficulties that might arise in the implementation of the Cairo Agreement.
- (c) They confirmed their belief that the adherence of the three governments to the April 17 Agreement provides a complete answer to dissident elements, Imperialism and Zionism who feared Arab unity as a threat to their illegitimate interests and who therefore try to thwart this unity. They agreed on the need to expedite the meetings of the unity committees particularly those on military affairs and the drafting of the Federal constitution.
- (d) The two parties also agreed to consult with the Government of their 'big sister', the United Arab Republic, in order to consummate their discussions.
- (e) The Syrian delegation condemned the plot uncovered on May 24 against the Iraq Government and both sides confirmed their belief that the realisation of tripartite unity would be subject to cooperation between the revolutions in the three countries. They declared that conspiracy against any Arab revolution was a plot against them all.
- (f) The two sides emphasised their determination to pursue the struggle. To liberate Palestine and other territories stolen from the Arab homeland and to support by all available means and forces, the Arab people struggling for freedom in Aden, Oman, etc.
- (g) The economic delegation had conducted talks to coordinate and expand trade and to advise on

CONFIDENTIAL..2

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

134

- 2 -

OFFICE measures to overcome difficulties surrounding the execution of the economic agreement between Iraq and Syria, in order to pave the way towards economic unity between the three countries."

Telegram No. 612

STRAND
LONDON, W.C.2

"My immediately preceding telegram.

This very verbose document seems to contain no new idea, but by reaffirming the solidarity of both governments behind the tripartite agreement of April 17 it is presumably intended to put Cairo on the spot. The communique studiously avoids anything provocative to Nasser in its wording, but makes it clear to him by implication that it is now up to him to say whether he is willing to cooperate with the two other partners as they stand. The insistence on expediting the meetings of the unity committees may be taken as a form of pressure on him to declare himself."

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Cairo and Washington.

- (a) The two sides emphasised their determination to press on towards tripartite unity to the execution of the Cairo Agreement in the spirit as well as the letter. (F.R. Dalrymple)
pleb for Senior External Affairs Representative.
- (b) They stressed the necessity of direct contacts between the revolutionary commands in Egypt, Syria and Iraq in order to facilitate the study of all questions concerning unity and to surmount any difficulties that might arise in the implementation of the Cairo Agreement.
- (c) They confirmed their belief that the adherence of the three governments to the April 17 Agreement provides a complete answer to dissident elements, Imperialism and Zionism who feared Arab unity as a threat to their illegitimate interests and who therefore try to thwart this unity. They agreed on the need to expedite the meetings of the unity committees particularly those on military affairs and the drafting of the Federal constitution.
- (d) The two parties also agreed to consult with the Government of their 'big sister', the United Arab Republic, in order to consummate their discussions.
- (e) The Syrian delegation condemned the plot uncovered on May 24 against the Iraqi Government and both sides confirmed their belief that the realisation of tripartite unity would be subject to cooperation between the revolutions in the three countries. They declared that conspiracy against any Arab revolution was a plot against them all.
- (f) The two sides emphasised their determination to pursue the struggle to liberate Palestine and other territories stolen from the Arab homeland and to support by all available means and forces the Arab people struggling for freedom in Asia, China, etc.
- (g) The economic delegation agreed to coordinate and expand the

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 967 12th June, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Syrian/Iraqi Relations

The British Embassy, Baghdad, sent the following telegrams to the Foreign Office on 8th June:

Telegram No. 611 - Visit of Syrian Delegation.

"The main points in the joint Syrian-Iraqi communique issued on June 7 at the termination of the visit were as follows:

- (a) The two sides emphasised their determination to press on towards tripartite Federal unity to the execution of the Cairo Agreement in the spirit as well as the letter and to the holding of a plebiscite as scheduled.
- (b) They stressed the necessity of direct contacts between the revolutionary commands in Egypt, Syria and Iraq in order to facilitate the study of all questions concerning unity and to surmount any difficulties that might arise in the implementation of the Cairo Agreement.
- (c) They confirmed their belief that the adherence of the three governments to the April 17 Agreement provides a complete answer to dissident elements, Imperialism and Zionism who feared Arab unity as a threat to their illegitimate interests and who therefore try to thwart this unity. They agreed on the need to expedite the meetings of the unity committees particularly those on military affairs and the drafting of the Federal constitution.
- (d) The two parties also agreed to consult with the Government of their 'big sister', the United Arab Republic, in order to consummate their discussions.
- (e) The Syrian delegation condemned the plot uncovered on May 24 against the Iraq Government and both sides confirmed their belief that the realisation of tripartite unity would be subject to cooperation between the revolutions in the three countries. They declared that conspiracy against any Arab revolution was a plot against them all.
- (f) The two sides emphasised their determination to pursue the struggle. To liberate Palestine and other territories stolen from the Arab homeland and to support by all available means and forces, the Arab people struggling for freedom in Aden, Oman, etc.
- (g) The economic delegation had conducted talks to coordinate and expand trade and to advise on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

132

measures to overcome difficulties surrounding the execution of the economic agreement between Iraq and Syria, in order to pave the way towards economic unity between the three countries."

Telegram No. 612

"My immediately preceding telegram.

This very verbose document seems to contain no new idea, but by reaffirming the solidarity of both governments behind the tripartite agreement of April 17 it is presumably intended to put Cairo on the spot. The communique studiously avoids anything provocative to Nasser in its wording, but makes it clear to him by implication that it is now up to him to say whether he is willing to cooperate with the two other partners as they stand. The insistence on expediting the meetings of the unity committees may be taken as a form of pressure on him to declare himself."

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Cairo and Washington.

(F.R. Dalrymple)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

UPI-203

173/11/23
131

TIBERIAS, ISRAEL, MAY 22 (UPI)--SYRIAN SOLDIERS OPENED
FIRE TONIGHT ON AN ISRAELI FARMERS WORKING IN THE FIELDS
THE TEL KATZIR SETTLEMENT, ISRAELI ARMY SOURCES REPORTED.
THE SOLDIERS FIRED FOR THE SECOND CONSECUTIVE DAY ON A
TRACTOR WORKING IN THE FIELDS OUTSIDE THE SETTLEMENT. THE
ARMY SOURCES SAID THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND THE SHOOTING
WAS NOT RETURNED.

ISRAEL PROTESTED THE INCIDENT TO THE U.M. ARMISTICE
COMMISSION. THE ARMY SOURCES SAID THE SYRIANS WERE BASED
AT TUALFIK ON THE SOUTHEAST PART OF THE SEA OF GALILEE.

JB147P

M.E.

NOTE FOR FILE

In February, 1958 Egypt and Syria united to form one State under the name United Arab Republic. New files were opened to cover the U.A.R. in the 214 series and the previous Egypt files (163 series) were temporarily closed. The U.A.R. ceased to exist in its original form in September, 1961, when Syria withdrew from the Union. As Egypt continued to be known as the U.A.R., all Egyptian material was filed on this series. Material relating to Syria was placed on files in the 205 series.

In April, 1963, a new United Arab Republic was formed. This was a federation of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. At this stage only material relating to the tri-partite federation was placed on the 214 (U.A.R.) series - other material relating to the constituent units being placed on Egypt (163), Iraq (173) and Syria (205).

April, 1963.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *Manchester Guardian Weekly* File No. *173/11/23*
Published at *Manchester* Date *21.2.63*

Syria, Iraq and Egypt

The Syrian Foreign Minister is reported to have offered to join in a federation with the new Government of Iraq. This political chess move is characteristically Syrian in its complexity—all the more fascinating because the overthrow of General Kassem is generally taken to be a victory of those forces that would like to overthrow the Syrian Government too. Indeed, not so many days ago a coup d'état looked

far more likely in Syria than in Iraq. One was just about due in any case. This week is the fifth anniversary of the union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic; this is a season when those Syrians who regret its dissolution get restive. Last year there was a serious army revolt in March, and there have been rumblings this year too—notably when four colonels, exiled to diplomatic posts abroad for their leadership in 1962, suddenly turned up in Damascus with new demands. Meanwhile, student disturbances have been eddying in various parts of the country in recent weeks; and just before the Iraqi revolution the Cabinet was in difficulties because most of the leading politicians in it had offered their resignations.

It is a principle of Syrian politics that when a regime feels threatened by Egypt it seeks reassurance in Iraq. The Government had already done this in General Kassem's time; last spring its leaders met him on the frontier with talk of a broad federation of Arab countries; and later there was much more talk of doing away with the Syro-Iraqi border. Visas and import controls were in fact abolished. But as usual the effort to create a Fertile Crescent did not get far.

Now, it appears, Damascus wants to move in early with another attempt. This would not only give the new rulers in Baghdad an interest in the survival of the present Syrian regime; it would also throw between President Nasser and President Aref a particularly baleful apple of discord. The Syrian Foreign Minister may think this no bad thing if the latter admires the former as warmly as he did in 1958. No doubt he is also mindful, like many other Syrians, of their reputation among Nasserists as splitters of Arab unity, and he said that he hoped the proposed federation would be the nucleus of one comprising all the Arab States. That would be excellent; Syria would then be spared (at least for a time) of the continual necessity of making a choice. But it is highly unlikely that the Iraqi coup d'état has effected such a revolution in Arab relations as to make this possible.



CONFIDENTIAL 127

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 352

19th February, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Iraq

The following are messages to the Foreign Office
on the above subject:

From Baghdad - 14th February (telegram No. 163)

"The following is best available summary of the main points made at a press conference given by Mr. Talib Hussein Al-Shabib, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on February 13.

Revolutionary Council: Mr. Shabib said that he did not know the identity of members and could not reveal it. This was Government policy and was in part due to an objection to the cult of personality.

Oil and Commercial Agreements: Mr. Shabib said that all existing concessions or commercial agreements, including those with Russia, would be honoured. Iraq welcomed foreign investments as long as the economy was not harmed and control remained in Iraqi hands. We will honour our agreements with the IPC. The question of oil and the concession areas will be reviewed. We expect friendly discussions in the near future. The status quo will be maintained during the transitional period. We will ensure the flow of oil.

Kuwait: The present regime's outlook was different from the previous regimes in that they considered all Arab countries are one. The claim that Kuwait was any part of another country was basically for the people of the two countries in question to settle and through their governments a reasonable solution would be found. Iraq belonged to Kuwait and Kuwait to Iraq. Iraq, Kuwait and Syria are all parts of the Arab nation.

Ba'ath Party: Mr. Shabib declined to comment on the extent of Ba'athist influence but he said that the party had played a leading role in the opposition to Qasim and brought about his downfall. Mr. Shabib denied that he had links with the Syrian Ba'ath party of Mr. Michel Aflaq though he sympathised with their slogan 'liberty - unity - Socialism'.

President Arif: The National Council in this transitional period is the legislative body of the country and Colonel Arif was Head of the State - the Prime Minister presided over the Cabinet.

Arab League: On the question of the League, Iraq would take a beneficial (sic) position, the foreign policy of the last regime was to separate Iraq from the Arab world and prevent her from taking her part

CONFIDENTIAL ...2

CONFIDENTIAL 126
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

in the Arab nation. Relations with the Arab League were under review like other aspects of Qasim's policy.

Communists: When they conform to the basic principles of the constitution, parties would be allowed. Some Communists tried to prevent the revolution and urged the people to oppose it. The revolution was against dictatorship not against a certain section of the people. He did not know how many Communists had been arrested.

Kurds: The bonds between the Arab and Kurdish peoples of Iraq are historical and cannot be broken. The people of Iraq have suffered under the former regime. Mr. Shabib was sure that all the aspirations of the people would be realised through the complete cooperation of the people with the Government.

The United Arab Republic: Asked if the objectives of the Egyptian and Iraqi revolutions were identical, Mr. Shabib said that the Iraqi revolution had been inspired by exploitation and despair going back fifty years. If this resembled the Egyptian revolution then it can be said that it was inspired by it. My Government is determined to establish the strongest possible relations with the UAR. Iraq would cooperate with liberated progressive Arab governments towards achieving Arab union.

Jordan and Saudi Arabia: Asked if he thought that the Governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia were working for the good of the Arab people, Mr. Shabib said that he would rather not judge the policies of other governments. The attitude of our Government towards other governments is founded on whether these governments have been chosen by the free will of the people.

Casualties: When asked how many people had been killed in the revolution, Mr. Shabib said that he did not know but he thought the number to be very small. Qasim had executed 10,000 - 5000 in Mosul alone. He said that Qasim had shot some men in the Ministry of Defence who had wished to surrender. The new Government had executed only 6 men officially and less than 8 unofficially. He also said that Qasim had held out in a shelter until 11.30 p.m.

Foreign Policy: Iraq firmly believed in a policy of non-alignment.

Internal Policy: The policy was to restore democracy and have elections. Our Socialism would involve the redistribution of wealth to ensure a decent standard of living for every citizen.

From Beirut - 12th February (Saying No. 10)

"At Cabinet meeting on February 11, Lebanese Government decided to recognise the new regime in Iraq. Karame cabled both Iraqi President and Prime Minister accordingly, wishing them success and hoping for cooperation between the two countries in their mutual interest and that of all Arabs.

Press reactions here since the coup have followed predictable course. Pro-UAR papers have been jubilant, forecasting a series of further coups in Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and declaring, apparently as a

CONFIDENTIAL
..3

- 3 -

general principle, that cooperation with the UAR is a prerequisite of internal stability. By January (sic ? February) all these papers were growing restive at Government's delay in according recognition, eight other Arab Governments having already recognised, during Independent and pro-Jordanian papers, though shedding no tears for Qasim, greeted the coup with some reserve. Their main concern is for the restoration of stability and democratic liberties; and until it becomes clear whether the new regime will (as some fear) line up with Nasser or (as all hope) steer an independent course, they suspend judgment. Communist press is hostile, attributing the coup to the machinations of Washington and Cairo. ~~After to hold a view issued by the new regime.~~

Such comment as has appeared today on announcement of Lebanese recognition is favourable. "Relations with the new Government might profitably be delayed until the

1a From Beirut - 15th February (telegram No. 131) c.

2. ~~Contacts with local business houses and banks are,~~
 "Subject of Iraq naturally came up when I took Sir G. Harrison to call on Foreign Minister yesterday. About current developments Takla did not claim special knowledge, but he said that some of the younger members of the new government were known to people here and seemed promising material. The revolution had been made in the name of Arab nationalism and socialism. It remained to be seen how these principles would be applied. After the first world war Iraq under King Feisal had been the centre of Arab nationalism, and Iraqis had continued to have their own conception of it.

Lebanon's main interest, he said, was to restore diplomatic relations at Ambassador level which had unfortunately been interrupted last year because of Kuwaiti dispute. He was hopeful about this, and thankful that the danger of joint economic pressure from Syria and Iraq had receded. Traditionally there were close links between Iraq and Lebanon, and the Lebanese Government was anxious to have good relations with Iraq as with all other Arab States."

From Damascus - 15th February (telegram No. 31)

"Following is text of official statement released here yesterday:

'Following the full support accorded to the Iraqi revolution by Arab Syria, where satisfaction is widespread at the success of the revolution of the (-) Ramadan which clarified the principles of its Arab policy after ridding itself of the dictatorship of one man and establishing a democratic Government inspired by the popular will and interest, Dr. Asad Mahasan the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that Arab Syria made it known that no obstacle exists to the establishment of a Federation with sisterly Iraq, a Federation which would form a hopeful, attractive and sound nucleus and framework for setting up a Federation comprising all Arabs in one State.' "

From Baghdad - 16th February (telegram No. 184)

"The following may be useful in answering queries from British businessmen.

Public order is being maintained and it is possible

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 124

- 4 -

to circulate fairly freely in most parts of Baghdad, although certain areas are sealed off by the authorities from time to time and there is at present a curfew in force from 11 o'clock at night until 6 o'clock in the morning. Persons arriving from abroad by air during the curfew are being safely escorted to their hotels but businessmen would probably find it more convenient to arrive when the curfew is not in force. Air travel to Basra is possible but journeys to the north are highly problematical.

In theory visas issued before February 8 are no longer valid but some have, in fact, been honoured. It would, however, be safer to hold a visa issued by the new regime.

Visits involving contacts or negotiations with the new Government might profitably be delayed until the latter have settled down, which may take some time. Contacts with local business houses and banks are, however, normal.

British subjects normally resident in Iraq could, I suggest, be given the gist of paragraphs 2 and 3 above."

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

CONFIDENTIAL

ME-123

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No: 173/11/23

Published at LONDON.

Date 15.3.63

**SYRIA OFFERS TO
JOIN WITH IRAQ**
DAMASCUS, Feb. 14.—Dr. Asad Mahassen, the Syrian Foreign Minister, announced tonight that his country was willing to set up a federation with Iraq. This federation could be a "nucleus and model for a pan-Arab federation comprising all Arab countries".
He said in a statement that the recent Iraq revolution had removed all obstacles to a Syrian-Iraq federation.—
Reuter.



CONFIDENTIAL

122

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1465. CONFIDENTIAL

21st September, 1962.



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Military Delegations from Iraq and Syria

The following are two telegrams received by the Foreign Office from Moscow and Baghdad:

15th September. From Moscow.

"Yesterday's 'Red Star' reported in one item the arrival in Moscow on September 13 of military delegations from Syria (led by General Kamal Namek) and Iraq (led by General Ali Galeb Aziz). The report does not make it clear whether they arrived together, but it gives this impression. They were both met at the airport by Marshal Zakharov and General Dagaev.

"Red Star" today reports that the delegations were received by Zakharov who afterwards gave a lunch for them. Again it is not clear whether he received them together; separate photographs show him being introduced to the Syrians and sitting round a conference table with the Iraqis. It is clear from the report, however, that the lunch was a joint affair.

It may emerge more certainly in the next few days how far these two delegations are being treated as a joint party."

17th September. From Baghdad

"Qasim normally emphasizes anything showing Iraqi-Syrian cooperation; but there has been no mention here of any special relationship between the two delegations.

General Aziz is an insignificant personality and it would be surprising if a delegation led by him had any special task or significance."

2. We are sending copies of this memo to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

Mr Phillips
Mr Sedgewick

To Sec.

28.10

Copies on 173/11/52
205/11/52.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL
121

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1478

24th September 1962

The Secretary
Department of External Affairs
Canberra

Military Delegations from Iraq & Syria

The following is the text of a telegram sent from Damascus to the Foreign Office on 18th September, 1962:-

"General Namiq Kamal was reported here to have left Damascus on September 13 with a party of senior officers to attend Soviet military manoeuvres. We have heard no suggestion that this was to be a joint visit with the Iraqis. In view of the Government's recent preoccupation to avoid too close an entanglement with Iraq we would not consider a joint visit altogether likely."

2. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

(R.N. Hamilton)
A/Senior External Affairs Representative

Aug on 205/11/52

(F) 173/11/23

CONFIDENTIAL

Sainsbury 109 31.7.62 / Mid East Econ Reports / 118

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

I.19172.

SUDAN

The 1962-63 budget estimates expenditure at £Stg.52 million and revenue at £Stg.71 million. Thirty percent of the general expenditure is earmarked for health and education. The budget also allocates £Stg.133,000 for the telephone and telegraph communications to be established with the UAR during the first phase of the construction of the Aswan High Dam.

SYRIA

A joint Syrian-Iraqi economic committee which met in Damascus from 10 to 18 June, 1962, made several important recommendations. To expand trade each country will be required to import its needs, where possible, from the other, and to coordinate industry neither country will establish industries competitive with those of the other state, or establish a new industry if the other state can satisfy the requirements of both. A special committee is to be established to supervise long-term industrial coordination. Special facilities are to be established for capital movement and the transfer of profits, and all kinds of economic activity and the free movement of persons are to be permitted, with the proviso that factories may not employ more than 15% of the nationals of the other country. The most immediate effect of the agreements is expected to be a Syrian gain of £Stg.4.5 million from Iraqi tourists, consequent on the abolition of visas.

Early in July it was reported that the Syrian Government had turned down a fresh bid by four western oil companies to exploit Syria's oilfields on a 50-50 not profit sharing basis.

In late June the Government decided to denationalise Syrian and other Arab banks nationalised under the union with the UAR. However, the state retains 25% of the shares of the Syrian banks, and 40% of those owned by nationals of other Arab states. All foreign banks operating in Syria remain nationalised.

A Yugoslav organisation has received the contract for building two bridges over the Euphrates, to cost \$2.8 million.

TUNISIA

Late in June it was reported that an ironworks is to be built in Tunisia with an initial output of 70,000 tons and 70,000 sheets annually. It will end the need to import semi-finished iron products and will serve as a basis for the growth of light industry.

At the end of July the United States announced that it had agreed to lend Tunisia up to \$100 million for a three-year economic development programme. The Agency for International Development said that the United States would support Tunisian development projects representing a total investment of \$785 million, designed to increase the country's gross national product by six percent a year. Tunisia is to provide some \$428 million from its own resources, and will raise about \$177 million from external sources other than America. The three-year programme is the start of a ten-year plan at the end of which Tunisia hopes to be able to maintain further growth with little or no outside help.

MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN & DEPT TRADE (C-M).
MIN & DEPT P.I. (C.M)
TREASURER & TREASURY.
MIN & DEPT N.D.
MIN & DEPT C & E.
P.M.'S DEPT.
P.M.'S.

7th August, 1962.

RESTRICTED

173/11/23

SEC A/SS MR LOOMES UN TA ER CONTROL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA EAF&ME E AFO ME INF DL IC.
NEW YORK(UN) OTTAWA PRETORIA ROME TEL AVIV WELLINGTON.
DAR ES SALAAM.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No. 173/11/23.

Published at LONDON.

Date 16-6-67

DEATH SENTENCE ON
SIX IRAQIS

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT
BAGHDAD, JUNE 15

Six civilians have been condemned to death by hanging by a military court here. They were found guilty of participating in the 1959 disturbances in Kirkuk. The court sentenced seven others to prison terms ranging from two to five years and acquitted two others. General Kassim, the Iraq Prime Minister, must approve the death sentences.

General Kassim today repeated his warning that: "If imperialism tries pressure or commits aggression in Syria we would check and end the aggression in a few hours." In an interview with Zaki Ahmed, owner of *Alahd Aljadeed*, General Kassim affirmed that Iraq was with Syria in prosperity and adversity, and would remain a faithful supporter of the Syrian people. He also said he is studying the question of establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

Later, addressing a Baghdad University graduation ceremony tonight, General Kassim declared: "The frontiers between Iraq and Syria will disappear shortly. The Iraq flag will fly in Iraq and the Syrian Republic flag in Syria; but the frontiers will disappear, for we are one people and one country."

Syria recently abolished visas and an Iraq economic mission is visiting Syria to discuss mutual extension of travel, residence, and employment facilities under the mutual economic cooperation agreement of last year.

ME,

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No. 173/11/23

Published at LONDON.

Date 11-6-62

IRAQ-SYRIA TALKS
ON COMMERCE

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BAGHDAD, JUNE 10

Mr. Nadhem al-Zahawi, the Iraq Minister of Commerce, left here today for Damascus, heading a delegation to the first meeting of the Iraq-Syria mixed committee formed under an economic cooperation agreement signed last November. Events in Syria during the past few months have prevented an earlier meeting of the committee, which is now to discuss the promotion of trade and other matters.

11-6-62.

118
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 595 12th April, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRASyria

The following Foreign Office telegrams are of interest:

(1) Baghdad Saving No. 4 of 3rd April

"Qasim's sole comment to date on recent events in Syria was made during the interview with 'Al Thawra' reported on April 1, in which he said: 'the recent movement in Syria is a purely internal movement. We are united in solidarity with our Syrian brethren and our relations with them are firmer and stronger than at any time: our relations will become increasingly stable with the passing of time.'

The Syrian Ambassador saw the Iraqi Foreign Minister on March 28, and Qasim on March 30. In subsequent statements he said that the March 28 movement was purely internal and involved no change in Syria's policy towards the other Arab states. His remarks echoed in general the official communique then being issued in Damascus.

Most press comment has been overtaken by events, but, in the absence of a clear official line, has been confused. The press has been unanimous in saying that it does not wish to interfere in Syrian internal affairs, while reserving the right to comment on the wider Arab implications. Attention has been drawn to the danger of imperialism profiting from the unstable situation in Syria.

Al Thawra, whose editor is close to Qasim, and Al Bayan, the organ of the National Progressive Party, were alone in commenting on the effect of events on the Iraqi/Syrian joint communique. Al Thawra on March 31 criticised the early statements of the High Command for making no specific reference to the communique, and for ignoring the call for an Arab Conference, and asked whether the leaders of the coup were for or against 'this sound trend'. On April 2, Al Bayan referred to Zahraddin's remarks approving all meetings between the liberated Arab states, which, it alleged, referred to the communique and praised these remarks as being in line with the paper's constantly expressed desire for the creation of a front comprising Iraq, Syria, and the U.A.R. But the press has carefully ignored the implied criticism of the communique contained in the reference to meetings embracing all Arab states."

(11) Damascus telegram No. 104 of 6th April

"There was a minor clash between anti and pro-Nasserites during the funeral in Damascus yesterday.

CONFIDENTIAL

112
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The pro-Nasserites are reported to have been arrested.

A bomb exploded in a main street here shortly before the curfew yesterday. Seven persons are reported injured. No sign of the lifting of the curfew yet."

(iii) Damascus telegram No. 105 of 6th April

"Four officers allegedly killed by pro-Nasser elements in Aleppo were buried with military honours yesterday; two in Aleppo and two in Damascus. April 1

Road and telephone communication restored with Aleppo where the curfew has been extended by two hours and is now 0800 to 1300. had claimed that the

A new Army Command committee has been formed representing the various branches and Regional Commands; the committee is said to be laying the foundations for stability, democracy and union with all liberated Arab States.

Borders are still closed for the entry of foreigners and we are unable to get permits for British journalists to enter."

(iv) Cairo telegram No. 218 of 7th April

"Al Ahram of today has as its main headlines and news item an inspired article on the U.A.R. attitude to current events. It is in effect a further declaration of non-involvement. and Siyassah rather surpris-

The main points are that:

- (a) The U.A.R. supported the unanimity of the Syrian people as reflected in the Homs decisions. The unanimity was the most important point about the latter. Syria-
- (b) The U.A.R. opposed the infiltration of reactionary forces into Syria, and considered it its duty to expose any such reactionary attempt. in waiting Syria more
- (c) The U.A.R. would intervene only in the event of an external threat to Syria. Apart from this, the U.A.R. was confident that the Syrian people and Army were capable of deciding the future of Syria in accordance with the national will. in the Middle East."

A 'picture of the conspiracies being hatched all round Syria' included allegations that

- (a) King Saud sought to induce the United States to send the Sixth Fleet units now in Beirut to Lattakia to forestall the Egyptians on the grounds that the demonstrations in North Syria were Communist in origin.
- (b) The Jordanian Military Attache in Beirut had spread rumours that commandos from Gaza were on their way to undertake terrorist acts in Syria.
- (c) Qasim had envisaged military intervention in Syria, following the overthrow of Qudsi. But there was

Further attempts were likely to be made by imperialist and reactionary forces but these would be frustrated. The U.A.R. was prepared to leave developments in Syria in the hands of the Syrian national will. But it would

CONFIDENTIAL...3
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

place its information at the disposal of the Syrians by every means available so that nobody might envelop the Syrian situation with a fog of obscurity, under cover of which he could strike at the Syrian people and Army."

(v) Beirut Saving No. 49 of 6th April

"Lebanese press reports on the situation are still confused and speculative, in particular over the nature of the decisions taken at the Homs meeting on April 1 and 2. According to Al Hayat (Independent) these did not include a referendum over union with Egypt, and there is consequently no obligation to hold one. Pro-U.A.R. Al Hawadith on the other hand claimed that the question of a referendum was included in the original set of resolutions, but the wording was altered from 'union with Egypt' to 'union with all liberated Arab States' after the departure of the pro-Nasserist officers from the meeting.

Comment in pro-U.A.R. papers clearly reflects their disappointment at the turn of events following the collapse of the insurrection in Aleppo. Sayyad of April 5 called for a resort to force to achieve union with Egypt. Today's Al Hawadith reported that Jordanian troops were waiting on the Syrian frontier, while Saut Al Uruba alleged that they had actually entered Syria. Two papers today made somewhat wild attempts to implicate Britain; Beirut Al Massa claimed that 'the father of Jordan's British Queen was directing operations' in Damascus, and Siyasseh rather surprisingly maintained that Col. Nahlawi and the other ring-leaders who have been exiled had sought refuge in Britain.

On the other hand independent and right wing papers are full of reports of the arrest of Nasserist sympathisers, and of the holding of anti-Nasser demonstrations in Aleppo and Damascus. l'Orient today commented that by provoking the recent uprisings in Aleppo and Homs Nasser had only succeeded in uniting Syria more solidly against him. Several papers urge the army to restore civilian government.

Al Nida (Communist) today also attacked Nasser whom it considered, together with imperialism, to be the source of all trouble in the Middle East."

(vi) Damascus telegram No. 108 of 9th April

"Curfew has been relaxed to 2200 to 0400 hours. Ports and airports are open from 0600 to 1800.

Press of April 8 and 9 carry presumably inspired predictions that a transitional civilian government will be formed very shortly and that a policy statement will soon be forthcoming, though from whom is not made clear. No mention of rule, if any, of Parliament."

(vii) Damascus telegram No. 109 of 9th April

"The situation remains confused but there seems a chance that a civilian Government may be established before long. Efforts to reconcile the military and civilian views continue, though most members of the former Government and a number of deputies remain in prison.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL¹¹⁰

- 4 -

Member of my staff visited Aleppo April 7/April 8. The city was quiet. The army and police appear to be in control with frequent armoured car patrols and many strong points. Heavy armour is on the city outskirts. Barbed wire barricades form a closed zone across the centre of the city separating the Moslem and Christian quarters. Life otherwise normal and all British subjects safe. U.A.R. Flags and most of the Nasser portraits now removed. Evidence of minor damage to shops in the centre of the town. Military and civilian casualties last week estimated at under forty.

The atmosphere remains, however, uneasy owing to fears of Moslem/Christian riots or other disturbances fomented by Nasser supporters. Pro-Nasser parachute battalion reported removed to Damascus. Aleppo political circles await Damascus' decisions with feeling of helplessness.

Homs Hama normal. Roads open and no road blocks."

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv.

(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM

AM

I.9877

2.

NASIR'S AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF SEPTEMBER 1958 REMAINS IN FORCE EXCEPT FOR MINOR REVISIONS. IT HAS NOT BEEN A MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE, ALTHOUGH ANTIREGIME ELEMENTS HAVE ALARMED THE PEASANTRY BY PREDICTING IT WOULD BE REVOKED. AZMAH'S STATEMENT INDICATED HE INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW.

OPPOSING IDEOLOGICAL FORCES

LATENT PRO-NASIR SENTIMENT, ESPECIALLY IN THE ALEPPO AREA, WAS BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE FOLLOWING THE 28 MARCH ARMY COUP, AND ITS IMPORTANCE AND STRENGTH WERE UNDERSCORED BY THE SUBSEQUENT REVOLT OF SOME ELEMENTS OF THE ALEPPO GARRISON. WORKER AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS THERE AND IN OTHER CITIES SHOWED THE EXTENT OF ASPIRATIONS FOR ARAB UNITY UNDER NASIR'S LEADERSHIP AMONG YOUNGER CIVILIAN AND ARMY ELEMENTS. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT AS TO THE WIDESPREAD DESIRE FOR SOME FORM OF ARAB UNITY IN SYRIA, BUT THE ACTUAL STRENGTH OF FORCES PUSHING FOR REUNIFICATION WITH EGYPT IS NOT KNOWN. THEIR STRENGTH MAY BE OVERESTIMATED AS A RESULT OF THEIR ADEPTNESS AT EXPRESSING THEIR FEELINGS VOCALLY AND THEIR ABILITY TO ORGANIZE MOB ACTION.

HISTORICALLY, SENTIMENT FOR UNION WITH IRAQ HAS BEEN STRONG AMONG A LARGE SEGMENT OF THE SYRIAN POPULATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE ALEPPO AREA, AND WHILE THERE IS AN AVERSION TO QASIM, HIS DEMISE AND REPLACEMENT BY AN ARAB NATIONALIST REGIME MIGHT GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THESE FORCES. THERE IS A SMALL ELEMENT WHICH LOOKS WITH FAVOR ON JORDAN'S KING HUSAYN, BUT THIS GROUP IS LOSING STRENGTH.

WITHIN THE ARAB UNITY ELEMENT, TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ARE PREVALENT: ONE THAT SEEKS FULL UNION WITH NASIR'S EGYPT, AND ANOTHER THAT DESIRES TO MAINTAIN SYRIA'S IDENTITY WITHIN AN ARAB FEDERATION. AT PRESENT THE LATTER GROUPING PROBABLY IS THE PREDOMINANT ONE. ASIDE FROM A NUMERICALLY INSIGNIFICANT INDUSTRIAL AND MERCHANT CLASS, THE FORMER OWNERS OF LARGE AGRICULTURAL ESTATES, AND THE CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT, FEW SYRIANS QUARREL WITH THE GOALS OF NASIR'S "ARAB SOCIALISM." THE STRUGGLE WILL BE CONCENTRATED ON THE PROBLEM OF WHAT FORM OF UNITY IS TO EVOLVE. IT IS THIS QUESTION THAT COULD RAISE THE SPECTER OF CIVIL WAR, SO NEARLY AWAKENED AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL.

THE SYRIAN ARMY AT THE PRESENT TIME IS DIVIDED INTO THREE IDEOLOGICAL GROUPINGS: THOSE FAVORING UNION WITH EGYPT, ANTI-NASIR CONSERVATIVE OFFICERS, AND A DOMINANT FACTION WHICH WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH NASIR SHORT OF FULL UNION. THIS MIDDLE FACTION FEARS THAT A RETURN TO UNION WOULD BRING ABOUT EGYPTIAN DOMINATION OF THE SYRIAN ARMY AND REVERSION OF SYRIA TO

(F) 173/11/23

108
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

AM

I.9877

3.

SECOND-CLASS STATUS. THE PRESENT ARMY JUNTA DERIVES
ITS BASIC SUPPORT FROM THIS FACTION.

MIN AND DEPT E.A.

30TH APRIL, 1962

SEC A/SS MR LOOMES MR ANDERSON MR PEACHEY MR MCNICOL MR BLAKENEY
MR ROWLAND MR FEAKES MR PHILLIPS MR GILMAN MR GILCHRIST
MR BRENNAN MR BORDER



CONFIDENTIAL 107

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 456

27th March, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Iraq-Syria Talks

Damascus reported on 17th March:

"The Qudsi-Qassem lasted two full days, ending on the evening of March 16. A joint communique, published simultaneously in both capitals, was the main story in all Syrian papers the following morning.

Contrary to earlier reports, the meeting in fact took place not in Syria but at Ratbe in Iraq.

The following are the main points of the joint communique:

- (a) Invitation to all Arab countries to a conference to be held within three months at a time and place to be decided by the majority. A temporary Committee, of delegates from countries accepting the proposal, should be formed within two weeks to prepare an agenda.
- (b) A military pact, including the establishment of a joint military command, should be concluded between all Arab states which so wish and which are free to do so.
- (c) An agreement for economic cooperation should be signed between Arab countries which wish to participate, on the basis of the complementary nature of the various Arab economies. An Economic Council, assisted by subordinate Committee, would supervise cooperation under the agreement. Its decisions would be binding.
- (d) A similar cultural agreement and Council is visualised.
- (e) States participating in the military pact should also coordinate their foreign policy under a joint authority whose decisions would be binding on all.
- (f) The object of the above measures is the achievement of Arab Union, taking account of the individual circumstances of each participating country.

The communique condemned ideas of a Greater Syria and the Fertile Crescent, and the 'project of the Gulf Sheikdoms' as imperialist-inspired, and designed to hinder the achievement of Arab unity.

CONFIDENTIAL ..2

According to the communique, the discussions also covered 'the danger of imperialism in general in the Arab world, and in particular British imperialism in the Arabian Gulf and the claim of Iraq to Kuwait'. Both parties agreed that the latter problem was of importance to the security of all Arab countries, including Iraq. It was in the Arab interest that the problem should be (a) solved by peaceful means, and (b) discussed at the proposed Arab Conference."

2. Damascus commented further on 19th March:

"Impression here is that this meeting is the result of a certain feeling of isolation on the part of both Syria and Iraq. The Syrians want to show that despite the break with Egypt they are still interested in Arab unity though in a form somewhat different from that represented by the Arab League which has not shown itself an effective focus of Arabism. Any training to refugees etc. the old struggle in a new form.

It does not seem very likely that this new initiative towards Arab unity will prove much more effective than past ones, even with the injection of 'Common Market' ideas. As seen from here the most to be expected is increased collaboration between Syria and Iraq with a primary reference to Palestine."

3. Beirut reported on 19th March:

4. Beirut reported further on 20th March:

"In the course of a call which I paid on the Foreign Minister on March 17 I asked him for his opinion on recent developments in the Arab World, beginning with the Syrian-Iraqi meeting at Rutbah. He attacked the event, accusing the two leaders of planning to implement."

Mr. Takla said that in a first reading of the communique there was much that he did not understand. He believed that because of reserves on the Syrian side no real progress had been made towards implementing the earlier military agreement between the two isolating countries. But the results at Rutbah seemed more than a facade to conceal cracks. He could not see what place they left for the Arab League. He asked me what I thought.

I said that there had been no time for me to learn the reactions of my colleagues in the area or to hear from you. Personally I was inclined to view the fresh development as part of the search for a new balance in the Arab World after the old balance had been upset by the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic. And personally I was doubtful about any attempts to improve the Arab League. Certainly it was in a bad way, but it was the one form of cooperation which all Arab States had been able to accept and its present difficulties seemed to me due to factors which could not be removed by new constitutions. I feared that the new alliance should result in the isolation of Lebanon.

Mr. Takla agreed that the League was in a very bad way. He had been taken aback by the latest pronouncements in Cairo, culminating in Haikal's article disclaiming a desire for cooperation. Understandably, Hassouna (of whom he spoke highly) had been very pessimistic on his recent visit to Beirut. But the League was based on a principle which for the Lebanese was essential; they would not accept the concept of binding decisions taken by a majority vote. Much depended on the attitude of the Syrians. The union with Egypt was unnatural and had not worked. But unhappily the new regime seemed unsure of itself and

CONFIDENTIAL 105

- 3 -

at a loss to know what line it should take. He hoped that the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would soon be going to Damascus (there being as you know no diplomatic representation between the two countries) and he might be able to elucidate matters.

He agreed when I suggested that it must take time for all concerned to digest the disruption of the Union.

About the new constitution in the Gaza strip he had no very clear opinion either. He recalled the earlier arguments about a Palestine "entity", which had been temporarily resolved, he said, by the acceptance at the Chitaura meeting in the summer of 1960 of the concept of a Palestine "personality". Perhaps the move by the United Arab Republic was intended to counter what the Iraqis had been doing by way of giving military training to refugees etc.: the old struggle in a new form.

Mr. Takla confirmed that Lebanese relations with Jordan had improved. King Hussein had sent President Chehab a 'fairly good' message, and this had been answered. After the abortive coup the atmosphere here had, he said, been heavy, but the Lebanon had no interest in quarrelling with any Arab country."

4. Beirut reported further on 20th March:

"The meeting at Rutbah between Qasim and Kudsi has received a mixed reception in Lebanese press. Pro-UAR papers have, of course, vehemently attacked the event, accusing the two leaders of planning to implement the Fertile Crescent scheme. Al Anwar of March 16 and Beirut Al Massa of March 18 took this line, claiming that this new project of unification had the active support of Saudi Arabia. The latter paper on March 16 maintained that the meeting aimed at isolating the UAR from the Arab world, and Saut Al Uruba on the same day called the new axis a bluff. Syria's alleged tacit recognition of Iraq's claim to Kuwait has also been the subject of attacks.

The meeting initially provoked an almost enthusiastic reaction in the majority of independent and Christian papers. The former were inclined to see in it a fresh attempt at inter-Arab cooperation; the latter a blow to Nasser's prestige. However this changed in most cases to an attitude of reserve, following the issuing of the communique, and only pro-Jordanian Ruwwad and Al Zaman, and pro-Iraqi Al Hayat have continued to welcome the agreement. Ruwwad however on March 18 regretted that King Hussein had not been invited to participate. L'Orient and An Nahar (Independent) on the other hand, on March 16 expressed concern lest the new alliance should result in the isolation of Lebanon, and the jeopardising of her independent position. Both papers maintained that Lebanese coolness towards Syria following her secession from the UAR was largely responsible for her present action in turning to Iraq for support. Al Amal (Phalange) on March 17 also emphasised the point that the most important thing for Lebanon was the preservation of her independence outside of all Arab coalitions.

In the last few days this section of the press has been concerned to bring out the implications which the


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 104

- 4 -

new axis may have for the Arab League. Al Jarida on March 17 called the meeting a knock out blow to the League, while Al Amal today claimed that the League was the correct framework within which all inter-Arab agreements should be concluded. An Nahar on March 18 emphasised Lebanon's traditional support for the League, and reported that the government were concerned at the effect which the new Syro-Iraqi agreement might have upon the competence of the latter. L'Orient on the same day called upon the States which still believed in the League, and, in particular, Lebanon, to work for the prevention of the disequilibrium which was threatening the Arab world."

5. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv.



(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 420

22nd March, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Iraq-Syrian Discussions

Baghdad reported on 17th March to the Foreign
Office as follows:

"Joint communique published today says the two
parties met on March 14 and 15 and discussed the
general Arab political situation and the problems
and difficulties confronting Arab relations. They
decided:

- (a) to invite the Arab States to attend a confer-
ence to be held within three months at a time
and place to be decided by a majority of the
States responding to the invitation;
- (b) to appoint a preparatory committee composed of
a delegate from each participating country
within two weeks of the date of the communique.

The meeting discussed the role of imperialism in
such schemes as Greater Syria, the Fertile Crescent
and the Emirates in the Persian Gulf and decided on
the need to draw the attention of Arabs to their
dangers and to the dangers of imperialism in general
and of British imperialism in the Persian Gulf in
particular. It was agreed that the problem of Kuwait
was of concern to the general safety of the Arab
countries and that it was in the interests of the
Arabs that it be solved by peaceful means.

Military, economic, cultural and political proposals
for discussion at the projected coming meeting of
Arab States were agreed upon."

2. Amman reported on 17th March:

"When I called on the Foreign Minister with Mr.
Worsley this morning, he told me that he had just
received from the Syrian Ambassador a copy of the com-
munique issued at the end of these talks. He was very
irritated by the references in it to the Fertile
Crescent and imperialist plots, and by the call for
cooperation amongst the 'liberated' Arab States, all
of which he considered were directly aimed at Jordan.

In response to his enquiries, the Syrian Ambassador
had indicated that the 'liberated' Arab countries were
those which no longer had foreign troops on their
territory and appeared to have implied that this
excluded Jordan. Nuseibeh said that he had taken the
opportunity of telling the Syrian Ambassador that in
the course of my first conversation with him after he

CONFIDENTIAL

102
CONFIDENTIAL


- 2 -

had become Foreign Minister, I had specifically explained to him that our Military Mission, which was now tiny, was here solely to help the Jordanians and would naturally be withdrawn whenever the Jordanians no longer had need of it. I told him that he had correctly represented the position, he added that he was personally convinced that the Jordanians did still require the help of our Mission and that it caused no embarrassment locally.

In a later conversation the King also referred to the matter. He said that he was sending for the Syrian Ambassador to question him about the meaning of the communique. He thought that Jordanian relations with Syria were improving, but the Syrians appeared to think these antics necessary for internal consumption without paying regard to the embarrassment they caused Jordan or to the effect they had in isolating Jordan from the rest of the Arab world. I told His Majesty that, at the time of the previous accusation about the landing of British troops in Jordan, I had tackled the Syrian Ambassador but had found him rather unreceptive; perhaps he was prone to believe them as a result of his previous incarnation as UAR Charge d'Affaires. I therefore thought it might be worth while my trying to explain the position to him in more detail. His Majesty agreed. I added that this sort of accusation was one of the reasons why we had thought that it might be better if our Mission disappeared as soon as it had served its purpose, and explained that the withdrawal of the Mission would indicate on our part no loss of interest in the future or efficiency of the Jordanian armed forces. His Majesty took the point but said that he did not think it necessary to be unduly sensitive about such accusations.

Nuseibeh also said that it looked as if the Iraqis had won the Syrians over to their side over Kuwait, but agreed with me when I suggested that it seemed that the Syrians had been careful to avoid committing themselves."

3. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv.



(R.N. Hamilton)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

ME
101

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No. 173/11/23.

Published at LONDON.

Date 20 3 62

ME

**CALL FOR ARAB
FEDERATION**

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BAGHDAD, MARCH 19.

Coming developments in Iraq-Syrian relations cast their shadows in a five-column editorial article today in the authoritative *Al Bayan*, the newspaper of the Iraq National Progressive Party. Saying that the realization of an Arab federation was now the cornerstone of the policies of Iraq and Syria, *Al Bayan* urged the United Arab Republic to co-operate to the utmost with Iraq and Syria, for repelling the dangers facing the Arab liberation movement and bringing about an Arab federation.

For the U.A.R. to look at this federation in the same way as it looked at the Hashemite federation (the union between Iraq and Jordan), before the July revolution would be contrary to truth, the newspaper said. Should the U.A.R. persist in its uncooperative attitude, the only recourse would be to proceed with establishing defence, political, economic and cultural organizations between Iraq and Syria which Dr. Nazim Kudsī, the Syrian President, and General Kassim, the Iraq Prime Minister, recently proposed.

The Kudsī-Kassim meeting, *Al Bayan* said, was held at a time when the Arab League was unable to hold even its regular meetings or carry out its responsibilities. The meeting remedied to a great extent the "weakest spot—Syria" in Arab defence against imperialism and Zionism.

ME

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS.

File No.

173/11/23

Published at B.B.C.

Date

19. 3. 62

ME/898/A/1

19. 3. 62.

100+

A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL

The Qasim-Qudsi Meeting

(a) Baghdad home service 17.00 GMT and Damascus home service 17.15 GMT 16.3.62

Text of joint communique on the Qasim-Qudsi meeting:

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. On 8th and 9th Shawwal 1381 AH, corresponding to 14th and 15th March 1962, Dr. Nazim al-Qudsi, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, met Maj-Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim, the Premier and C-in-C of the armed forces of the Iraqi Republic, in the Rutbah area. The meeting was attended by Dr. Ma'ruf ad-Dawalibi, Premier and Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, and HE Hashim Jawad, the Foreign Minister of the Iraqi Republic. The two sides were assisted by civilian and military advisers.

(1) The conferees discussed the general political situation in the Arab countries and reviewed the difficulties and obstacles impeding inter-Arab relations. They agreed that clear and candid discussion of these matters at an official level by representatives of the Arab States and the bringing of them to the attention of Arab public opinion would facilitate their solution. They also agreed that the present international situation, as well as Israel's growing danger and its persistence in carrying out its aggressive plans, necessitate speeding up the adoption of a practical national course to safeguard the supreme Arab interests.

After reviewing various methods for the solution of these problems, the conferees decided: (a) To invite the Arab States to a conference to be held within three months at a place and time decided by the majority of the Arab States responding to the invitation. (b) To set up a preparatory committee for this purpose, whose members should be appointed two weeks from the issue of this statement. To this committee will be added a representative of each Arab State which agrees to participate in the conference. The committee shall prepare for the conference, and shall draw up its agenda and submit proposals for feasible solutions to the topics on the agenda.

(2) The conferees discussed the plans propounded from time to time by certain quarters, plans such as Greater Syria and the Fertile Crescent, and the plans concerning the amirates of the Arab Gulf. They found out that all these plans are entrusted by imperialism to certain people of good will or other people harbouring certain ambitions. The sole aim of these plans is to block the true Arab march towards a union that will satisfy the hopes of the Arab peoples and realise their historical aims. The conferees found it imperative to warn the Arabs against the dangers underlying such plans, behind which imperialism takes cover, because these plans do not spring from the interests of the Arab nation.

(3) The conferees discussed the menace of imperialism in the Arab area in general and British imperialism in the Arab Gulf area in particular, as well as Iraq's right to Kuwait. The two sides agreed that this question is of importance to the general safety of the Arab countries and is associated with the very safety of Iraq, that it is in the interests of the Arabs that this question should be solved by peaceful means, and that it should be discussed on an all-Arab level at the forthcoming conference.

(4) The conferees decided to propound the following proposals for discussion at the forthcoming conference:

(A) The military field: (1) It is imperative to conclude a military agreement between the free Arab States wishing to do so, and to establish a joint general command capable of action under any circumstances. The conference should fix a near and reasonable date for the establishment of this command. (2) When the military agreement is concluded, joint committees should be set up to discuss speedy means for the gradual development of this agreement to bring about a unified military force of the signatory States. (3) The conferees believe that the conclusion of the military agreement and the establishment of a joint command would be a true expression of the free Arab States'

understanding of their responsibility for warding off imminent and future dangers Arab homeland.

(B) The economic field: (1) It is imperative to conclude an economic agreement between the Arab States wishing to do so. An economic council should be set up to supervise the implementation and development of this agreement. It will be assisted by committees whose particular task will be to co-ordinate industrialisation in the signatory countries within the potentialities and consumption needs of each State, and to study and co-ordinate the complementary economic relations between the Arab States for the purpose of the development of the economy of these States. (2) The studies of the committees should be based of the presupposition that the Arab homeland forms a self-complementary and co-ordinated economic unity. (3) The proposals of the aforementioned committees will be binding on each of the signatory States following their endorsement by the economic council.

(C) The cultural field: (1) It is imperative to conclude a cultural agreement between the Arab States wishing to do so. A higher cultural council will be set up to supervise the implementation and development of this agreement. It will be assisted by competent committees which will submit studies and proposals to this council according to the needs and circumstances of each State. (2) The proposals of these committees will be binding on each of the member States following their endorsement by the higher cultural council.

(D) The political field: Effective political machinery must be devised which will unify the foreign policy of the member States of the military agreement. Its decisions shall be binding. The machinery will also devise feasible methods to co-ordinate the foreign policy of these States and the foreign policies of the other Arab States.

(5) The conferees believe that these military, economic, cultural and political organs should clearly tackle all the topics submitted to them, in order to bring about a gradual evolutionary Arab union consistent with the circumstances and needs of each member country. The organs should make use of the experiences of the past to avoid everything that is liable to impede the attainment of arrival at this sublime aim.

(6) The conferees believe that one of the main aims of imperialism, world Zionism, and the enemies of Arabism is to cast doubt on the Arab's intentions toward each other. Imperialism finds this to be the best means of realising its ambitions and forestalling any fruitful Arab rapprochement, which the Arab nation desires for the sake of its present and future.

(7) The conferees declare that they are seeking, in their decisions and proposals, practical methods leading to the co-ordination and unification of efforts as a first step, to be followed by other steps towards the achievement of common Arab objectives and the people's welfare. These steps should not be regarded as weakening the Arab League but as a sacred duty, the achievement of which will ensure the strength of the Arabs.

(8) Finally, the conferees urge their brothers throughout the Arab countries - with hearts full of fraternity and serenity and love for the good of mankind and with full belief in God and Arabism - to place the sublime Arab interest above all other considerations so that this good and constructive invitation may be a strong factor for Arab unity and for bolstering their glory and promoting their standing. Victory comes from God. Hold fast by the covenant of God together and be not disunited. Rutbah district, 9th Shawwal 1381, corresponding to 15th March 1962.

(b) Baghdad home service 19.00 GMT 16.3.62

Text of report:

The faithful leader Abd al-Karim Qasim, Premier and C-in-C of the armed forces, arrived in Baghdad by air from Rutbah at 17.45 hours after the conclusion of the talks between His Excellency and the Syrian President Dr. Nazim al-Qudsi. The Syrian President left Rutbah this afternoon by air for Damascus.

Dr. Qudsi
of the armed forces,
and myself, in leaving
and Arabism, to thank
response to the sublime
joint productive work for
countries, with the spirit
Arab Harbours toward his
President of the Syrian A
(c) Baghdad home service 1
Precis of talk:
The joint communiqu
of all the Arab people
plots and to achieve for a
division of their ranks, which
and the enemies of the many
imperialist political
national of the Arab
council.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS.

File No.

173/11/23

B.C.

Date

19. 3. 62

ME/898/A/3

100

Dr. Qudsi sent the following cable of thanks from the air to the faithful leader Abd al-Karim Qasim: HE leader Maj-Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim, Premier and C-in-C of the armed forces, the Iraqi Republic, Baghdad: It pleases the Syrian Arab delegation and myself, in leaving after carrying out some of our Arab duties towards our two countries and Arabism, to thank you for the welcome and Arab hospitality accorded to us. Your response to the sublime objectives, which we came to feel, encourages us to carry out joint productive work for the Arab people's interest in Iraq, Syria, and in all other countries, with the spirit of fraternity, equality and mutual interest which every Arab harbours toward his Arab brother, wherever he may be. Signed: Nazim al-Qudsi, President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

(c) Baghdad home service 19.00 GMT 16.3.62

Precis of talk:

The joint communique issued after the historic meeting between the leader Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Syrian President Dr. Qudsi has truly expressed the desire of all the Arab people for action to ward off the danger of the imperialist and Zionist plots and to achieve the many gains so far missed by the Arab countries because of the division of their ranks, which has only benefited the imperialists and the covetous and the enemies of the Arab nation. The imperialist military concentrations and imperialist political plots in the military and political field and in Arab and international circles, and the Zionist exploitation of Arab divisions to achieve their criminal schemes, make the present phase through which the Arab nation is passing a most serious one. The Arab States' ability to pass the critical test of their relations can only be judged by the degree of responsible consciousness of those leading the nation.

It has been the unanimous view of sincere men that Arab problems should be settled at an official level by representatives of Arab States. News of this historic meeting has been warmly received by the Arab peoples from the Atlantic to the Gulf, since great dangers surround the Arabs and numerous imperialist schemes, such as the fertile crescent project and the Gulf Amirates projects, have achieved some of the imperialist ends, obstructed Arab solidarity, and created doubts and ill-intentions that have only benefited the imperialists and the covetous. This is what happened in the exploitation of Iraq's claim to the usurped district of Kuwait.

The Iraqi and Syrian sides admitted that the imperialist danger in the Arab Gulf region and Iraq's right to recover Kuwait are among the questions that threaten security in the Arab countries and that it is in the Arab's interest that this problem be solved peacefully at an Arab level.

The Iraqi Republic, while acquainting Arab public opinion with the outcome of the Iraqi-Syrian meeting, sincerely hopes that the invitations contained in the communique receive the support of all the Arab countries. The moves mentioned in the joint communique will secure the liberation of all Arab parts from imperialism and Zionism and from all forces opposing the Arab liberation movement.

(d) Baghdad home service 06.00 GMT (press review) 17.3.62

Text of report of the 'Al-Mustaqbal' article:

In its editorial today 'Al-Mustaqbal' comments on the joint Iraqi-Syrian communique. The paper says: It is a great step forward in combating imperialism and Zionism and reviving Arab solidarity. The paper adds: The joint communique is in harmony with the entire Arab entity in all parts of the Arab homeland, from the Syrian Republic in the north to the Arab South, and from the Iraqi Republic and the Arab Gulf in the East to the Atlantic Ocean in the West. The present joint communique deals with all matters which occupy the attention of the Arabs everywhere, including the intrigues, plots and dangerous plans and networks which imperialism continually and persistently hatches and spreads to do away with the independence of the liberated Arab countries and paralyse the nationalist liberation movements in countries still afflicted by the rule of imperialism and its agents.

The joint communique states that this question concerns the general of the Arab countries as well as the safety of Iraq, that it is in the Arab interest to solve this question peacefully, and that it must be discussed on an Arab level. It is in full agreement with the many statements which were made by the faithful Abd al-Karim Qasim and which were issued by the Iraqi Republic's Government on several occasions. The communique categorically denies that the British, the overlords of the agent shaykhs, have a right in Kuwait or in any part of the Arab world. The joint Iraqi-Syrian communique has turned over a new and a bright page in the history of true co-operation and useful solidarity between liberated Arab brethren and has ushered in a new era - the era of decisive action to repel imperialist intrigues, expose its plots, and extend aid to liberate all usurped Arab lands afflicted by imperialism, its systems and its agents. Let us not forget here the success which the Iraqi Republic has scored in establishing its clear and deep-rooted rights in the usurped district of Kuwait, which British imperialism has turned into a base violating peace, using its shaykhs as a foundation for its plots and plans against the nationalist liberation movements in the Arab Gulf.

(e) ANA in Arabic 10.30 GMT 16.3.62

Text of dispatch:

Beirut: Some Lebanese press comment today welcomed the meeting between the Syrian President and the Iraqi Premier, while other comment criticised it.

The independent paper 'Al-Hayah' said: Is Arab public opinion to be blamed for receiving with surprise the meeting between President Qudsi and Maj-Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim, when a Foreign Ministers' meeting around an Arab League table has become quite a miracle? It is natural for us, therefore, to welcome this meeting and to hope that it will be in the interest of the two brotherly countries and the general good of the Arabs. 'Al-Hayah' added: President Qudsi and Premier Qasim did not hold their meeting for appearance and formalities but for vital realities, which we hope will be manifested in the outcome.

The pro-UAR paper 'Bayrut al-Masa' said: There is no doubt that the basic purpose of the meeting was to unite the reactionary forces in Syria and the factionalist forces in Iraq, both of which are encountering a strong popular pressure that is nearly destroying them, in a new attempt to isolate Cairo, ruin its influence in the region, and crush its supporters. The paper added: We would have liked the objective of this meeting to have been the concentration of the Iraqi and Syrian forces against Israel, but this, regrettably, is the last thing the Iraqi Premier and Syrian President would think of. Their only aim has always been and still is the protection of their shaky regimes.

'Al-Amal', organ of the Lebanese Phalange Party, said that this meeting was a good precedent and calls for a similar course to be followed by all the heads of the member States of the Arab League, so that they may be frank with one another and so that each one of them may tell the others what he thinks should be done to turn over the page of the disgraceful past and to begin an era of positive construction, away from the futility of the leadership and domination complex, which brings nothing but harm.

The independent paper 'An-Nahar' said: If Beirut had responded to the Syrian capital's desire for long-term co-operation - which was advocated from the first day of the secession by faithful Lebanese who realised the importance of having Lebanon and Syria kept out of the arena of the Arab struggle for domination and influence, we would not have seen Dr. Qudsi hurrying to meet Qasim - despite the different and, in fact, conflicting regimes of their countries - in pursuit of a Syrian-Iraqi co-operation to replace the Syrian-Lebanese co-operation in the Arab balance of power.

The independent 'At-Talligraeph' said: We welcome these meetings of Arab Heads of States and leaders, because they strengthen co-operation and understanding and pave the way for the consolidation of the Arab League, which constitutes an element of strength for the Arabs as well as a centre for solving their problems and settling their disputes.

The Right
Iraqi forces at
Blow will not be
Palestine. The
the decisive battle.

The independent
the Syrian President
brotherhood, then every
true fraternity to prevail

Qasim's Speech at Peasant
Dignified home service

Text of speech by Qasim at
the Iraqi Peasants' Society

Whole life to your service
to strike imperialism
and weak

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS.

File No.

Date

173/11/23

19 3 62

ME/898/A/5

The Right-wing paper 'Ar-Ruwad' said that although we believe that the Syrian and Iraqi forces are capable of dealing a deadly blow to Israel, "we feel that such a blow will not be complete unless it is delivered jointly by the Arab States surrounding Palestine. The absence of any of these forces would mean more than simply a gap in the decisive battle."

The independent paper 'Ar-Rasid' said that if the aim of the meeting between the Syrian President and the Iraqi Premier is to bolster the Iraq and Syrian peoples' brotherhood, then every Arab everywhere hopes for the realisation of this aim and for true fraternity to prevail throughout the Arab world.

Qasim's Speech at Peasants' Conference

Daghdad home service 08.15 GMT 17.3.62 (live)

Text of speech by Qasim at the second annual conference of the General Federation of the Iraqi Peasants' Societies:

Peace be on you, you beloved citizens, peasants and workers. I devote my whole life to your service and to raising the people's standard of living. We came to strike imperialism in the heart, because it wants to divide us, exploit our resources and weaken us. We are independent and free people, born free in this land - the cradle of civilisation.

I came today to open your annual conference in the name of God and our noble peasants. We meet here today completely free in our country. Citizens and peasants are liberated from imperialism and feudalism. We are now pursuing feudalism to its last cell in our country.

I came today here very happy to meet a good class of our society, everyone, Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens and the other minorities. We smite with an iron fist whoever tries to divide us. At any rate, henceforth imperialism will never be able to set foot again in our immortal Republic. We are determined on Iraqi national unity. Thus, our Arab nation and the Islamic nation can depend on us. Let us therefore consolidate ourselves. Those who tell lies and aim at dividing people are doomed to fail.

Thanks to the unity and solidarity of our people, we were able to set up a strong, peaceful and neutral Republic. We are marching ahead to establish social justice at home. There should be no hostility or rancour among the sons of one people. Our Republic is now a strong base for liberation, resolved to revive its glories and back our Arab brethren everywhere.

Since the blessed revolution of 14th July imperialism has been trying to divide us. But we have worked and persevered. And, when it used extremist elements against us, we triumphed every time. We live as brethren and one people - Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens and other minorities. We defend our people everywhere in the Republic, in the north, south, east and west.

Brother peasants, Almighty God has given us patience, faith and strength to unite in one single force. Social justice has enabled women to attend this conference today and enjoy equal rights with the men. This is the day of freedom, independence, prestige, dignity and honour. We build our country, open roads, drill artesian wells and irrigate the agricultural land.

Almighty God has given me strength, faith and patience to work day and night in the people's interest. Imperialism has tried to destroy me before I could accomplish my work. I am with every devoted citizen, and we exploit every opportunity for the benefit of the people.

Brothers, we have removed all land taxation. Therefore the land now belongs to you and to your children. I depends on you now to till the land properly. Now that the land is yours, I request you, brother peasants, to be helpful to the poor and co-operate among yourselves. Once you help one another, poverty will be eliminated in this country. We do not want to leave a gap to enable imperialism to infiltrate again into our country.

Brothers, we work for the people. It depends on you to make use of the good land given you. The people expect mighty work from you. I told you also that if you have any problems, submit them to us in writing and we will do our best to solve them.

Brothers, those peasants among you who already own land please stand up. You see? Most of you stood up, except for a few. The few who do not yet own land, please submit your names. We will help you and solve your problems.

Brothers, I want to remind you that life is full of problems; it is not a bed of roses. These problems have to be solved gradually. Remember the past years when you were under the domination of feudalism. We are now planting a tree which will bear fruit in the future. You should therefore give your care and attention to this tree. We must live in co-operation, friendship and love. We must fight chaos. Any problems you have, submit them to your societies, and keep out of personal differences. You must be patient and not in a hurry about things. We could distribute the whole of the land within a week. But we have to work on the land and to reclaim it as well as to prepare lists. You do not want to own desert land, do you?

Brothers, listen, I told you a while ago that if anyone had a complaint, he must submit it in writing.

[There was a commotion at this point in the background. Qasim called an individual forward and asked him whether he had had land before the revolution. The peasant said no. Qasim again asked him whether the revolution had not removed land taxation. The peasant agreed. Then, said Qasim, you have no proper complaint.]

This man has benefited from agrarian reform and the removal of land taxation, things which he never had in the past. He has only personal differences with a fellow peasant.

Brothers, I am pleased to be with you today. But, as I have already told you, you must be patient and co-operate among yourselves. We should not regard personal differences as a general problem. We are working hard to reclaim land and to introduce irrigation to land which we intend to distribute later on.

[There was further commotion in the background, including a complaint about water.]

There has been a shortage of water in the area our brother peasant spoke of. Work is now proceeding to improve irrigation in the area. For instance, Darbandi Khan, which was recently completed, has improved irrigation in the area.

Brothers, as I have told you, we are dealing with several things at the same time. We are reclaiming land and fighting imperialism and the biased propaganda against us. There should be co-operation among all. I work for the interests of everyone. Whoever works with all the people, he is my brother. I am with the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmens and the minorities. I defend everyone in this Republic. I do not harbour hatred for anyone. Whoever attacks me, may God forgive him, and whoever works with me, may God help and encourage him.

Therefore, brethren, concentrate on tilling your good land, and remove any evil thoughts and hatred you may harbour against others. We are honourable and respectable people. We are doing everything in the interests of the people. We are building houses, roads, hospitals and schools for everyone.

Brother Kurds, I wish to tell you to improve the standard of your tobacco. Good tobacco is exported abroad, but poor quality tobacco remains at home. Therefore I would like to use the right kind of land for growing tobacco. This year I shall give orders that your tobacco produce is to be received, but in future years I advise you to use the land for other crops. The people do not want to live on tobacco. We want grain [cheers and poems in praise of Qasim].




OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 387

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA



Syria-Iraq

Baghdad reported to the Foreign Office on 15th March:

"All papers report that Qasim met Qudsi, the Syrian President, on the Iraq/Syrian frontier on evening of March 14. Both are described as having been accompanied by civilian and military delegations. No details have been given of matters discussed."

2. Damascus reported similarly:

"Syrian press today report a meeting on the evening of March 14 on the Syrian side of frontier between Presidents Qudsi and Qasim; the Syrian Prime Minister was present."

No account of the talks has been published but a joint communique is expected."

3. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv.

R.N. Hamilton

(R.N. Hamilton)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

*See Philip-13 sec.
not commuted*



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 387

19th March, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Syria-Iraq

Baghdad reported to the Foreign Office on 15th March:

"All papers report that Qasim met Qudsi, the Syrian President, on the Iraq/Syrian frontier on evening of March 14. Both are described as having been accompanied by civilian and military delegations. No details have been given of matters discussed."

2. Damascus reported similarly:

"Syrian press today report a meeting on the evening of March 14 on the Syrian side of frontier between Presidents Qudsi and Qasim; the Syrian Prime Minister was present."

No account of the talks has been published but a joint communique is expected."

3. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv.

(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No.

173/11/23

Published at LONDON.

Date

19 3 62

ME IRAQ ALSO PROMISES
SUPPORT

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BAGHDAD, MARCH 18

Commenting on the Israel-Syrian fighting, Hashem Jawad, the Iraq Foreign Minister, said today that Iraq considered any attack on Syria an attack on Iraq itself, and the Iraq Army was always fully prepared to respond to any Syrian call for help to crush the aggressors.

The Foreign Minister recalled Abdul Mitalah Amin, the Ambassador in Iran, after the presentation of letters of credence to the Shah by the Kuwait Ambassador—described here as the “so-called Ambassador” in view of Iraq’s claim to Kuwait. The Iraq Ambassador has also been recalled from Japan for the same reason.



J.R. Rowland, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.



With the Compliments
of
MR. E.V. VINES

Encl: Copy of telegram from Damascus
to Foreign Office No. 21.

Ref: Syrian - Iraqi talks.

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Canberra, A.C.T.

7th February, 1962.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

D.1.00 p.m. January 25, 1962.
R.3.36 p.m. January 25, 1962.

telegram No. 21 of January 25.

Beirut

completion of Syrian - Iraqi talks

Arab cooperation and elimination

ties to the principle of
foreign policy.

eliminate imperialism in
and "elsewhere" in the Arab World.

talks on military cooperation
tries.

5. report that discussions have been held towards
implementation of last November's commercial
agreement.
6. Welcome for irrigation projects in each country of
interest to both and agreement to discuss details of
them where necessary.
7. Despatch follows by bag.

Foreign Office pass Baghdad, Cairo, Beirut and Amman as
my telegrams Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 4.

(Repeated as requested)

PA

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Clarke

D.1.00 p.m. January 25, 1962.
R.3.36 p.m. January 25, 1962.

No. 21
January 25, 1962.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 21 of January 25.

Repeated for information to :

Baghdad Cairo Beirut

My telegram No. 20.

Communiqué issued on completion of Syrian - Iraqi talks

cover the following points.

1. Need for general inter-Arab cooperation and elimination of disputes.
2. Adherence of both parties to the principle of non-alignment in foreign policy.
3. Intention to try to eliminate imperialism in Palestine, Algeria and "elsewhere" in the Arab World.
4. Intention to start talks on military cooperation between the two countries.
5. Report that discussions have been held towards implementation of last November's commercial agreement.
6. Welcome for irrigation projects in each country of interest to both and agreement to discuss details of them where necessary.
7. Despatch follows by bag.

Foreign Office pass Baghdad, Cairo, Beirut and Amman as my telegrams Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 4.

(Repeated as requested)

PA

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

Mr. Clarke

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

No. 21
January 25, 1962.

D.1.00 p.m. January 25, 1962.
R.3.36 p.m. January 25, 1962.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 21 of January 25.

Repeated for information to :

Baghdad Cairo Beirut

My telegram No. 20.

Communique issued on completion of Syrian - Iraqi talks
cover the following points.

1. Need for general inter-Arab cooperation and elimination of disputes.
2. Adherence of both parties to the principle of non-alignment in foreign policy.
3. Intention to try to eliminate imperialism in Palestine, Algeria and "elsewhere" in the Arab World.
4. Intention to start talks on military cooperation between the two countries.
5. Report that discussions have been held towards implementation of last November's commercial agreement.
6. Welcome for irrigation projects in each country of interest to both and agreement to discuss details of them where necessary.
7. Despatch follows by bag.

Foreign Office pass Baghdad, Cairo, Beirut and Amman as
my telegrams Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 4.

(Repeated as requested)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No. 173/11/23.

Published at LONDON.

Date 17 3 62

**SILENCE ON SYRIAN
BORDER MEETING**

FROM OUR MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, MARCH 16

The border meeting between Syrian and Iraq leaders which began on Wednesday continued yesterday but was expected to end late today. All that is known about it so far is that it took place at a Syrian border post called Abu Shamah.

The newspapers of Iraq and Syria have so far written only generalities about the historic character of the occasion. Cairo comments have been slighting or malicious. The independent section of the Lebanese press says that it welcomes any move that might inject some reality into inter-Arab relations.

Approval and encouragement have been broadcast from Saudi Arabia, where King Saud, a week after his return from medical treatment abroad, has reorganized his Cabinet, as reported in *The Times* yesterday. In the face of hostility from Cairo, the King seems to be patching over past differences with his brother, Crown Prince Faisal, whom he has made deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister under himself as nominal Prime Minister. Shaikh Abdullah Tariki, Minister for Petroleum and Mineral Resources, has been replaced by Ahmad Zaki Yamani.

TRANSIT SLIP

File No.....

File Passed to.....

From.....

Date.....

Please tear off and return to
Records Clerk.....Section

TRANSIT SLIP

File No.....

File Passed to.....

From.....

Date.....

Please tear off and return to
Records Clerk.....Section

TRANSIT SLIP

File No.....

File passed to.....

From.....

Date.....

Please tear off and return to
Records Clerk.....Section

TRANSIT SLIP

File No.....

File Passed to.....

From.....

Date.....

Please tear off and return to
Records Clerk.....Section

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper CANBERRA TIMES.

File No.

173/11/23

Published at CANBERRA.

Date

26 1 62

Irak-Syria Defence Pact

BAGHDAD, Thursday (A.A.P.).—Iraq and Syria agreed to start negotiations for a military defence co-operation for the safety of their own and other Arab states, a joint communique said last night, American Associated Press reported.

The countries said the agreement was designed to safeguard their own security as well as "the security and liberation of the Arab world," and to "Arab absolute right to Palestine."

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS. File No.

published at B.B.C.

Date 20. 11. 61

IV - THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

11.00 GMT 3.11.61 - 14.00 GMT 4.11.61

Syrian-Iraqi Trade Agreement Both the Iraqi and the Syrian radios gave much publicity to an Iraqi-Syrian agreement on economic co-operation. The agreement (details of which will be reported in the Weekly Supplement to be published on 9th November) frees from customs duties each country's agricultural, animal, industrial and natural products with the exception of certain manufactured articles, on some of which duty is reduced. It also permits the free movement of capital and labour from one country to the other.

Baghdad radio quoted the Iraqi Trade Minister as saying that the agreement marked the initiation of Arab solidarity, which was the only way of bringing into being an "international entity" enabling the Arabs to "confront the enemies and the covetous". It later quoted the Iraqi 'Al-Akhbar' as saying that the agreement was in accordance with the principles of the Iraqi revolution and the calls made by Qasim for strengthening solidarity among the liberated Arab countries.

Baghdad radio also reported an answer given by the Syrian Minister Awad Barakat to a question about the Euphrates dam. Barakat said he thought there was no clash between Syrian and Iraqi interests here: both countries would co-operate in use of the Euphrates riverwaters.

Damascus radio quoted Awad Barakat as saying that the agreement was a "bold step" and differed from other Arab agreements in opening "wide vistas for future economic expansion", since it provided for possible amendment of the lists of dutiable articles and for periodic consultation. Its immediate effect, he said, would be a tenfold increase in trade but its remote and more important effect was in laying a sound foundation for economic co-operation; he described it as an exemplar for inter-Arab relations. The Syrian 'Sawt al-Arab', quoted on 4th November, hoped that it would lead to the establishment of an Arab common market and that it would soon be followed by similar agreements with Saudi Arabia and Jordan.



File 173/11/23 90
CONFIDENTIAL

Memo No. 1772

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

16th October, 1961

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Syria - Recognition

Reference our memorandum No. 1756 of 13th October.

2. We do not propose to furnish further details on this subject from Foreign Office material except where there may be particular interest, as with the following:

(a) Beeley reported on 12th October as follows on advance notice given to Egyptians:

"Zulficar Sabri was in his least forthcoming mood, and made no comment when I told him that we would shortly recognise the Syrian Government. He undertook however to convey the information to the President and to treat it as confidential."

(b) Stewart in Peking reported on 12th October that the People's Daily of that day printed the text of a telegram from the Chinese Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister of the Arab Syrian Republic stating that the Chinese Government had decided to give recognition to the Arab Syrian Republic, and to establish diplomatic relations and exchange diplomatic representatives with the rank of Ambassador.

(c) As received from Baghdad, dated 10th October, following is translation of text of Council of Ministers' decision to extend recognition to Syrian Arab Republic:

"Sisterly Syria and Egypt have recently passed a critical situation, during which matters were tackled wisely and patiently. This has deprived imperialism of the opportunity to interfere in the affairs of this region. It has also protected the strength of the Arab rank from rupture.

The Iraq Republic which has been liberated by the immortal July 14 Revolution and destroyed imperialism, feudalism and reaction is still continuing its march for consolidating its liberation and the freedom of its people. It has confidence in the principles of the Arab brotherhood link which ensures for the Arabs their strength and the unity of their rank; in the Moslem brotherhood link which is for the good of all Moslems; and in the national unity which ensures the strength of the people and serves the common good of all Arabs.

It is on this just basis that the Iraq Republic strives that each Arab State maintains the link of Arab brotherhood with its sister Arab States, works with them on an equal level, enjoying her liberty, sovereignty and independence; and also cooperates with them in adversity and prosperity under an atmosphere of cordiality and sincerity in working together for the destruction of imperialism and for the liberation of the usurped parts of the Arab homeland.


...2A

CONFIDENTIAL

The Iraq Republic has pleasure in seeing the Syrian Arab Republic participating with her sister states in their sincere efforts to guarantee Arab strength. Therefore, the Iraq Republic has decided to extend to her sister, the Syrian Arab Republic, full recognition of her sovereignty and independence, to enable her to be an active member in the Arab community and to work in the path of humanity and for the good of Arabs and Moslems.

It has also decided to notify this recognition to her sister. It wishes her and the Arab Nation liberty, welfare and progress."

3. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to Washington and Cairo for information.

(H. Marshall 
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *The New York Times*
Published at *New York*

File No. *173/11/23 M.E.*
Date *30.8.58*

Syria Said to Send Small Arms to Iraq

By OSGOOD CARUTHERS

Special to The New York Times

ROME, Aug. 29.—The Syrian Army is reported to be shipping large quantities of new surplus Czech-made small arms and ammunition to the revolutionary regime in neighboring Iraq.

The report comes from authoritative sources in close touch with the military in Damascus, which this correspondent recently visited.

According to these sources, the Syrians made the deal with Iraq to sell arms for oil shortly after the pro-Nasser coup brought the present regime to power in Baghdad.

It was a direct bilateral arrangement between the Iraqis and the northern region of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic, the sources said.

The Soviet Union, which only

Continued on Page 3, Column 1

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

recently has resumed relations with Iraq, was said to have had no connection with the exchange.

The Iraqis were said to have been distributing Soviet bloc weapons and ammunition to the newly formed People's Militia they have been organizing throughout the country. The weapons are reported to consist mainly of pistols, carbines and light machine guns.

The reported deal has numerous facets of political as well as military importance. It demonstrates a natural affinity between Syrians and Iraqis that could develop into an alliance even more viable than the present union of Syria and Egypt.

It gives President Nasser a foothold in Iraq through development of a need for continuing supplies of ammunition and spare parts for the newly acquired weapons.

Military observers believe it suits President Nasser's designs to try to get all the Arab countries to convert to Soviet arms, if only for standardization.

Iraq is receiving shipments of military supplies from the West after a brief interruption in that program after the revolution. But the Western arms are heavier types that can be used only by the army organization.

Shortage of Small Arms

The informants said Iraq's new revolutionary leaders had found that they were critically short of small arms and ammunition for their army and for the new militia.

The Iraqi leaders were reported to have felt that such shortages, especially of ammunition, were part of the design of the former royalist Government of Premier Nuri as-Said to try to prevent just such a military coup as the one that took place.

According to the informants, the Iraqis expressed a desire for supplies of light weapons when a top-ranking Syrian military mission went to Baghdad a few days after the revolution last July.

The mere fact of the revolution, which removed a Government that was hostile to the Nasser regime, made it possible for the Syrians to relax their guard along the Iraqi-Syrian frontier.

Soon after the revolution the Syrian desert corps, which had patrolled the frontier, was pulled back and partly demobilized, the informants said. This gave the Syrians a considerable surplus of light weapons that they were able to hand over to the Iraqis in exchange for badly needed petroleum products.

In mid-August truckloads of arms and ammunition began rolling across the desert from northeastern Syria to Iraq. When this surplus from the desert corps was exhausted, the informants said, the Syrians continued shipments direct from the port of Latakia as fast as the arms were unloaded from Soviet vessels.

Up to now there have been well-authenticated reports of big convoys of Syrian Army trucks—some containing as many as a hundred vehicles—carrying loads of small, heavy crates such as might contain arms and ammunition across

Name of Paper

The New York Times

File No

173/11/23 ME.

Published at

New York

Date

7-8-58.

NEW SYRIAN LINKS TO IRAQ PRESSED

Aide in Baghdad Discusses
Rail and Road Projects—
New Sea Outlet Pushed

By RICHARD P. HUNT
Special to The New York Times

DAMASCUS, United Arab Republic, Aug. 6—Syria is talking about new rail and road links with Iraq.

The proposals are among several development projects that are being discussed despite what appears to be a stringent shortage of hard currency because of failure of the Syrian wheat crop.

Amin Nafouri, Minister of Communications for the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic, is in Baghdad to discuss a railroad and road links between the two countries, according to reports here.

One objective appears to be improving the position of Latakia, the Syrian port on the Mediterranean, for competition with Beirut, the big Lebanese port. Beirut is the main Mediterranean outlet for Iraq, Syria and Jordan.

Mr. Nafouri is believed here to be broaching the subject of a railroad connection between Latakia and Baghdad. The rail connections between the two points now run in a big loop along the Turkish border.

Land Reclamation Projects

He is also thought to be weighing proposals for roads connecting Baghdad with Damascus, Homs and Aleppo. The last three are Syria's main cities. They are now linked with Baghdad only by caravan trails or vehicle tracks across the Syrian desert.

At the same time several Syrian ministers are in Cairo for conversations about the budget and financial problems. One of the ministers is Nuri al-Din Kahhaleh, Syrian Minister of Public Works, who said there that two huge land reclamation plans were being considered.

One is a proposal to irrigate about 1,500,000 acres in the Euphrates Valley at an estimated cost of a billion Syrian pounds (about \$250,000,000). The other would reclaim about 150,000 acres around Khubur. Its cost has not been given.

Mr. Kahhaleh also indicated one way in which Syria could hope to pay for such developments. He said oil had been discovered at one point in Syria and that explorations were under way at three others.

At home, however, Syria has been tightening her belt since the drought destroyed about half the normal wheat crop, which is reaped and exported in the spring. A system of import licenses has been imposed.

No licenses are being issued for such "luxury" items as cotton and silk fabrics, small vehicles and electrical appliances. Steps have been taken to prevent hoarding of coffee and tea.

Improvement Promised

The Ministry of Trade promises that conditions will return to normal by the end of September when Syria's summer crops will be harvested and ready for export.

with Beirut, the big Lebanese port. Beirut is the main Mediterranean outlet for Iraq, Syria and Jordan.

Mr. Nafouri is believed here to be broaching the subject of a railroad connection between Latakia and Baghdad. The rail connections between the two points now run in a big loop along the Turkish border.

Land Reclamation Projects

He is also thought to be weighing proposals for roads connecting Baghdad with Damascus, Homs and Aleppo. The last three are Syria's main cities. They are now linked with Baghdad only by caravan trails or vehicle tracks across the Syrian desert.

At the same time several Syrian ministers are in Cairo for conversations about the budget and financial problems. One of the ministers is Nuri al-Din Kabbaleh, Syrian Minister of Public Works, who said there that two huge land reclamation plans were being considered.

One is a proposal to irrigate about 1,500,000 acres in the Euphrates Valley at an estimated cost of a billion Syrian pounds (about \$280,000,000). The other would reclaim about 150,000 acres around Khubur. Its cost has not been given.

Mr. Kabbaleh also indicated one way in which Syria could hope to pay for such developments. He said oil had been discovered at one point in Syria and that explorations were under way at three others.

At home, however, Syria has been tightening her belt since the drought destroyed about half the normal wheat crop, which is reaped and exported in the spring. A system of import licenses has been imposed.

No licenses are being issued for such 'luxury' items as cotton and silk fabrics, small vehicles and electrical appliances. Steps have been taken to prevent hoarding of coffee and tea.

Improvement Promised

The Ministry of Trade promises that conditions will return to normal by the end of September when Syria's summer crops will be harvested and ready for export.

The main road from Damascus to Beirut was opened yesterday, as evidenced by the departure along it of a number of Lebanese Opposition leaders who had been staying here. The road brings Syria's gasoline and most of its other imports in from Lebanon.

Public attention was focused today on a press agency story from Tel Aviv speculating that Israel might launch a preventive attack on Jordan with a view to taking over the west bank of the Jordan River.

The influential Damascus daily newspaper Al-Rai al-Am was quick to connect this story with the visit to Paris by Mrs. Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister, and with the reinforcement of United States troops in Lebanon.

The newspaper charged that Israel had France's blessing for an attack and said the United States planned to use its forces in Lebanon to prevent the United Arab Republic from intervening.

Iraq Continues Purge

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Aug. 6 (Reuters).—Iraq's new regime has jailed about 100 persons to await investigation into their political activities prior to the July 14 revolution, it was learned today.

At the same time the new regime continues to empty senior Government offices in a wholesale purge.

Under a purge law published last week the revolutionary junta has suspended or retired 150 senior administrative officers.

Those in jail include Fadhil al-Jamali, a former Foreign Minister, and several Cabinet members of the overthrown regime of Premier Nuri as-Said.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL 85

...:VA

I. 15954

Sent: 24th October, 1957

Rec'd: 30th October, 1957.

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAV. EX441. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Australian Embassy, Washington EX379,
Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York EX159.

Syria. Iraqi Reaction.

The Iraqi Government issued a statement on 21st
October making the following points:-

- (a) Soviet allegations of the existence of a plot against Syria involving Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, the Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq were designed to create a chaotic atmosphere in the Arab world in order to further the aims of international communism there.
- (b) The Iraqi Government had not been approached and had not had any discussion on any question affecting the independence of Syria.
- (c) In view of Iraq's long-standing support of Syria, it was more likely that Iraq, rather than the Soviet Union, should have Syria's best interests at heart.
- (d) The Turkish Ambassador had reaffirmed to the Iraqi Government that Turkey had no hostile intentions against Syria.

2. According to reports of 22nd October which we have seen from the United Kingdom Embassy at Bagdad the instructions then held by the Iraqi delegation at New York were:-

- (a) To be guided by the fact that Iraq was a member both of the Bagdad Pact and of the Arab League;
- (b) to seek a solution which would be acceptable to the whole Arab Bloc and not only to its anti-Western members;
- (c) to point out that the absence of a solution to the Palestine question was a main cause of the tension in the area, which had led to the present appeal by Syria, and that a solution was becoming increasingly urgent.

In addition the Iraqi delegation had been instructed to make full use in any statement in the Assembly of the Iraqi Government declaration mentioned in paragraph 1 above. In view of Syria's

... /2.

CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/23

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

I. 15954

2.

offer of mediation, the Iraqi Government were apparently considering whether to instruct the Iraqi delegation to vote against Syria in the Assembly or to abstain. The United Kingdom Embassy were told by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs that if the Saudi Arabian, Jordanian and Lebanese representatives voted against Syria, Iraq would almost certainly do the same but if they abstained then Iraq would probably also abstain.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.

30th October, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E
AP&ME INF DL MT C&P

G

TEL AVIV WELLINGTON OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

...:MMc

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I. 15365

Dated: 15th October 1957

Rec'd: 22nd October 1957
1125

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
L O N D O N.

SAV. EX. 413. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington Ex. 355, Australian Mission to
the United Nations New York Ex. 151.

Middle East.

On 14th October we discussed with Hadow, Acting Head
of Levant Department, Foreign Office, announcement that Egypt had
sent troops to Syria.

2. Hadow said that United Kingdom authorities did not
yet have information of number of troops involved; they at
present inclined to the view that the "troops" may be instructors
required for the Syrian army. Whatever the numbers of the troops,
Hadow considered, the most important thing about their arrival in
Syria was the propaganda use to which it would be put. The Syrians
were no doubt glad to have this evidence of Egyptian support,
which would be publicized, and, at the same time, the Egyptians
were probably happy to make a conspicuous gesture of support for
Arab solidarity after being excluded for some time from the lime-
light by events in Syria.

3. Hadow considered that the most significant effect of
the publicized arrival in Syria of the Egyptian troops would be
that the Turks would now, for reasons of prestige, be unable to
withdraw their forces from the Syrian border, and their continued
presence there would permit the Syrians to maintain the pretence
that they were threatened from Turkey. Hadow implied that the
United Kingdom authorities considered that it would be better if
the Turks now withdrew, but he said specifically that the United
Kingdom had made no representations in this sense to the Turks.
He considered that such representations would be fruitless,
especially in view of the general election to be held shortly in
Turkey.

4. Hadow drew our attention to the connexion being made
in Syrian propaganda between the threat to Syria from Israel and
that from Turkey. Israel and Turkey were being represented as
allies against Syria. This he thought was a serious development:
the next step would be for Syrian propaganda to emphasize Turkey's
membership of the Baghdad Pact, to imply that the Baghdad Pact
was supporting Israel against Syria, and then it would be easy to
accuse Iraq, as a member of the Pact, of supporting Israel against
Syria.

5. On present Iraqi policy towards Syria, Hadow
commented that it appeared to represent an attempt by the Iraqi
Government to give a trial to King Saud's thesis that anti-
Communist elements in Syria were still worth supporting and that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

82

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.I.15365

other Arab Governments should accordingly not drive Syria into isolation. United Kingdom information was that King Feisal, the Crown Prince, and the Iraqi defence authorities were pessimistic about the ability or will of anti-Communists in Syria to affect developments there, and they therefore had few illusions that the Iraqi Government's present policy would meet with any success. They seemed, however, to have little alternative to offer. Hadow said that there had been no confirmation from the United Kingdom Embassy at Baghdad that the Iraqi Prime Minister was to visit Cairo. (It has been reported in the press here over the last few days that the Prime Minister will make this visit in a few weeks).

6. The aim of the Jordanian Government, according to Hadow, was to keep up the public pretence of good relations with Syria so long as the Syrians refrained from propaganda attacks on Jordan. The Jordanians would, of course, be able to make good propaganda use of the recent series of bomb explosions in Jordan as evidence of Syrian subversion, should the Syrians renew their propaganda attacks.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

22nd October, 1957.

CONFIDENTIAL

81
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

:CM

I.14635

Dated: 3rd October, 1957.

Rec'd; 9th October, 1957.
1150

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON

173.11/23.

Sey. EX395 SECRETRepeated Australian Embassy Washington EX345.
Australian Mission to United Nations, New York EX148

Iraqi Prime Minister's visit to Syria.

According to reports we have seen from the United Kingdom Embassy at Bagdad, the Iraqi press has attributed the Iraqi Prime Minister with the statement, during his recent visit to Damascus, that Iraq would rally to Syria like a brother in case of aggression. The Iraqi press has also stated that, when asked what Iraq would do if the aggressor were a Bagdad Pact power such as Turkey or the United States, the Prime Minister replied that Iraq was a member of the Arab League and a partner in the Arab collective Security Pact and would not hesitate to support any Arab country attacked from outside. The Iraqi press has also published reports that the Iraqi Minister to Syria had presented a Note from the Iraqi Prime Minister to the Syrian Government stating that any aggression against Syria, or any other Arab country, would be considered as aggression against Iraq and all Arab countries. Iraqi press comment has been to welcome these indications of improved relations with Syria and of repaired Arab unity.

2. We recently discussed these reports with the Commonwealth Relations Officer, who said that their advice from the United Kingdom Embassy at Bagdad was that all the relevant reports quoted in the Iraqi press had emanated from Syrian sources, and did not represent formal statements issued by the Iraqi Prime Minister or any shift in Iraqi foreign policy. The Embassy, as a result of its approaches on the matter to the Iraqi authorities, had gained the impression that the reports represented Syrian distortions and amplifications of remarks made by the Iraqi Prime Minister in paying the usual lip service to the ideal of Arab unity. The Iraqis specifically denied to the Embassy that any Note from the Prime Minister had lately been delivered to the Syrians by the Iraqi Minister in Damascus, although there had of course been informal messages from the Prime Minister to his Syrian hosts on his return to Bagdad.

3. The Iraqi Prime Minister recently gave to the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires at Bagdad an account of his visit to Syria. The Prime Minister said that the Syrians had told him that they had turned to the Communist bloc for arms because they feared an attack from Israel, whom the West was arming. (The Prime Minister commented that he was convinced that Syrians' fear of an Israeli attack was genuine.) The Syrians had also referred to their economic difficulties, which they said had been aggravated by the West. The Syrians stated that they were "friends of the Soviet Union, not of communism". The Prime Minister said that in justifying to him their close relations with Communist

SECRET

80
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD ²SAVINGRAM.

I.14635

countries the Syrians had made much of the support the Arabs had received from the Communist bloc against Israel. The Prime Minister commented to the Charge d'Affaires that the position of the Western powers vis a vis Israel was now surely such that they could impose a solution of the Palestine problem on Israel.

4. The Iraqi Prime Minister went on to say that he had made three points to the Syrians:-

- (a) The Turks had some justification for their alarm at the military build-up in Syria. The Syrians should remember that Turkey had a long experience of dealing with the Soviet Union and could reasonably take such precautions as that experience dictated in view of the supply of communist arms to Syria.
- (b) Syria should not expect to retain the support of other Arab countries if she became clearly under Communist domination. In this connection the Iraqi Prime Minister said that he had mentioned to the Syrians the fears of neighbouring countries that Syria was in fact being developed as a forward Communist base in the Middle East.
- (c) As a small, poor and backward country, Syria should avoid antagonizing the great powers, whose support and assistance she could hardly do without.

According to the Iraqi Prime Minister, King Saud had also made (b) and (c) above to the Syrians.

5. The Prime Minister told the United Kingdom Charge d'Affairs that while in Damascus he had attended a meeting of the Syrian Cabinet and had been impressed by the unanimity of its members and by the authority which Kuwatli possessed. He considered that this made it all the more important to give what support was possible to Kuwatli and those Syrian Ministers who were clearly non-Communist.

6. The United Kingdom Charge d'Affairs has commented to the Foreign Office that the Iraqi Prime Minister seemed to have no ideas for any further action with regard to Syria. According to the Charge d'Affaires, this impression has also been formed by his United States colleague, to whom the Iraqi Prime Minister has given a similar account of his visit to Damascus.

A/G MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE

9th October 1957

SEC A/Ss LAT(DIV.5) UN ER PAC&AM CR AM&SP S&SEA
SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME@ INF DL MT C&P
G
TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

SECRET

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.14633.

..MC

Dated: 2nd October, 1957.

Rec'd: 9th October, 1957.
1150.

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

173/11/23.
~~205~~

Savingram No. Ex.394. UNCLASSIFIED

Repeated Washington Ex.344.

Iraqi Relations with Syria

Reference our savingram No. 388, set out below is text (as reported by the United Kingdom Embassy, Bagdad) of Iraqi statement on Syrian Note:-

"Commenting on the Syrian Note, we say that Mr. Loy Henderson did not visit Iraq, nor was a senior Iraqi official from Iraq deputed to enter into official discussions with him.

It is known that Mr. Henderson was a diplomatic representative for his country in Iraq for a long time, and has many acquaintances and friends among Iraqis. Consequently if he has met with some of them or had talks with them, such an event does not necessitate the exchange of Notes between one country and another about such talks or meetings. In the American statement it is said that the envoy conveyed to his superiors "the great concern" which he found in the Middle East as a result of the infiltration of Communist propaganda. The statement does not mention that responsible personalities in any specific country had expressed to the envoy that they entertained such concern. However, the Syrian Note inferred that concern prevails among responsible personalities in Iraq, but, at the same time, admits that the Syrian Government has perceived nothing to indicate the presence of concern in the Iraqi Government. This latter perception must undoubtedly represent the conviction which the Syrian Government has really arrived at and it is a fact in so far as it concerns the Iraqi Government. There was no justification in these circumstances for sending an official Note about a state of affairs which the Syrian Government admitted, did not exist ab initio.

The Syrian Government know only too well that they are not in the habit of initiating or carrying on discussions with Iraq about the contacts and negotiations which they themselves are conducting with any foreign country.

Irrespective of the inferences to be drawn from the text of the American statement, it is very pleasing and a matter of considerable satisfaction for Iraq to receive the contents of the Note, namely that that is that Syria does not think of interfering in Iraq's private affairs nor of provoking Iraq. It is known to all that this is precisely the line which Iraq has adopted in its dealings with all Arab States - a wise line which they have made public on numerous occasions and which they intend to continue.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.14633.

The third paragraph of the Note dealt with the American statement with regard to the possibility of aggressive acts being carried out against Syria's neighbours, where reference was made in that statement to the hope that the International Communists will not push Syria to commit any act of aggression against its neighbours. The Iraqi Government at no time thought that Arab and nationalist Syria will carry out aggressive action against a sister Arab State. Iraq's policy towards the Arab States is clear and well known; Iraq adheres by Arab covenants and is always in readiness to co-operate with the Arab States against any impending danger that they might face.

Iraq, in turn, considers that basic danger to be the Zionist danger, and Iraq has repeatedly warned the Arab States about that danger.

Iraq believes the possession of arms from the Eastern bloc for legitimate self defence to be one thing but the exploitation of Arab nationalism by international Communism for its own ends, is another.

Iraq was the first to support the Egyptian Government when they bought arms from the Eastern bloc, because it believed that the strengthening of any one Arab country is strength for the entire Arab States; Iraq entertained no concern then because Egypt put a limit on Communism which it considered to be repugnant to the interests, conventions, history and religious teachings of the Arab nation. Arab nationalism was not subjected to any danger as a consequence of Egypt's arming itself from the Eastern bloc.

Iraqi Government welcomes Syrian preparedness for continuous discussions in all Arab matters, and the principle that Arab affairs are of importance to all the Arab countries and that all the Arab States must join in discussing and talking about such affairs on common Arab nationalist basis, and in the Iraqi view the Arab League was created expressly for the fulfilment of such aspirations."

A/MIN & DEPT E.A.
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE

9th October, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
EAF&ME E AF&ME@ INF DL MT C&P

G

TEL AVIV WELLINGTON UN.NEW YORK

47

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I. 14002

Sent: 27th September, 1957.
Rec'd: 30th September, 1957.

BH

FROM:

(Transmitted via leased channel)

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON

Sav 385. CONFIDENTIAL.

123/5/F.
173/11/23.

Information copy to London.

Iraq.

State Department (Newsom) gave us following on
26th September:

(1) Reports of Iraqi involvement in possible Turkish action against Syria were unfounded. Indeed, Iraqi Minister of Interior had advised the United States that the internal security situation probably could not be controlled if Iraq forces were ordered into action against Syria.

(2) The State Department had no evidence to suggest any change of Government in Iraq was in the offing. The present Government appeared disposed to take relatively conciliatory attitude in regard to relations with all Arab States. From West's point of view it was probably the best Government possible in Iraq other than the one led by Nuri said. The department had no definite information regarding future intentions of either Crown Prince or Nuri.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE

30th September, 1957.

SEC A/SS LA UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME@
INF DL MT C&P
G.
TEL AVIV UN. NEW YORK WELLINGTON OTTAWA.

*Mr. [unclear] on
return*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

MMC:ABF

Dated: 24th September, 1957.
2120.
Rec'd: 25th September, 1957.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2213. CONFIDENTIAL.

173/11/23.

Repeated Savingsgram Washington EX337.

From External.

Syria.

In response to Syrian note enquiring whether the Iraqis had expressed concern to the United States about Syrian developments, the Iraqis propose oral reply saying that since they had not expressed concern to Syrian Government or in public statements, the Syrian enquiry was out of place. The Iraqis propose to inspire broadcast comment along these lines and also that the Syrians disregarded diplomatic convention by announcing purport of the note before delivering it to the Iraqis.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

25th September, 1957.

SEC A/S. LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT C&P.
G.
TEL AVIV UN. NEW YORK WELLINGTON.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

75

INWARD CABLEGRAM

1.13106

Sent: 15th September, 1957.
1210
Rec'd: 16th September, 1957.
0830

DD/BH

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

173/11/23.

326.

RESTRICTED.

Syria.

Turkish Ambassador told me today that his government regarded Syria as "quite lost". He did not see any hope of an internal change; effective opposition leaders had either been imprisoned or had fled to Lebanon and ultimately Turkey. U.S.S.R. had bought the army. Secretary of Arab League in Paris last week his view that last November integration with Iraq, long wished by some opposition leaders and by northern Syrians should have been effected, by entry of Iraqi forces into Syria but this chance had now gone.

Stirling.

ø corrupt groups.

16th September, 1957.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.U.

SEC A/SS LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E
AF&ME@ INF DL MT C&P
G.
TEL AVIV UN. NEW YORK WASHINGTON LONDON WELLINGTON OTTAWA.

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL 74

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

:CM

INWARD SAVINGRAM. 12386

Dated: 23rd August, 1957.

Rec'd: 3rd September, 1957.
1530

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON

173/11/23.
173/11/23.

Sav. EX333 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Australian Embassy Washington EX278.

Syria.

The Following report of 21st August from the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires at Bagdad provides some useful background information about the meeting at present taking place between King Hussein, King Feisal and the Turks:-

"The Iraqi Acting-Minister for Foreign Affairs inform me that the Turkish Prime Minister saw King Feisal and the Crown Prince in Istanbul on August 19 and expressed alarm at the developments in Syria. M. Menderes then said that Turkey could do nothing about the situation in Syria but that Iraq must. Ali Muntaz said that he had consulted the Lebanese and Jordanian representatives here. Neither of them knew of any plans by their own Governments for tackling the Syrian situation, nor had any advice to offer. He himself was without ideas and he clearly discounted the possibility of an Iraqi military adventure. His conclusion is that there is nothing that Iraq can do, particularly as the Iraq Government do not wish to give the Syrians an excuse to cut the oil pipeline."

2. The Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Iraqi Prime Minister have spoken to United Kingdom and United States representatives at Bagdad on the subject of United States and United Kingdom relations with Israel at the present time. Following is the report of the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires:-

"Ali Muntaz has told the American Ambassador that he hoped that the worsening of Syrian-American relations would not impel the United States Government to do anything which could be construed as pro-Israel. This would merely enlist sympathy for the Syrians in other Arab countries. The Iraqi Prime Minister sent for me on 21st August and made a similar point. He said that he hoped that both the American Government and Her Majesty's Government would restrain the Israelis. He feared that Israeli provocation, like the occupation of the demilitarized zone about which Jordan has now complained to the Security Council, if it were not resisted by the Western countries, would encourage others in Jordan and Syria to believe that their ultimate salvation lay in friendship with the Soviet Union because the West were incapable of defending them against Israel encroachment and would thus strengthen the Syrian regime. He told me that he had spoken in similar sense to the American Ambassador."

3. The Iraqis have in addition informed the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires that they have refused the official Syrian invitation

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 73

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM. 1.12386

to attend the opening ceremony of the Damascus Trade Fair, because they did not wish to show approval of the Syrian regime in any formal way. The Foreign Office do not think that this implies that the Iraqis are not now going to participate in the Trade Fair.

A/G MIN & DEPT E A

4th September, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P
G
TEL AVIV WELLINGTON UN.NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

3/12/58

Secret

Memo.No.. 1221/57

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.



SECRET

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

16th August 1957

Iraqi-Syrian Relations

I refer to paragraphs 4 and 5 of our memorandum No. 1216 of 14th August concerning relations between Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Prime Minister received the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires in Bagdad on 13th August at the latter's request. Set out below is a summary of the report to the Foreign Office by the Charge d'Affaires on his interview: -

"The Prime Minister himself raised the question of Syria, saying that he had been on the point of sending for me to talk about it. He explained that on assuming office he had instructed the Iraqi representatives in Cairo and Damascus to assure the Egyptian and Syrian Governments that Iraq was animated by good intentions towards them and that Iraq's foreign policy was clear, being dictated by her geographical position at the eastern end of the Arab world near to the Soviet Union, and that it contained no hidden designs antagonistic to the interests of any of the other Arab countries. The Prime Minister said that his main hope in giving this assurance had been that it would bring to an end, or at least soften, Egyptian and Syrian propaganda attacks on Iraq, thereby making the task of his Government both at home and abroad more easy. His hopes had not been great and they had not, on the whole, been disappointed. He then said that he had expected to find the Egyptian Government taking a lead in antagonism to the West, friendship for the Soviet bloc and opposition to Iraq, but recent events, and particularly the visit of the Syrian Defence Minister to Moscow, made it appear that it was Syria who was making the running. This aroused in him serious misgivings as Syria lay athwart Iraq's lifelines with the Mediterranean. He had, therefore, made enquiries through the Iraqi Minister in Damascus from his personal friends in Syria (he mentioned Shukri Kuwatly, Rushdi Kekhia and Nazim Kudzi) what help the Iraq Government could give them to strengthen them vis-a-vis the present Left Wing set-up, but he had received a vague and temporising answer which was disappointing. He was going to make a further approach through Ali Mumtaz when the latter visited the Lebanon in mid-August.

His object in raising this question with me was to enquire what news we had of conditions in Syria and what we could do to strengthen friendly elements there. I replied that, in view of the severance of diplomatic relations, our information was scanty and that, as far as I was aware, we were not in contact with any of the leading politicians in Syria who had previously been friendly to us. In fact, we had regretfully come to the conclusion that our former friends in the Nationalist and Populist parties were so demoralized and disorganized that we could expect very little from them. I took the opportunity to rub in that the present Syrian Left Wing leaders were opposed to the very regimes at present existing in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and would do all they could to upset them, and that conciliatory gestures by the Iraq Government would be construed as signs of weakness. In the context of these remarks about the regime in Syria and the dangers of appearing too conciliatory to it, I gave as an example the anxiety which the Iraq Government's alleged new tendency had caused King Hussein. Ali Jaudat stoutly denied that he had been in any way conciliatory to the present Syrian Government. True, Kuwatly was his friend but he agreed that he was virtually a prisoner of the Left Wing. He said that, apart from his original declaration made with a view to reducing tension, he had done nothing which could be construed as conciliatory to the Left Wing rulers of Syria, and, indeed, his present approach to me showed that he was

SECRET

/...thinking

SECRET

SECRET

thinking on quite the opposite lines. At the same time, he did not want to irritate or provoke the Syrian rulers unnecessarily for obvious reasons.

Ali Jaudat is still inclined to view the inter-Arab politics in terms of the Queensberry Rules and is only slowly awakening to the fact that the Egyptians and the Syrians have no scruples about hitting below the belt, but it is encouraging that, of his own accord, he is coming to realize that the situation in Syria in particular is fraught with danger for Iraq, and that some means must be found to combat it.

From what the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me last night, the recent publicity concerning better relations between Syria and Iraq has come entirely from the Syrian side. The Syrians have made two approaches to the Iraq Government for an economic agreement which would allow them to sell Syrian goods in Iraq on more favourable terms. The Iraqis are studying this. News of a Syrian démarche for raising the Iraqi and Syrian missions to Embassy status is without foundation, and was given to the local representative of the Arab News Agency by the Syrian Minister here, who is anxious to receive promotion before he retires. There is likewise no question of the Iraq Prime Minister visiting Syria and the only unusual contact between the two countries is the Iraqi participation in the Damascus Fair. This was decided on in principle last year and does not appear particularly harmful. The Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan is at present in Bagdad and will doubtless return to Amman with reassuring messages to King Hussein about the Iraq Government's attitude."

2. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Washington.

S.B. Feakes
(G.B. Feakes)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

SECRET

3/12/38

Australian External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

Secret

Memo. No. 1221

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.



Iraqi-Syrian Relations

I refer to paragraphs 4 and 5 of our memorandum No. 1216 of 14th August concerning relations between Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Prime Minister received the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires in Bagdad on 13th August at the latter's request. Set out below is a summary of the report to the Foreign Office by the Charge d'Affaires on his interview: -

"The Prime Minister himself raised the question of Syria, saying that he had been on the point of wending for me to talk about it. He explained that on assuming office he had instructed the Iraqi representatives in Cairo and Damascus to assure the Egyptian and Syrian Governments that Iraq was animated by good intentions towards them and that Iraq's foreign policy was clear, being dictated by her geographical position at the eastern end of the Arab world near to the Soviet Union, and that it contained no hidden designs antagonistic to the interests of any of the other Arab countries. The Prime Minister said that his main hope in giving this assurance had been that it would bring to an end, or at least soften, Egyptian and Syrian propaganda attacks on Iraq, thereby making the task of his Government both at home and abroad more easy. His hopes had not been great and they had not, on the whole, been disappointed. He then said that he had expected to find the Egyptian Government taking a lead in antagonism to the West, friendship for the Soviet bloc and opposition to Iraq, but recent events, and particularly the visit of the Syrian Defence Minister to Moscow, made it appear that it was Syria who was making the running. This aroused in him serious misgivings as Syria lay athwart Iraq's lifelines with the Mediterranean. He had, therefore, made enquiries through the Iraqi Minister in Damascus from his personal friends in Syria (he mentioned Shukri Kuwatly, Rushdi Kekhia and Nazim Kudsi) what help the Iraq Government could give them to strengthen their vis-a-vis the present Left Wing set-up, but he had received a vague and temporising answer which was disappointing. He was going to make a further approach through Ali Muntaz when the latter visited the Lebanon in mid-August.

His object in raising this question with me was to enquire what news we had of conditions in Syria and what we could do to strengthen friendly elements there. I replied that, in view of the severance of diplomatic relations, our information was scanty and that, as far as I was aware, we were not in contact with any of the leading politicians in Syria who had previously been friendly to us. In fact, we had regretfully come to the conclusion that our former friends in the Nationalist and Populist parties were so demoralized and disorganized that we could expect very little from them. I took the opportunity to rub in that the present Syrian Left Wing leaders were opposed to the very regimes at present existing in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and would do all they could to upset them, and that conciliatory gestures by the Iraq Government would be construed as signs of weakness. In the context of these remarks about the regime in Syria and the dangers of appearing too conciliatory to it, I gave as an example the anxiety which the Iraq Government's alleged new tendency had caused King Hussein. Ali Jaudat stoutly denied that he had been in any way conciliatory to the present Syrian Government. True, Kuwatly was his friend but he agreed that he was virtually a prisoner of the Left Wing. He said that, apart from his original declaration made with a view to reducing tension, he had done nothing which could be construed as conciliatory to the Left Wing rulers of Syria, and, indeed, his present approach to me showed that he was

/...thinking **SECRET**

SECRET

SECRET

thinking on quite the opposite lines. At the same time, he did not want to irritate or provoke the Syrian rulers unnecessarily for obvious reasons.

Ali Jaudat is still inclined to view the inter-Arab politics in terms of the Queensberry Rules and is only slowly awakening to the fact that the Egyptians and the Syrians have no scruples about hitting below the belt, but it is encouraging that, of his own accord, he is coming to realise that the situation in Syria in particular is fraught with danger for Iraq, and that some means must be found to combat it.

From what the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me last night, the recent publicity concerning better relations between Syria and Iraq has come entirely from the Syrian side. The Syrians have made two approaches to the Iraq Government for an economic agreement which would allow them to sell Syrian goods in Iraq on more favourable terms. The Iraqis are studying this. News of a Syrian démarche for raising the Iraqi and Syrian missions to Embassy status is without foundation, and was given to the local representative of the Arab News Agency by the Syrian Minister here, who is anxious to receive promotion before he retires. There is likewise no question of the Iraq Prime Minister visiting Syria and the only unusual contact between the two countries is the Iraqi participation in the Damascus Fair. This was decided on in principle last year and does not appear particularly harmful. The Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan is at present in Bagdad and will doubtless return to Amman with reassuring messages to King Hussein about the Iraq Government's attitude."

2. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Washington.

G. B. FEAKES

(G.B. Feakes)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

SECRET

Confidential

Memo. No. 126/57

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Australian External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

14th August 1957

Relations between Syria, Jordan and Iraq

I refer to paragraph (c) of Washington savingram No. 166 of 6th August 1957 concerning recent exchanges between Jordan and Syria. As you will have seen matters were patched up between the two countries for a short time following the return to Amman of the Syrian Charge d'Affaires and the issue of a conciliatory statement by Jordan on 6th August. We set out below for your information a summary from recent United Kingdom telegrams of the exchanges at the beginning of August between the two countries: -

- (a) The Jordanian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for the Syrian Charge d'Affaires on 31 July and asked him to return to Damascus to tell his Government how deeply Jordan resented recent Syrian press criticism of King Hussein. The Foreign Minister told the UK Ambassador at Amman that relations with Syria were extremely bad following the press comments exchanged by both countries on Nasser's speech.
- (b) Damascus Radio alleged that the Jordanian Foreign Minister had threatened the Syrian Charge d'Affaires, who had now returned to Damascus.
- (c) On 4 August the Jordanian Government issued a statement refuting Syrian allegations that Jordan had been "subjugated by imperialism and had abandoned the objectives of Arab nationalism". The statement also described the Jordanian Foreign Minister's interview with the Syrian Charge d'Affaires (referred to in (a) above).
- (d) The Syrian Charge d'Affaires returned to Amman on 5 August and was received by the Jordanian Foreign Minister in an interview, which the Jordanian Government's statement described as "friendly". The statement went on to say: "It is expected that a new era of fraternal relations will open between Syria and Jordan and their Governments for the benefit of the Arabs and their common problems."

2. While the exchanges were proceeding the United Kingdom Ambassador at Amman was told by King Hussein that he intended to hold manoeuvres shortly near the Syrian frontier. The Ambassador replied that he thought this might simply strengthen the position of the Syrian regime by seeming to threaten Syria as a whole. The King gave a non-committal reply and the Ambassador has expressed to the Foreign Office the view, with which they agree, that he will need to exercise a restraining influence on the Jordanians should they become too openly aggressive towards Syria.

3. Meanwhile there has been a resurgence of the Syrian press and radio campaign against Jordan, in which statements have been made that the Jordanians are plotting to overthrow the Syrian Government. The Jordanian Minister for Foreign Affairs told the United Kingdom Ambassador on 13 August that the Jordanians had discovered a Syrian plot involving bomb attempts throughout Jordan. An agent of the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau living in Amman had toured the country and arranged for bombs to be planted in Jerusalem, Hebron, Ramallah Irbid and Amman. The bomb in the Hebron area had duly exploded without damage a few days previously. In Amman a bomb had exploded, also without damage, in the Moslem cemetery three nights previously. The Foreign Minister considered that the Syrian Government were trying to weaken the Jordanian regime partly for obvious political reasons and partly because they wished to distract attention from their own increasing internal difficulties. Having failed by ulterior and propaganda means, they were trying to achieve this by terrorist means designed to give the impression that a strong underground movement and a near revolutionary situation existed in Jordan. In

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

In pursuance of this object a whispering campaign had been started in Amman papers to the effect that the present Jordanian Government were out of favour with King Hussein, owing to the bomb attempts in the country, and intended to resign.

4. In a recent interview, King Hussein informed the UK Ambassador that he was disturbed by the tendency of Iraqi policy towards Syria. He understood that the Iraqi Prime Minister intended to visit Syria and there were proposals for raising the two countries' missions in status from Legations to Embassies and for a trade pact. The King asked whether the United Kingdom could not use its influence in Bagdad against this tendency in Iraqi policy. The Ambassador reported to the Foreign Office that in his view the root of Hussein's anxiety lay in the fear that, if Iraq and Saudi Arabia both adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Syria and towards Egypt, Jordan would be isolated in the Arab world.
5. Commenting on King Hussein's remarks, the UK Charge d'Affaires at Bagdad has advised the Foreign Office that it is true that the new Iraqi Prime Minister, on assuming office, had hopes of reducing friction between Syria and Iraq and that this is still very much in his mind. According to the Charge d'Affaires, Ali Jawdat recently urged the Syrians to stop their press attacks on Jordan and has been considering ways of improving Iraqi-Syrian relations. These include the possibility of negotiating an Iraqi-Syrian trade agreement and Iraqi participation in the Damascus Fair. The question of raising the two countries' missions to embassies was raised by the Syrians, but no decision has yet been reached by the Iraqis. So far as the UK Charge d'Affaires knows, there is no question of Ali Jawdat's visiting Damascus. The Charge d'Affaires also states that the Iraq Government's official advisers in the Foreign and Defence Ministries are under no illusion about the nature of the Syrian regime and are convinced of the impossibility of any genuine rapprochement with Syria. With the backing of the Palace, they have made their views known to the Prime Minister and these should be reinforced by the recent visit to Moscow of the Syrian Defence Minister. The United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires was to see the Iraqi Prime Minister on 15 August to explain to him the United Kingdom view that any conciliatory gestures made at the moment by the Iraqis towards the Syrians must embarrass the Jordanian Government.
6. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Washington.

(G.B. Peakes)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

CONFIDENTIAL

3/12/38

66

Memo.No..

262

1st March 1957

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Iraqi-Syrian Relations

You may be interested in a report we have seen from the British Ambassador, Baghdad, concerning a Note published there on the 19th February, giving the reply of the Iraqi Government to an earlier Note from the Syrian Government (which has not been published). This report is as follows: -

"In a long note published on February 19, the Iraqi Foreign Minister defended Iraq's traditional policy towards the Arab cause. The note refutes charges that Iraqi money and arms had been used to organise trouble in Syria, and denies that the Baghdad Pact had isolated Iraq, pointing to the Syrian request for aid to Jordan in November, 1956 as evidence. Now an iron curtain has been imposed on the Syrian press and radio and it was Syria who was isolated. The blowing up of the pipelines had served Zionism and Communism and caused greater loss to the Arab nation than to Iraq.

Iraq was anxious over Syrian surrender to Communism, examples of which were:

- (i) The trial of liberal Syrian leaders.
- (ii) The Moscow-inspired propaganda campaign against Iraq.
- (iii) The destruction of the pipelines.
- (iv) Syrian instigation of Iraqis to overthrow the regime in Iraq.
- (v) The ban on publishing Iraqi official statements in Syria.

The note expresses surprise that Syria had not investigated responsibility for the sabotage of the oil installations, or at least had failed to discover those responsible, when she claimed to have traced conspiracy against her to Iraq, Lebanon, Ankara, Tehran and London. As a sovereign country Syria could allow repairs to pipeline leaving the export of oil and the reopening of the Canal till the Israeli withdrawal was complete. Only 46 of 2,591 Syrians had been deported from Iraq, none of whom had been ill-treated. Iraq would open her doors to any Arab citizen respecting her laws and vital interests, and would not permit herself to be a tool of foreign purposes and ambitions."

N. GLEESON-WHITE.

(N.Gleeson-White)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

173/11/23

63

Name of Paper.....*The Times*
Published at.....*London*

File No.....
Date.....*20/11/56*

M.E.

DANGER TO IRAQ **CONCERN FOR OIL LIFELINE** **SYRIAN ASSURANCES SOUGHT** **SECURITY NEED**

From Our Correspondent

BAGHDAD, Nov. 19

The essential for any attempt to repair the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Tripoli is absolute security in Syria. This has been made plain in conversations with people close to the Iraq Petroleum Company. Clearly this opinion is also shared by the Iraq Government, which is making every effort to ensure the cooperation of the Syrian Government, in spite of the recent anti-Iraq propaganda in Syria, styled yesterday by the Iraqi Foreign Minister as "deliberate lies."

Under the best conditions complete restoration of the pipeline will take up to six months, according to well-informed circles; but given the security, it would be possible to resume some pumping within a few weeks. This would be achieved by by-passing the damaged pumping stations and using the available power from the pumps within Iraq, and possibly from the repaired station at T-2, inside the Syrian border. This would enable the flow to be resumed, at greatly reduced pressure, until full repairs could be undertaken.

Considerations of security, by the company at least, must recall the circumstances of the original attacks on the three pumping stations in Syria, of which details are now freely available here. According to accounts originating from people actually present, the work was definitely carried out by detachments of the Syrian Army. At one station the British maintenance staff were either handcuffed or chained together and led into the desert, out of sight of the station. The Syrian staff were led in another direction, also out of sight of the station. Demolition explosions followed and the Syrians were led back to the damage and to be told: "See what the British have done." In view of the handcuffing of the British staff, this is scarcely likely to have impressed the Syrians, but presumably the idea was to provide a basis for a propaganda story, if needed.

The British were taken from the stations to Homs, and were later allowed to travel to Beirut. So far as can be ascertained, in view of the strict Syrian censorship, and the Syrian Army force came to "guard" the pumping stations after the damage was complete. The Syrian Government has been vociferous in its denials that it has any part in the work of destruction, but many observers here believe the work may have been carried out by Army detachments against the Government's wishes. Be that as it may, the question not unreasonably arises, in the minds of those responsible for the pipeline, whether the Government is to-day in any position to provide greater safeguards than at the time of the original destruction.

and using the available power from the pumps within Iraq, and possibly from the repaired station at T-2, inside the Syrian border. This would enable the flow to be resumed, at greatly reduced pressure, until full repairs could be undertaken.

Considerations of security, by the company at least, must recall the circumstances of the original attacks on the three pumping stations in Syria, of which details are now freely available here. According to accounts originating from people actually present, the work was definitely carried out by detachments of the Syrian Army. At one station the British maintenance staff were either handcuffed or chained together and led into the desert, out of sight of the station. The Syrian staff were led in another direction, also out of sight of the station. Demolition explosions followed, and the Syrians were led back to the station and to be told: "See what the British have done." In view of the handcuffing of the British staff, this is scarcely likely to have impressed the Syrians, but presumably the idea was to provide a basis for a propaganda story, if needed.

The British were taken from the stations to Homs, and were later allowed to travel to Beirut. So far as can be ascertained, in view of the strict Syrian censorship, and the Syrian Army force came to "guard" the pumping stations after the damage was complete. The Syrian Government has been vociferous in its denials that it has any part in the work of destruction, but many observers here believe the work may have been carried out by Army detachments against the Government's wishes. Be that as it may, the question not unnaturally arises, in the minds of those responsible for the pipeline, whether the Government is to-day in any position to provide greater safeguards than at the time of the original destruction.

IN TWO STAGES

The early repair of the pipeline is of the utmost urgency for Iraq, whose entire economy depends on the revenue from oil. This is now cut down to the small amounts available from the fields in southern Iraq. There is little hope of any great increase from these in the near future, as all southern Iraq oil has to be tankered, and there are no extra tankers available.

The prospect of economic trouble presents itself in two stages, both of which the Iraq Government is clearly aware: loss of employment for the oilfield and pipeline staff, followed by such loss of national revenue that development work would come to a halt and thousands would be thrown out of work, either directly or through lack of work for the secondary industries. Little information is yet available about the employees in the oil industry, but it is obvious that even the wealthy oil company cannot continue indefinitely to pay staff it cannot actively employ.

Thus it is understandable that the efforts of the Iraq Government are concentrated on ensuring the opening of the pipeline. There is little doubt that this is under discussion—indeed, the whole question of relations with Syria—at the present meeting of the leaders of Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan, which was joined to-day by the Foreign Minister of Persia, Dr. Ardalan, who arrived in the Shah's private aircraft.

Apart from Iraq's anxiety about other Powers attending, part of Turkey, must be vitally interested in relations of Syria with the Soviet Union. There has been no diminution of relations here of the close association between Syria and the Soviet block, and a pro-Russian Syria is bound to be "a knife at Turkey's back."

PROPAGANDA POINTER

Although the Iraq Government is trying to reach an amicable settlement with Syria, there are influential persons here who maintain there will be no security for Iraq's oil lifeline unless Iraq is directly able to protect it. These sources argue that if the Communists wanted to bring chaos to the most prosperous and stable country in the Middle East, the sure way to do it would be to make certain that oil did not flow again through Syria. They claim that the recent propaganda against Iraq may be a sign that something of this nature is intended. If this is so, they argue, Iraq cannot afford to stand by and see her economy strangled.

There is no indication that this is a present the viewpoint of the Iraq Government, but that it realizes the seriousness of the potential threat is fully apparent.

173/11/23
64

A.B.C. NEWS : TUESDAY, 27th NOVEMBER.

An assertion that Britain would never leave the Suez Canal area unconditionally was made last night by the British Minister of Education, Mr. Eccles. He said British troops would stay until the Suez Canal was cleared and placed under international control. Britain's other conditions for withdrawing, he said, were that steps be taken to prevent any part of the Middle East becoming a Soviet satellite, that the Arab-Israeli differences were settled, and that living standards in the Middle East were raised. Questioned by reporters, Mr. Eccles said that Britain would withdraw from Egypt if she were able to hand over to an effective UN force which would remain in Egypt until all these conditions were met. But to help attain this the full weight of America's matchless power would be needed. He said events had shown that America must come into the Middle East politically and militarily as well as commercially, because if the Americans stayed out the Russians would move in.

Bitter attacks on American policy were contained in leading conservative newspapers in Britain. The Rothermere and Beaverbrook groups have adopted an anti-American line. The "Evening News" in a despatch from New York quotes British diplomats there as saying that Eisenhower no longer cares to associate with Britain until British troops leave Egypt. The despatch alleges that Eisenhower twice snubbed Casey last week when he tried to see him to put the British point of view. Britain and France are regarded as criminals while Australia is seen as an accessory after the fact. The despatch says Eisenhower now believes that Britain is washed up in the Middle East while the U.S. emerges as a great moral power. The New York "Herald-Tribune" says that Eisenhower is doing all he can to restore Nasser to a position of commanding leadership in the Arab world. This it says is one of the most remarkable of recent somersaults in American foreign policy.

There are reports of increasing tension between Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Government yesterday sent a note to Syria warning against its hostile policy towards Iraq. Iraq would defend its sovereignty and dignity by all power within its means. Syria's attitude had become inconsistent with the requirements of good relations. It complained of Syrian propaganda hostile to Iraq, the sabotage in Syria of oil pipe lines from Iraq and the crossing of armed bands from Syria to commit acts of violence in Iraq. Syria recently accused Iraq of smuggling arms and money into Syria for an attempted overthrow of the government. In Washington the Iraqi ambassador has appealed to the U.S. to send urgently supplies of arms including aircraft to help Iraq defend herself. The British Government announced at the weekend that it has received reports of heavy Soviet arms shipments to Syria including the latest jet planes and tanks.

1.30: The Communist Hungarian government gave indications last night that it was adopting a tougher policy towards the striking workers. A few hours ago Mr. Kadar made a special broadcast to the Hungarian people ordering workers to return to their jobs and threatening severe punishment for what he called counter revolutionaries.

F 21

3/12/38



173/11/23
AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.

CANBERRA LONDON, W.C.2.

1st March 1957

Memo.No. 262/57

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Iraqi-Syrian Relations

You may be interested in a report we have seen from the British Ambassador, Baghdad, concerning a Note published there on the 19th February, giving the reply of the Iraqi Government to an earlier Note from the Syrian Government (which has not been published). This report is as follows: -

"In a long note published on February 19, the Iraqi Foreign Minister defended Iraq's traditional policy towards the Arab cause. The note refutes charges that Iraqi money and arms had been used to organise trouble in Syria, and denies that the Baghdad Pact had isolated Iraq, pointing to the Syrian request for aid to Jordan in November, 1956 as evidence. Now an iron curtain has been imposed on the Syrian press and radio and it was Syria who was isolated. The blowing up of the pipelines had served Zionism and Communism and caused greater loss to the Arab nation than to Iraq.

Iraq was anxious over Syrian surrender to Communism, examples of which were:

- (i) The trial of liberal Syrian leaders.
- (ii) The Moscow-inspired propaganda campaign against Iraq.
- (iii) The destruction of the pipelines.
- (iv) Syrian instigation of Iraqis to overthrow the regime in Iraq.
- (v) The ban on publishing Iraqi official statements in Syria.

The note expresses surprise that Syria had not investigated responsibility for the sabotage of the oil installations, or at least had failed to discover those responsible, when she claimed to have traced conspiracy against her to Iraq, Lebanon, Ankara, Tehran and London. As a sovereign country Syria could allow repairs to pipeline leaving the export of oil and the reopening of the Canal till the Israeli withdrawal was complete. Only 46 of 2,591 Syrians had been deported from Iraq, none of whom had been ill-treated. Iraq would open her doors to any Arab citizen respecting her laws and vital interests, and would not permit herself to be a tool of foreign purposes and ambitions."

N. Gleeson-White
(N. Gleeson-White)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper.....

*The Times
London*

File No.....

173/11/23

62

Published at.....

Date.....

2nd May 1956

**FURTHER TALKS ON
JORDAN WATERS**

**MR. HAMMARSKJÖLD IN
DAMASCUS TO-DAY**

DAMASCUS, May 1.—The Syrians announced to-day that Mr. Hammarskjöld will, at their request, return for further talks on Arab-Israel tension to-morrow, because of the seriousness of the Jordan River question.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman said Syria was insisting on an Israel pledge not to divert the Jordan waters, in return for Syrian agreement to the cease-fire undertaking proposed by Mr. Hammarskjöld.

Lebanese Government sources here said Mr. Hammarskjöld might be asked to visit Beirut again before leaving for Rome to draft his final report to the Security Council.

IRAQ OFFER ACCEPTED

The Syrian Prime Minister, Said Ghazzi, announced to-day that his Government has accepted an Iraq offer of military aid, if Syria should be attacked. He said acceptance of aid from Iraq had been approved by the joint Syrian-Egyptian military command set up recently. The command had insisted that any aid sent by Iraq should consist of effective forces, not token units, and that the Iraqi troops should operate under the Syrian-Egyptian joint command.

Said Ghazzi said the Iraq offer was a result of the raid by Israel on Syrian territory in the area of Lake Tiberias last December.—*Reuter*.

AF.ME.

173/11/23

61

TAWFIQ AL-SUWAIDI'S VISIT TO DAMASCUS

Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, a former Iraqi Premier, arrived in Damascus on 19th May for "a private visit". Next morning Sharq al-Adna cited an official Iraqi source in Damascus for the information that Tawfiq al-Suwaidi would ask Syria to summon all the Arab States to hold discussions on the tripartite pact and that he would propose that no Arab country should be excluded from the pact; Iraq considered the Arab collective security pact the best means of Arab defence and was prepared to agree to its amendment.

On 20th May Damascus reported that Tawfiq al-Suwaidi had discussed the Arab situation with the Syrian Premier and the Foreign Minister (Damascus 19.15, 20.5.55). The following day ANA said Sabri al-Asali had informed the press that Tawfiq al-Suwaidi had told him that Iraq was prepared if necessary to discuss revision of the Arab League Charter and the collective security pact, that Suwaidi had made no proposals, and that he (the Syrian Premier) had not given him a copy of the Arab tripartite pact.

Cairo radio, reporting on 22nd May that Suwaidi was going on to Beirut, said he was going there to discuss the "failure" of his talks with Syrian leaders on amending the Arab League Charter.

Arriving in Beirut on 23rd May, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi told ANA that he had informed the Syrian authorities to the following effect:

Iraq believed the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi agreement to be an unnecessary, hostile agreement, that the Iraqi Government was prepared to propose a revision of the Arab League Charter and the collective security pact, provided that the proposed tripartite pact was not signed. He had not submitted any specific proposals to the Syrian Government, but had acquainted it with Iraq's insistence that the tripartite pact would be of no avail; he had concluded from his contacts with non-official Syrian personages that the proposed agreement had not met with the enthusiasm displayed by the Syrian authorities.

An ANA dispatch of 24th May reported Tawfiq al-Suwaidi as saying in Beirut that union between Syria and Iraq was inevitable, that he thought the Syrians themselves would strive to bring it about, that Syria would not sign the Egyptian-Saudi agreement, that this agreement would divide the Arab States into two, thus benefiting only Israel, and that within 10 years the Iraqi army would be one of the strongest in the Middle East.

On 24th May Damascus radio broadcast the following statement issued by Sabri al-Asali and Khalid al-Azm after being asked about reports, published in Lebanese newspapers and by agencies, which quoted Tawfiq al-Suwaidi.

We do not believe that Tawfiq al-Suwaidi could make statements expressing doubt that Syria is going ahead with the policy of reaching agreement on the signing of the new Arab pact. Syrian Government officials with whom he conferred in Damascus affirmed to him that the Government had unanimously approved the policy of completing the Arab pact, because it constitutes the means of serving the Arab national cause and the adoption of practical measures against the Israeli danger. We confirm that we are proceeding with the policy of completing the discussions, the conclusion of which will lead to the signing of the Arab pact. We shall not deviate from this policy. We declare that the policy which we pursue for achieving complete Arab unity is the only earnest policy which will lead the Arab nation to its national objectives. Any other policy will result in dividing the Arabs and diverting their attention from Israel, the real and chief enemy of the Arab nation.

Damascus broadcast on 25th May statements by Tawfiq al-Suwaidi denying 'Al-Jarida' reports of his statement in Beirut.

SYRIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Tawfiq al-Suwaiddi's visit to Damascus See next page.

Demarche to the Lebanon on anti-Syrian press campaigns According to a Cairo broadcast of 20th May, informed sources in Damascus said the Syrian Government had requested the Lebanese Government to take steps to stop libellous campaigns against Syria being run by certain Lebanese newspapers and promoted by supporters of the Qawmi al-Suri Party. (Cairo 18.30, 20.5.55)

Officials dismissed for Qawmi al-Suri membership The Syrian Ministry of Interior issued an order dismissing five officers of the security forces for their affiliation with the Qawmi al-Suri Party. The Director of Police stated that another group will be dismissed soon. (ANA 23.5.55)

Politicians' actions against 'Al-Sham' The leader of the Sha'ab Party, Rushdi al-Kikhiya, and Faidi al-Atassi have brought a libel suit against the Damascus newspaper 'Al-Sham'. The owner of the paper, Bakri al-Muradi, said that he would bring a cross-suit against Faidi al-Atassi for libelling him in his newspaper 'Al-Suri al-Jadid'. (ANA 20.5.55)

Cattle-stealing incident on Turkish border Syrian cattle reported to have been stolen from al-Jawhariyya by two Turkish soldiers were restored after negotiations at the frontier. (ANA 20.5.55)

Yugoslav Minister presents credentials Slavko Zore, Yugoslav Minister to Syria, presented his credentials on 12th May. (Damascus in Hebrew 14.30, 12.5.55)

Athens Legation transferred to Belgrade The Syrian Foreign Ministry has decided to transfer the work of the Legation in Athens to Belgrade; the Syrian Minister in Belgrade will also be Minister to Greece. (ANA 18.5.55)

CONFIDENTIAL

S.4 4/1

Box 273
Australian Legation
CAIRO

Memo No. 365

2nd June, 1955.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN AGREEMENT

It will be recalled that according to inspired reports the signing date for the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian Agreement had been fixed as prior to the Bandung Conference, during the Conference and immediately following the Conference. The latest date given regularly in the press is 10th June, but the Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry told me last night that not only was this most unlikely, but that there is still wide divergence of views on a final text.

2. The Iraqi Government continues strongly to oppose the projected Agreement and has addressed another Note to the Syrian Government threatening an economic boycott since she regards the Pact as a hostile action which would isolate her from the rest of the Arab world. In the meantime, one Iraqi ex-Prime Minister has been "explaining the Iraqi attitude" to the Syrian Government and he, together with another ex-Prime Minister, have been having talks with the Lebanese Government.

3. President Shamoun of the Lebanon is still obviously anxious to play the role of mediator and has now suggested an extraordinary meeting of the Arab League Council to discuss differences between the members. He has suggested that the meeting should be at a Prime Ministerial level.

4. The Egyptian reaction to this proposal is not yet known, but it is possible that the Egyptians would now be content if their proposals for an Agreement with Syria and Saudi Arabia could be given a decent burial, although it is difficult to see how this could be brought about without further damage to the Regime's prestige.

5. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the External Affairs Officer, London.

(Sgd) H. D. WHITE

(H.D. WHITE)
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

173/11/23

oy on 181/2/4

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

59

Name of Paper The London Times File No. 173/11/23
Published at London Date 5th May 1956

BEIRUT.—Dr. Husni Sawaf, secretary-general of the Syrian Ministry of Economy, stated that negotiations between the Syrian Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company for an increase in oil royalties paid to Syria for the passage of the pipeline across Syria will be resumed on May 14 in Damascus.

173/11/23

205/11/30

58

SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

No broadcast was heard from either Baghdad or Damascus referring to an Iraqi memorandum to Syria on Arab defence or on other aspects of Iraqi-Syrian relations. The following reports are therefore compiled exclusively from extraneous sources.

Cairo radio said in an external Arabic broadcast on 15th May that the Iraqi Government had presented an aide-memoire to the Syrian Government stating that it considered the proposed Arab pact a hostile act directed especially against Iraq; that it held Syria responsible for the consequences of joining the pact; and that the Iraqi Government was ready to review the existing Arab collective security pact and the common defence pact and to accept any amendments approved by the countries concerned.

The Syrian Premier, as reported by ANA on 18th May, said the Iraqi Government had merely expressed its views on the proposed tripartite pact; the Iraqi memorandum had contained no pressure or threat against Syria. It had said that Iraq adhered to the Arab League Charter and the collective security pact; that Syria should be a medium of reconciliation among the disputing Arab States, not helping to establish opposing camps among them; and that Iraq was ready to amend the collective security pact and the Arab League Charter in order to achieve the co-operation stipulated in the tripartite pact.

Beirut radio reported on 20th May that the text of the Iraqi memorandum had been published in Syria. According to this account, it said that any amendment or revision of the Arab League Charter or of the collective security pact would make alliances and pacts valueless in the future and that it was in Syria's interest not to join any pact which would lead to the isolation of Iraq, since that would serve only those countries opposed to the Arabs.

Cairo radio quoted the Syrian Minister of Health, Wahib al-Gharim, as saying on 16th May that the Syrian Government had replied to the Iraqi memorandum by saying that Syria's policy was inspired by her own interests in particular and by the interests of the Arab nation in general.

Beirut, in its broadcast of 20th May mentioned above, said that in its reply the Syrian Government had declared that it had never contemplated abrogation of the Arab League Charter or the collective security pact; that this was not the time to amend the pact; that Syria took into account her own interests and future; and that the Syrian Government's attitude towards the tripartite Arab pact was fully in line with the nation's higher interests.

On 18th May the Syrian Premier announced that Tawfiq al-Suwaidi would arrive in Damascus the next day to acquaint Syria with Iraq's views on the tripartite Arab pact; he would remain two days in Syria and then leave for the Lebanon. (ANA 18.5.55)

Beirut radio, reporting Tawfiq al-Suwaidi's arrival in Damascus on the 19th, said that he was to explain Iraq's desire for the strengthening of Arab co-operation within the scope of the Arab League and the collective security pact.

On 15th May Beirut said the Syrian Ambassador to Iraq had handed the Iraqi Foreign Minister a formal message about abolishing visas between Syria and Iraq and that Iraq was understood to have taken a similar decision.

SYRIAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS

The search for Qawmi al-Suri members An ANA dispatch of 20th May said it had been reported from Latakia that the Syrian police arrested several members of the Murshid family for refusing to hand over members of the Qawmi al-Suri Party who were said to have taken refuge in the Murshid family's village.

Bill to prohibit political activity by officials The Syrian Chamber of Deputies referred to committee a Bill prohibiting State officials from belonging to a political party, attending political meetings, or carrying out any party activity. (ANA 16.5.55)

Col. Safa sentenced A sentence of six years' imprisonment passed on Col. (ret'd.) Mohammed Safa for inciting revolution in the army was confirmed on 18th May. The military court set aside a sentence imposed on Maj. (ret'd.) Bashir al-Hawasili, who was arrested with Safa seven months ago. (ANA 18.5.55)

Resignation of Abd al-Baqi Nizam al-Din The Minister of Public Works handed in his resignation, for reasons not disclosed, on 19th May. He agreed later to postpone the resignation until after 'Id al-Fitr. (ANA 19.5.55)

Extraordinary budget approved The Syrian Government approved an extraordinary budget of 570,000,000 Syrian pounds for projects, including the construction of an international airport at Damascus and of airports in the provinces, the expansion of Aleppo airport, and the establishment of real estate and industrial banks. (ANA 19.5.55)

Unions demand nationalisation of transport Syrian trade unions have sent a memorandum to the Government urging the nationalisation of public transport. (Beirut 12.5.55)

Appointment in Ministry of the Interior Salim al-Yafi has been appointed Director of the Arab refugees organisation in the Syrian Ministry of the Interior to replace Dr. Adib al-Dawoudi, appointed Counsellor to the Syrian Embassy in London. (ANA 16.5.55)

The coming Damascus Fair The following countries are reported to be among those who have accepted invitations to exhibit at the Damascus international fair to be held 1st-30th September.

Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Eastern Germany, Yugoslavia, Japan, Pakistan, Persia, Saudi Arabia, the Lebanon, Libya, Greece, Italy, Austria, Western Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and the USA.

Czechoslovakia is to send a dance troupe to perform national dances at the fair (Damascus 17.5.55). An East German group arrived in Damascus on 16th May to construct its country's exhibit (Damascus 16.5.55). The USA has applied for 5,000 sq.m. of land for its exhibit, which will be the largest at the fair (Damascus in Hebrew 22.4.55). The Syrian Minister of Economy has appointed a committee to select a site for a permanent fair "town", which is to be five times as large as the present site and used as a public park when not in use for fairs (Damascus 11.5.55).

Khalid al-Azm denies reported statement about treaty with the USSR The Syrian Foreign Minister denied press reports that in Beirut on 12th May he said that Syria was ready to conclude a treaty with the USSR. (Jordan 15.5.55)

S.4/4/1

Memo No. 339

19th May, 1955.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THE PROPOSED SAUDI/SYRIAN/EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT.

Since our Memorandum No. 328 of the 12th May, there does not appear to have been any progress towards the signing of the proposed Saudi/Syrian/Egyptian agreement, although announcements continue from Damascus and Cairo to the effect that it will soon be signed.

2. The main development during the week which has been reported in the Press was the presentation by Iraq to Syria of an official Note. According to the Press, the Note made the following points:-

1. The Iraqi Government regards the tri-partite Arab Pact as a hostile act directed against itself.

2. Iraq will not join this Pact, and if Syria insists on signing it, it will be responsible for the serious consequences resulting from such a move.

3. Iraq is willing to reconsider the old Arab Collective Security Pact and is prepared to accept and implement any amendment agreed upon by the countries concerned.

One newspaper reported that there was a fourth point in the Note, which said that the projected tri-partite pact does not serve Arab interests and is aimed at sowing the seeds of dissension among the Arabs.

3. According to the Press, the Iraqi Note has been rejected by the Syrian Government and that in her reply Syria stated that "Syrian foreign policy will not be directed by inspiration from any Arab or foreign country". The Foreign Minister, Khaled El-Azm, is reported as saying "Syria will pursue the policy which serves its national interests, and it is for public opinion and the nation's representatives to formulate its own political programme."

4. Needless to say, the Egyptian Press did not lose this opportunity of repeating its charges against Iraq as the "tool of the Imperialists" and "her unwarranted interference in Syrian affairs".

(Sgd) H. D. WHITE
(H.D. WHITE)

Charge d'Affaires a.i.

→ 173/11/23

orig - 19/2/4

CABLEGRAM.

::HP

I.5128

FROM:

Dated: 19th April, 1955.

1826

Rec'd: 20th April, 1955.

1120

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.194. UNCLASSIFIED.

Security Council.

After hearing Egypt, Israel and several members of the Council the President said that the consensus of opinion was that no further action was necessary as the situation was covered by March Resolutions.

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " " Defence.
Mr. Goss.
P.M.'s.

20th April, 1955.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.4) MR.HOOD UN@ CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SA SEA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P
G

173/11/20/3

175/11/20/3 55

Summary of Report to the Security Council by General Burns,
the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organisation, concerning the incident of 28th February, 1955
near Gaza.
(dated 17th March, 1955)

The Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission found that on the night of 28th February, a force of the Israeli Army estimated at two platoon strength, crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line east of Gaza, ^{and} advanced more than three kilometres inside Egyptian controlled territory attacking Egyptian installations. The Commission also found that another group crossed the line south-east of Gaza and ambushed an Egyptian military truck bringing reinforcements. An Israeli counter-complaint was not adopted by the MAC.

The Report of the Chief of Staff outlined the incidents which the MAC had investigated over recent months in the Gaza area. He concluded that although infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory had not been the only cause of the present tension, it was undoubtedly one of its main causes. Other factors had been the Egyptian Governments action in the "Bat Galim" case, the trial in Cairo in January of Jews charged with espionage, and the condemnation to death of two of the defendants.

The Chief of Staff attempted to find out whether there had been a special immediate cause for the Gaza incident. On the day of the incident the Israel Army's spokesman had released a communique (which had earlier been passed to the local Press) concerning the alleged espionage activities of a group of three armed men from the Gaza strip, who were said to have stolen official documents from an Israeli Government building near Rishon Le-Zion, and later murdered a cyclist. Another Egyptian group was said to have raided Israeli installations on the morning of February 26; and these incidents were connected by the Israel authorities with the activities of the Egyptian intelligence service.

The action near Gaza could appear in this context as retaliation for spying but no evidence supporting the Israeli contention had been shown to the U.N. authorities, although early in 1954 two cases investigated by U.N. observers in the area did suggest that Arab infiltrators had been spying on Israeli forces.

In his report the Chief of Staff states his opinion that requests to Government to curb the activities of military intelligence in obtaining information would be of little use. The fundamental need ^{now} for effective co-operation in patrolling the demarcation line by both sides.

On 11th November, 1954, General Burns, had reported to the Security Council (Document S/3319) certain measures he considered necessary. These were:

- (a) Joint patrols along sensitive sections of the Demarcation Line;
- (b) Negotiation of a Local Commander's Agreement;
- (c) A barbed wire obstacle along certain positions of the Demarcation Line;
- (d) Manning of all outposts and patrols by regular Egyptian and Israeli troops.

An agreement along these lines was drafted, but although both sides had now replied to the U.N. drafts, a meeting would be required to arrive at a final agreed text.

The Report concludes that such an agreement would reduce infiltration to an occasional nuisance, "a kind of thieving which Israel must probably regard as inevitable so long as there are vast numbers of poverty stricken refugees on her borders - more than 200,000 in the Gaza strip alone." Investigation of incidents by both sides could restrain demands for retaliatory action in future. If the Egyptian authorities took appropriate measures against theft and sale of goods stolen by infiltrators, the Israeli contention that no serious attempt is being made to prevent these depredations, would no longer have any force.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper... The London Times
Published at... London

File No... 173/11/23 53
Date... 17th March, 1955

**PROPOSED COORDINATION
OF ARAB PACTS**
FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, MARCH 16

A Syrian official source stated in Damascus to-night that the Syrian Foreign Minister, ~~Khaled~~ al-Azm, who is now in Baghdad, had suggested to the Iraq Government that the work of the Turkey-Iraq pact and of the proposed Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Syria alliance might be coordinated. Syrian evening newspapers have published a statement by the Syrian Minister in Ankara, Kazem Jazaeri, in which he said there is a likelihood of a "reconciliation" between the two pacts.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper... *The London Times* File No... *173/11/23.*
Published at... *London* Date... *16th February 1955*

**PATCHING UP
ARAB UNITY**

**SYRIAN EXPLORATION
IN BAGHDAD**

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BAGHDAD, MARCH 15

Exploratory talks continued here to-day between the visiting Syrian delegation led by the Foreign Minister, Khaled al-Azm, and the Iraqi representatives led by the deputy Prime Minister, Ahmed Mukhtar Baban.

The talks have been largely devoted to Syrian efforts to explain why they have not joined the Turkey-Iraq pact and why they took part in the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian declaration about the proposed formation of a new Arab alliance. The keynote of the Syrian explanation is that the proposed pact would strengthen their defences against Israel. This is not a new argument, and Iraq has pointed out before, and has no doubt repeated now, that a collective security pact already exists for this purpose. A new pact such as that proposed would naturally be weaker, because it would exclude at least two of the strongest armies in the area—the forces of Iraq and Jordan.

'ALEXANDRETTA QUESTION'

It is believed that the Syrian attitude is conditioned by the instability of her internal situation. Much play is being made with the question of the *saniak* of Alexandretta, which was handed over to Turkey during the French mandate. Syrian nationalists have long demanded the return of Alexandretta, but it is difficult to decide whether this embodies a real hope that it will one day be recovered or provides a handy electioneering weapon. At any rate it is now being used, at least in private conversation, as an argument to show that the Syrian Government is unable to associate with Turkey in the absence of a satisfactory settlement of the "Alexandretta question" without causing a public outcry which might bring down the Government.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

173/11/53

NEW FILE PLS 52

Name of Paper The London Times

File No. 205/11/35

Published at London

Date 1st March 1955

SYRIAN DELEGATION FOR BAGHDAD

BROAD DISCUSSIONS

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BAGHDAD, MARCH 6

A Syrian delegation, led by the Foreign Minister, Khalid al-Adhm, is expected in Baghdad soon. Official sources indicate that talks will be held covering various political and economic matters, including current Arab developments.

Among the economic questions likely to be discussed are: the granting of facilities to Iraq at the rapidly developing Syrian port of Latakia; general trade relations; and the future of the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline.

The Syrian delegation will leave Damascus on the conclusion of Khalid al-Adhm's present mission to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.

President Ismet Bayar, of Turkey, who is paying a state visit to Iraq accompanied by Madame Bayar, will not take part in political discussions here. His time is occupied with a round of social activities and visits to religious centres.

SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper... *The London Times*

File No... *173/11/23.*

51

Published at... *London*

Date... *5th January 1958*

**PAYMENT FOR TRANSPORT
OF IRAQ OIL
COMPANY TO MEET SYRIAN
GOVERNMENT**

BY OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

Reports from Syria have stated that discussions on the payments to be made by the Iraq Petroleum Company for transporting oil from Iraq by its pipeline through Syria to the Mediterranean are to be held between the company and the Syrian Government. At the same time, the company has been accused of abusing the privilege which it has of importing certain equipment free of duty.

Yesterday a spokesman of the company issued a statement confirming that discussions were about to start, but denying the accusation that the company "has abused the Customs privileges whereby the company is exempt from Customs duty on equipment imported for the exclusive purpose of transporting oil." The statement also pointed out that in addition to the fees covering, among other things, transport and loading, payable to the Syrian Government under its present agreement (in 1954 about £360,000), "the Syrian Government benefits to the extent of more than £1m. sterling a year from the operation of a discriminatory rate of exchange applicable only to the company." The company, under a decree of 1952, receives a rate of 6.13 Syrian pounds to the £1, the rate normally being 9.7.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

50

Name of Paper.....

File No. 173/11 '23

Published at.....

Date 24th March 1954

SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS

Iraqi

Iraqi Chamber congratulates President Al-Atassi At a meeting of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies on 7th March, the Deputies Shakir Mahir and (Abd al-Jalil Kanna) proposed that a congratulatory cable should be sent to the President of Syria "on the occasion of the return of constitutional life to the country and the termination of individual rule". The Chamber approved this proposal, and a cable was sent to President Al-Atassi on its behalf. (Baghdad 14.00, 7.3.54)



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

23 FEB 1954

17.3/11/23
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No. 5/5/2.

Memo. No. 212

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

15th. February, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

IRAQI-SYRIAN RELATIONS.

Reference is made to the Legation's Memorandum No.188 of the 8th. February, concerning disturbances in Syria.

The exact reasons for the withdrawal of the Iraqi Military Attache from Damascus and the great suspicion with which the Syrians are viewing Iraq, are not yet clear. There have been accusations in the Syrian press that the Iraqis, supported by the British were working to undermine the Shishakli regime. The Secretary-General of the Syrian Foreign Ministry delivered a statement in the Chamber of Deputies on 10th. February in which he claimed that Syrian relations with all the Arab states were on the best possible footing, but he went on to say that, "as to relations with our neighbour, Iraq, while efforts are made to preserve these in the same fraternal spirit, there have been tensions which it is hoped will be short-lived."

The Secretary-General added that these tensions arose firstly, from the Baghdad Government's having harboured common criminals which she allowed not only to enjoy political asylum, but also to act subversively against the interests of Syria and of the Arabs; secondly, the Iraqi press attacked Syria and President Shishakli with a determination foreign to common international usage.

"Further, the Iraqi Military Attache in Damascus acted beyond his prerogatives and outraged the confidence reposed in him by the Syrian Government in such a way as would benefit only the common enemy of the sister-countries. In the circumstances the Syrian Government requested the Attache to leave, confident that Iraq would not sympathise with its Attache but, as retaliation and without complaining of his behaviour, the Iraqi Government requested the withdrawal of the Syrian Military Attache from Baghdad. The Syrian Government is continuing to reveal to Baghdad the activities of its former Attache, hoping to restore relations to normal".

The Syrian official added a further jibe at Iraq by saying: "The Arab federation scheme presented to the Arab League at its last meeting does not go beyond wishful thinking; it has no practical basis and does not go as far as the Syrian Constitution's call for the liberation and unification of the Arab Nation".

"This is why the Arab states' representatives received the Iraqi scheme coldly, and asked why the Iraqi delegation did not insist on the scheme's being studied."

In Baghdad feelings have also run high and Dr. Jamali proposed a special meeting of the Arab League Council to discuss the Syrian situation, which however received no support from the other Arab states, and the Iraqis were then forced to deny officially that the Iraqi Government had made such a request.

During a debate in the Chamber of Deputies Dr. Jamali confined himself to saying that the maintenance in Syria of Law, order and stability, the safeguarding of the constitution and of civil liberties was of much concern to Iraq since "the good of Syria is the good of all Arabs", and that the Government would spare no effort to assist Syria.

A number of Deputies during the same debate, however, vigorously denounced President Shishakli, one of them calling for military intervention to put an end to the "tyrannies of the Damascus Nero", and not a single Baghdad newspaper gave Shishakli any support.

It is the opinion of the British Embassy in Baghdad that though there is no indication that the Iraqi Government took any positive action to support the rebels, their total failure to overthrow Shishakli must have disappointed Dr. Jamali.

The latest development is that Dr. Jamali visited Amman where it is presumed the Syrian situation was discussed with Jordanian leaders and from whence he went to Beirut at the invitation of President Shamoun. On the 13th. February it was reported that Jamali and Shamoun discussed Iraqi-Syrian relations for two hours. It is believed that Shamoun made an effort to arrange a meeting between Shishakli and Jamali, however, Jamali returned to Baghdad to-day.

Renouf
23/2

alan renouf
(Alan Renouf)
Secretary.

situation in Syria in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies on 2nd February. Dr. Jamali said in this speech that Syria was a country dear to Iraq because it was a part of the single Arab entity and that the Iraqi Government was greatly interested in the continued prevalence of stability, order, constitutional life and public freedoms; Dr. Jamali emphasised that Iraq would spare no effort to offer every possible service for Syria's welfare. (Note: cf. No.438, p.32)

In his comment on this section of the Iraqi Press, the Governor made a number of statements, leading merchants, landlords and farmers. Delegations were continuing to come to them which were received with applause. Deceptions were continuing to be used in to express their feelings towards the plot that had been crushed. (Damascus, 7.2.54)

Telegrams of support for Shishikili's measures to suppress the sedition and anarchy woven by imperialism and "criminal Zionism" were received respectively from the trade unions of mechanical spinning workers, plasterers, civil servants, electricity cinematograph workers and mechanics and a Hama town quarter. A telegram was also received from a Hama town quarter. (Damascus 05.15, 8.2.54)

...the opportunity which Iraq's statesmen let slip and did not exploit to achieve for the country a true stability or to provide for the country a sound regime and constitutional life - namely, the Egyptian revolution and the Mau Mau revolution. Al-Tillawi went on to note how parliamentary elections in Iraq were more like appointments, with strong candidates seeking freedom and sovereignty for their nation and homeland being withdrawn so that pro-British Deputies might win. Al-Tillawi indicated that over 30 years 100 Governments had been formed by 10 persons in rotation and that not a single Iraqi Chamber of Deputies had completed its full legislative term. He also drew attention to the aspects of instability in the sister country Iraq. He said in conclusion:

"Syria was, and still is, suffering great pain from the behaviour of the majority of Iraqi statesmen who have successively held office during the past few years, particularly during the period preceding the gigantic national struggle of the Syrian people to rid themselves of French imperialism. At that time the Fertile Crescent plan emerged, aiming at the unification of Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq under the shadow of the Iraqi Treaty. This plan remained in existence until the plan for union with Iraq, on the same basis as the former plan, appeared. This plan too remained in existence for five years until Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali's plan appeared. It is not overlooked that such plans aim at disturbing stability, order and public life. These latter are not affected by any external influence in a country which enjoys its independence unconditionally without any treaty with, or any preferential position, camp, base, harbour or airfield for, any foreign State.

"We, who earnestly desire that stability, order, constitutional life and public freedoms - in reality and in word and deed, and not merely by word of mouth without action - should prevail in our sister Iraq, are endeavouring to solve the Palestine question on a basis satisfying Arab honour and restoring rights to their rightful owners, regardless of the cost, and are working for the liberation of the Arab countries from imperialist bonds - with dear Iraq at their head - however great the cost may be. Since Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali assures the honourable Deputies - particularly those who sense more than others the bad state of affairs - that Iraq will spare no effort in offering any service in her power for Syria's good, we ask him for one service, a very simple service on which the future of the Arab nation depends. This is that he should tell the British that the 1930 Treaty is no longer fitting for the Government of dear Iraq. Can he perform this service?" (Damascus 12.35, 4.2.54)

Syria's Request for the Recall of the Iraqi Military Attache

In connection with Syria's request to Iraq for the recall of her Military Attache from Damascus, which was officially announced on 5th February, an official Syrian spokesman said that it had been established that the Iraqi Military Attache

situation in Syria in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies on 2nd February. Dr. Jamali said in this speech that Syria was a country dear to Iraq because it was a part of the single Arab entity and that the Iraqi Government was greatly interested in the continued prevalence of stability, order, constitutional life and public freedoms; Dr. Jamali emphasised that Iraq would spare no effort to offer every possible service for Syria's welfare. (Note: cf. No.438, p.32)

In his comment on this section of the Iraqi Premier's speech, Al-Tillawi said:

"As Syrians, we can only thank Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali profusely for his noble feelings and for his recognition that Syria is part of the single Arab entity. This is a testimony worth a thousand testimonies since it is voiced by the Iraqi Premier without its being tied to the Iraqi project for Arab unity which Dr. Jamali himself prepared. Dr. Jamali likewise heard in person the project's repercussions throughout this Arab world."

Al-Tillawi then summed up Iraq's general situation, based on the 1930 Treaty between Iraq and Britain - the treaty that was the cause for confusion in Iraq. Al-Tillawi then referred to the opportunity which Iraq's statesmen let slip and did not exploit to achieve for the country a true stability or to provide for the country a sound regime and constitutional life - namely, the Egyptian revolution and the Mau Mau revolution. Al-Tillawi went on to note how parliamentary elections in Iraq were more like appointments, with strong candidates seeking freedom and sovereignty for their nation and homeland being withdrawn so that pro-British Deputies might win. Al-Tillawi indicated that over 30 years 100 Governments had been formed by 10 persons in rotation and that not a single Iraqi Chamber of Deputies had completed its full legislative term. He also drew attention to the aspects of instability in the sister country Iraq. He said in conclusion:

"Syria was, and still is, suffering great pain from the behaviour of the majority of Iraqi statesmen who have successively held office during the past few years, particularly during the period preceding the gigantic national struggle of the Syrian people to rid themselves of French imperialism. At that time the Fertile Crescent plan emerged, aiming at the unification of Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq under the shadow of the Iraqi Treaty. This plan remained in existence until the plan for union with Iraq, on the same basis as the former plan, appeared. This plan too remained in existence for five years until Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali's plan appeared. It is not overlooked that such plans aim at disturbing stability, order and public life. These latter are not affected by any external influence in a country which enjoys its independence unconditionally without any treaty with, or any preferential position, camp, base, harbour or airfield for, any foreign State.

"We, who earnestly desire that stability, order, constitutional life and public freedoms - in reality and in word and deed, and not merely by word of mouth without action - should prevail in our sister Iraq, are endeavouring to solve the Palestine question on a basis satisfying Arab honour and restoring rights to their rightful owners, regardless of the cost, and are working for the liberation of the Arab countries from imperialist bonds - with dear Iraq at their head - however great the cost may be. Since Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali assures the honourable Deputies - particularly those who sense more than others the bad state of affairs - that Iraq will spare no effort in offering any service in her power for Syria's good, we ask him for one service, a very simple service on which the future of the Arab nation depends. This is that he should tell the British that the 1930 Treaty is no longer fitting for the Government of dear Iraq. Can he perform this service?" (Damascus 12.35, 4.2.54)

Syria's Request for the Recall of the Iraqi Military Attache

In connection with Syria's request to Iraq for the recall of her Military Attache from Damascus, which was officially announced on 5th February, an official Syrian spokesman said that it had been established that the Iraqi Military Attache

had carried out acts exceeding the scope of his official duties and which were inconsistent with the present circumstances and violated the confidence placed in him by the Syrian Government. (Damascus 12.15, 5.2.54)

Later the same day Beirut radio said that it had been announced officially in Baghdad that the Iraqi Government had decided to request the Syrian Military Attache in Iraq to leave the country. An Iraqi Government spokesman had announced that this was in reply to the Syrian Government's decision to ask for the recall of the Iraqi Military Attache in Damascus. (Beirut 17.00, 5.2.54)

On 6th February, however, Damascus radio reported that an official (Syrian) spokesman had stated that the Syrian Military Attache's return to Damascus had taken place as a result of his recall by the Syrian Government and not as a result of his expulsion from Iraq. He had not committed any act inconsistent with the requirements of his post, whereas the Iraqi Military Attache in Damascus had been asked to leave Syria because he had. (Damascus 12.15, 6.2.54)

In a statement to ANA on 5th February, the Iraqi Minister of Defence, Gen. Hussein Makki, expressed his extreme sorrow over the measure taken by the Syrian Government regarding the Iraqi Military Attache when it ordered him to leave the country within two days. He added that Syria was held responsible for this measure, which had caused Iraq to take counter-measures with regard to the Syrian Military Attache in Baghdad. The Minister declined to reply to a question on the effect of these measures on relations between the two countries. The Syrian Charge d'Affaires also declined to comment on the affair. The latter denied that the Iraqi-Syrian frontier was closed. (ANA 6.2.54)

Egyptian Interest in Syrian-Iraqi Relations

On 6th February ANA reported that high circles in the Egyptian Government and the Arab League had alike confirmed their interest in the Syrian-Iraqi dispute. The Egyptian Government had stated that it was prepared to give every assistance to reconcile the two sister nations. It was believed that the Arab League was fully prepared to summon the League Council and the Political Committee if Iraq, Syria or any of the member States considered it necessary. Egyptian circles viewed with great anxiety the recall of the Military Attaches and felt that immediate practical action should be taken before the situation was aggravated; there was no doubt that such action would meet with the full support of the Egyptian Government and the Arab League Secretariat-General. The Egyptian Military Attache in Syria and the Lebanon was expected to arrive in Cairo on 7th February to report on recent events in Syria. (ANA 6.2.54)

Well-informed sources in Damascus said that the visit the Egyptian Ambassador paid to the Syrian Foreign Minister on 6th February was for the purpose of mediating in the Syrian-Iraqi dispute on his Government's instructions. (ANA 7.2.54)

Referring to the question of Syrian-Iraqi relations in a talk on 6th February, the Egyptian commentator Abd al-Hamid al-Khatib said that it was natural for official relations between Arab Governments sometimes to become clouded. Such clouds were soon dissipated because behind these official relations there were the more deeply-rooted relations which bound the Arab peoples to one another, making them a united nation with unified steps and objectives. There was no doubt that Egypt had been grieved by reports that Syrian-Iraqi relations had been subjected to some strain (here the commentator quoted reports about the withdrawal of the Syrian and Iraqi Military Attaches). No Arab people was afflicted with a catastrophe or a crisis whose sufferings were not shared by all the peoples of the Arab world from the Persian Gulf to Gibraltar and from the Taurus Mountains to Central Africa. What must not be misunderstood was that the whole Arab world was still struggling against imperialism; some of its States were still the victims of unmasked imperialism while others had rid themselves of imperialism but not of its plots; there were some in which imperialism had changed its name with alliances and military bases and others in which imperialism which had left an occupation which marred their lives, exhausted their wealth and placed all kinds of obstacles in the way of their renaissance.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

**SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS**

Name of Paper.....

File No. 173/11/23

Published at.....

Date 12.2.54



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

9 MAR 1953

173/11/23
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No. 5/5/2

Memo. No. 561/53

P.O. Box 273

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION.
CAIRO.

27th February, 1953

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Economic Relations Between Iraq and Syria

1. Further to this Legation's memorandum No. 1149/52 of 4th December, relations between Syria and Iraq have by now improved to such an extent that it appears possible that an economic agreement might be concluded in the not too distant future.

2. The Iraqi Minister to Syria declared on 17th February that the two countries would open negotiations soon for the conclusion of an economic agreement. Two days previously, the Syrian Minister of Finance had predicted the opening of talks between the two countries for "a cordial agreement based on new cooperative lines compatible with the interests of both countries". The Minister asserted that he would personally attend to this matter, because he was a firm advocate of a new sincere cooperation between all Arab countries for the good of all those countries.

Alan Renouf
(Alan Renouf),
Secretary.

CS

90



In reply quote No. 5/5/2

Memo. No. 244

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

30 DEC 1952

CANBERRA.

P.O. Box 273

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

18th December, 1952

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Possible Visit of Colonel Shishakly to Iraq

1. Further to this Legation's memorandum No. 1149/52 of 4th December concerning the growing rapprochement between Syria and Iraq, there have been reports from Cairo and Damascus to the effect that Colonel Shishakly, Syrian Chief of Staff and Deputy Premier, will visit Iraq following his recent visit to Cairo (see this Legation's memorandum No. 1239 of 18th December).

2. One of the reports concerning this was attributed to a member of the Iraqi delegation which attended Syria's National Day celebrations (see paragraph 2 of the first mentioned memorandum). This delegate blamed the recent tension between the two countries on "politicians of both parties". He considered it likely that the two soldier-Statesmen, Colonel Shishakly and General Mahmoud, Iraqi Prime Minister, were more likely than politicians to overcome the strained relations between the two countries and to benefit the whole Arab world. This was especially so since their Egyptian counterpart, General Naguib, had been able to offer an important contribution during his conversations with Colonel Shishakly in Cairo.

D 21/12

→ No. 1239/52

CS

alan renouf
(Alan Renouf),
Secretary.

of copy taken 16/3/11/23
RS go g



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

15 DEC 1952

173/11/23
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No. 5/5/2

Memo. No. 1149/52

P.O. Box 273

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

4th December, 1952

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Rapprochement Between Iraq and Syria

1. Reference is made to this Legation's memorandum No. 598/52 of 20th August concerning the growing rapprochement between Syria and Iraq, which had steadfastly refused since Colonel Shishakly's coup of 29th November, 1951 to recognise the new Syrian regime.
2. Almost on the first anniversary of the Syrian regime, it received official recognition from the Iraqi Government. On 2nd December an Iraqi Military Delegation arrived in Damascus to attend the big military parade held on the following day.
3. It is reported that ~~on~~ following this event, Syria and Iraq will raise their Legations in each other's country to the status of Embassies.

Alan Renouf

(Alan Renouf),
Secretary.

Mr. J. J. J. J.

106/1

11/11/52

Jk

CS

Recd. 6/11/52

43

5/5/2

P.O. Box 273
Australian Legation, Cairo.

Memo. No. 1149/52

4th December, 1952

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Rapprochement Between Iraq and Syria

1. Reference is made to this Legation's memorandum No. 598/52 of 20th August concerning the growing rapprochement between Syria and Iraq, which had steadfastly refused since Colonel Chishakly's coup of 29th November, 1951 to recognise the new Syrian regime.
2. Almost on the first anniversary of the Syrian regime, it received official recognition from the Iraqi Government. On 2nd December an Iraqi Military Delegation arrived in Damascus to attend the big military parade held on the following day.
3. It is reported that ~~as~~ following this event, Syria and Iraq will raise their Legations in each other's country to the status of Embassies.

Sgd. A. P. RENOUF

(Alan Renouf),
Secretary.

C O P Y

173/11/23
Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

Memo. 740/52

27th September, 1952.

Ref. No. S.2/3/1

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Economic Union between certain of the Arab States
Lebanese proposal to Arab League Council.

The Lebanese Foreign Ministry revealed on 26th September, 1952, that the Lebanon presented informally to the recently concluded session of the Arab League Council a proposal for the formation of an economic union between the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. The Ministry has stated that no progress was made with the proposal.

No reasons for virtual rejection of the project have been given by the Ministry. However, the press has stated that the real reason was Syria's apprehension about entering upon such a union with Iraq. In view of this apprehension, Syria asked that Saudi Arabia should be included. When approached upon the matter, Saudi Arabia replied that it would only participate if Egypt were included. Egyptian participation was not possible because of geographical and political considerations.

(Sgd.) Alan Renouf
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

In reply quote No. S.12/5/1

Memo. No. 598/52



P.O. Box 273

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

20th August, 1952.

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Rapprochement Between Iraq and Syria

1. It appears that the estrangement in relations between Iraq and Syria which resulted from the coup d'Etat of Colonel Shishakly is now being brought to an end. Official circles in both countries are at present being reported as welcoming a new era in their relationships.
2. The chief evidence of the rapprochement lies in the frequent visits which the Iraqi Minister to Syria has recently been paying to the Syrian Foreign Minister. Moreover, it is said that the recent private talks conducted at Shutura between the Syrian Chief of Staff, and the former Premier of Iraq, Nuri Said Pasha, have laid the foundations for more normal intercourse between the two countries.
3. It is expected that official recognition by Iraq of the Shishakly regime will be accorded shortly, perhaps as a sequel to the forthcoming session of the Political Committee of the Arab League.

alan denning
Secretary

1/1/7/2
1/1/7/3

173/11/23 40

orig on 173/1/1

Memo No. 919/52.

22nd August, 1952.

MEMORANDUM for:


The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Subject: Iraqi views on the Syrian and Egyptian Coups;
also on the Palestine Refugee question and on
Arab/Israeli relations.

Dr. Fad-el-Jamali, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, said on August 21st, 1952, that he considered the Egyptian coup had "preserved constitutional life in Egypt", but that the Syrian coup had created an "unconstitutional situation which the Iraqi Government cannot recognise". This did not mean, he said, that there will be no cooperation with Syria in international matters and in day-to-day Iraqi/Syrian relations.

2. Jamali supported the plan of rehabilitating Palestine Arabs in Transjordan.

3. Jamali made a point of stressing that there would be no *recognition of Israel by the Arabs.


O.C.W. Fuhrman
Australian Minister.

* See also an earlier Memorandum of mine - No. 328/52 dated March 28th, 1952 being a report of my meeting Fad-el-Jamali in Beirut on March 17th, 1952.

O.C.W.F.



39

In Demand

strongly doubt
this is
not the
ref. in

I think this dispute
should be placed
on Jordan file.
non-refugee case
made on 17/11/23.
cl

JORDAN'S CRISIS OF EXISTENCE

The present dynastic troubles in Jordan connected with the question of King Talal's health suggest that these troubles could be regarded by any of Jordan's neighbours, all of whom have at various times cast greedy eyes towards her, as a golden opportunity for annexation.

The implications of Jordan's crisis from the Israeli point of view are obvious; any lessening of the fine standard of public security maintained in Jordan would be a clear invitation for Israeli intervention, if only to forestall intervention by Arab States. Saudi Arabia is less likely, perhaps, to originate any move for annexation, for although Jordan abuts into its territory in a most enticing manner the present weariness of King Ibn Saud will probably preclude any direct intervention. If any move were to be made the most likely contenders would be Iraq and Syria, both enticed by Jordan's administrative efficiency and Arab Legion, but above all by the sheer fact of Jordan's territory.

Immediately after King Abdullah's death last July, there seemed much to suggest that union between Jordan and Iraq was a definite possibility. Iraq for its part seemed anxious to revive schemes for the creation of the Fertile Crescent. Like Jordan, it was ruled by a Hashemite family, and enjoyed good relations with Jordan; on the other hand, Syrian relations with Jordan were strained until the visit of Talal to Damascus and the efforts made by Shishakly for a rapprochement.

From Jordan's point of view, the idea of a Fertile Crescent was not entirely unacceptable, and, in fact, received considerable support in many influential circles. For during December 1951 Jordan's "crisis of existence" became apparent to many leading Jordanese who realised forcibly, after the failure of the 1951 crops, that Jordan was not a viable State. The remedies suggested to overcome this problem were twofold. One school of thought believed that Jordan's economic crisis was temporary, having been largely caused by the drought and the refugee problem, and could be overcome if capital assistance could be obtained from abroad for irrigation works and industry. The other school of thought, however, considered that the crisis was permanent; accordingly it felt that neither grants from U.N.R.W.A. nor British aid was a reliable basis for the nation's economy, and was pessimistic about the country's ability ever to be self-supporting, no matter what foreign loans were obtained. Moreover, if British aid were to cease the Government would be compelled either to lead the country to bankruptcy in attempting to keep up the Arab Legion, or to disband the Legion and leave Jordan exposed to Israel along the 450-mile frontier.

Public concern at the nation's grave economic situation caused the Chamber of Deputies on December 12 last to ask the Government to provide it at a secret session with a statement on the question of Jordan-Iraq union. At the time the general feeling among Deputies was that Jordan was in no position to solve her economic difficulties through her own resources, and that the only permanent solution would be for union with another Arab State. Iraq, as a Hashemite State, was favoured as the most suitable for this purpose. As a result of the request a

secret session of the Chamber of Deputies was held on December 18, during which the Prime Minister, Abul Hoda Pasha, gave a long statement on the question of union with Iraq. No clear report has been published concerning the nature of this statement, but it was obvious that the Government itself viewed the situation with the utmost seriousness; for at the time it urged the press to curb its discussions about the State's economic dilemma and possible solutions for it, and warned that censorship might have to be imposed and newspapers suspended if the plea were disregarded.

Following the publication in foreign newspapers of what he called "shamefully distorted" reports concerning the secret session in the Chamber of Deputies, Abul Hoda Pasha on January 12 found it necessary to clear up several misapprehensions. The scheme for unity with Iraq, he claimed, was an Iraqi proposal which had been made in reply to a scheme put forward shortly before his death by King Abdullah. However the Iraqi leaders, including the Regent, Prince Abul Illah, had made it clear after the death of King Abdullah that they considered that Jordan should preserve any status which it considered to be in its interests. This statement, implicating Iraq at the same time as it exonerated her, was described in Iraqi political circles as extraordinary, for it had been Jordan which had striven to effect the union, with King Abdullah as the champion of the move, while Iraq had not referred to the matter since King Abdullah's assassination.

The Jordanese Prime Minister persisted in his claim that foreign reports of the Jordanese Chamber of Deputies' secret session were greatly distorted. He claimed that certain unofficial persons, both in and outside Iraq, had deliberately created rumours because they did not understand the facts; in view of what Abul Hoda Pasha has revealed since about the activities of Prince Naif it seems possible that he may have been referring here to the Prince, who is regarded in many quarters as a proponent of Jordan-Iraq union.

In a revealing statement Abul Hoda Pasha indicated the reasons for Jordan's apparent rejection of the plan for union. He said that "if the proposed unity aimed at unity of defence or of the army, or of any other actual co-operation, then we would consider it beneficial and successful. But it is limited to unity of the Crown, and provides that the Army be left receiving foreign aid". In other words, Britain's yearly contribution of some £5 million for the upkeep of the Army, which though acceptable, is irksome to Jordan, would have to continue even after union with Iraq. Moreover, this proposed scheme for union would only last for "a period ranging between five and ten years, after which the matter will be reconsidered to see what can be done regarding the Army, or any other real co-operation in economic affairs or otherwise". Such a scheme, failing as it does to make any mention of "the basis upon which agreement will be made in the future" could hardly be regarded as acceptable.

Consequently the scheme for Jordan-Iraq union, which was discussed so actively only five or six months ago, has now, at least for the present, faded into the background, particularly following Abul Hoda Pasha's rejection of the suggestion made by the Iraqi Regent that a senior member of the Hashemite family should be represented on the present Jordanese Regency Council. By contrast, a general move towards Syria seems to have taken place in Jordan. This may not have

the same implications as the previous move towards Iraq, however, for Abul Hoda Pasha has recently made it clear that his Government will not tamper during the present dynastic crisis with the rights of King Talal nor of the Crown Prince Hussein - in other words, will not sacrifice the Crown to achieve political union.

The new move by Jordan towards Syria is part of the general movement towards improved Syrian-Jordanese relations. This policy meets with the approval of Saudi Arabia, anxious to reconstruct the Damascus-Medina railway and to lessen the danger of increased Hashemite influence. The new movement is significant, for formerly Syria, like Saudi Arabia, feared the well-known ambitions of King Abdullah. Syria's concern until now has therefore been to see that Jordan remains independent and does not threaten the balance of power in the Levant either by pursuing schemes for uniting Syria with it under a common monarchy, or by increasing Hashemite influence through amalgamation with Iraq. A new feeling of security seems to have developed in Syria, no doubt aided by the assurance given by Abul Hoda Pasha to Colonel Shishakly during their meeting on June 6 that Jordan would not amalgamate with Iraq and that her friendship for Syria remains unaltered.

Although Syria is determined not to succumb to Jordanese domination it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that it would be prepared to agree to some sort of union, particularly in the economic sphere, with Jordan. Jordan, for its part, would no doubt welcome such a scheme provided that it could retain political independence under its Hashemite dynasty. For such an economic union would permit it to obtain immediately the help which according to Abul Hoda Pasha's statement as given above, Iraq has apparently been reluctant to provide for the maintenance of the Army and the Jordanese economy. Already Jordan and Syria have buried their former antagonism to such an extent that, following recent discussions, they are well on the way to reaching an economic agreement which could provide for an economic union with the non-Western help which Jordan appears so earnestly to desire.

Such economic union between Syria and Jordan was the policy of the Syrian Social National Party (now banned, like all Syrian parties). Although small, this Party is well organised and influential. Colonel Shishakly was a member of it until he found it necessary to resign during the Palestine war in order to avoid prejudicing his position as a high-ranking Army officer; as he still takes careful note of the Party's platform, its policy may be regarded as semi-official. One of the first steps advocated by the Party for the achievement of the union of "natural Syria" is the establishment of a common foreign policy which would lead to economic union.

Nevertheless any country which agrees to accept Jordan as a partner must be prepared for many years to come to meet heavy liabilities in order to keep it in existence. For already Britain provides an annual grant of some £5 million to maintain the Arab Legion; by comparison, Jordan's total exports for the year 1949-50 amounted only to some £1,400,000.

CAIRO (M.D. 26)

27th June, 1952.

In reply quote No. S.4/5/4.

Memo.No. 12/52

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Situation in Syria

Further to my Memorandum No.497 of the 21st. December, 1951, it appears that the Arab States, particularly Iraq and Egypt, are continuing to take almost undue interest in the recent Coup d'Etat in Syria. This Coup is almost universally regarded in official and press sources as representing a danger to the Arab League.

Colonel Shishakly on about 22nd. December despatched a military delegation headed by two Colonels to Baghdad in order to explain to the Iraqi authorities the new Syrian Government's objectives and desire for continuing relations with Iraq. In spite of this attempt however, Iraqi opposition to the Syrian Coup remains fixed. While it is not right to say that relations between the two countries are suspended, since Diplomatic representation between them still continues, all signs indicate that Iraqi Government remains unwilling to co-operate with the present Syrian Administration or any other Government that may be established under the present regime.

As was reported in Ministerial Despatch No.13 of the 13th. December last, Iraq has been approaching other Arab States in order to obtain support for its views that the new Syrian regime should not be recognised. The Iraqi Minister in Egypt, after discussions in Baghdad on this subject, met the Egyptian acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on 25th. December and later returned to Baghdad in order to convey the Egyptian reaction to his discussions.

The Egyptian attitude towards the new regime however appears to remain the same as was indicated in the Ministerial Despatch referred to above, namely that the events in Syria were an internal affair concerning only the Syrian people. Nevertheless Nahas Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, expressed to Syria the desire of the Egyptian Government, which is supported by Saudi Arabia, that the Syrian Government should take positive steps towards the restoration of Parliamentary life by fixing a date for the elections and by releasing all those detained in the Coup in order that they might take part in such elections in an atmosphere of freedom and quiet.

So far it appears that no reply has been received to Nahas Pasha's plea. The Egyptian Minister to Syria had remained in Cairo waiting for such a reply, but returned to Damascus at the end of December without one having been received. According to reports before his departure for Damascus he was authorised by the Egyptian Government to discuss with Colonel Shishakly Egypt's desire for the restoration of Parliamentary life. Some reports however stated that his hasty return was due to the receipt of information that the Army authorities in Syria intended to try Al Said Rushdi el Kikhia, leader of the People's Party, Dr. Nazim el Kodsi, President of the Chamber of Deputies, Ahmed Kunbur, an ex Minister and certain others, all of whom have been detained since the coup, on the charge of high treason and jeopardising Syria's independence.

*noted
and
205/12/1*

CS

*C. H. Nelson
C. H. Desmond*

Copy on 163/11/22

/...



F.O. Box 273

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
CAIRO.

4th. January, 1952.

Official sources in Egypt have been attempting to show that Colonel Shishakly's attack on members of the People's Party was not connected with any plan for Syrian-Iraqi union, which they had relinquished following the third Coup d'Etat, but rather to other reasons. This latter allegedly included the desire of the People's Party to nationalize the Syrian Bank and all foreign Companies supervising Syrian public utilities; the Army's opposition to universal training; and the Army's desire to refute accusations circulated about its inclination towards France. The Egyptian anxiety to prove that the coup was only concerned with internal matters may well indicate a desire to cover up a split within the Arab League either over the question of Syrian-Iraqi union or over the attitude towards the Four-Power proposals.

H. S. Barnett

Secretary.

P/17/8.
Memo. No. 1392/51.

173/11/23
32
Israel.
28th December 1951.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Subject: Syrian Coup d'Etat

The press reports here that a Syrian goodwill army delegation, consisting of two senior officers, arrived in Baghdad to "explain" the reasons for the recent Syrian coup. Official and unofficial Baghdad circles remained reticent, refusing to comment on the arrival of the delegation, after they had previously violently attacked the new régime in Syria and demanded that the Arab League withhold recognition from the military clique ruling in Damascus.

J.C. Ingram

J.C. Ingram,
Third Secretary.

orig - 205/2/1

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

PW/LB.

I. 20993.

FROM:

Dated: 13th December, 1951,
1751.
Rec'd: 14th December, 1951
9.00 a.m.Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.5457. SECRET.

From External Affairs.

Syria.

The French, United States and United Kingdom Governments have now decided to reply to Shishakli's note announcing changes in Syrian Government thus in effect recognising the new regime. This will probably be done in the next few days.

3. All three powers have been looking into the question of military aid for Syria assuming that the prospect of this might induce Shishakli to come over firmly to the west and thus commence break-up of Arab League. However, they find they have nothing much to offer under present appropriations or in view of present commitments and, in any case, do not yet trust Shishakli, who might easily turn on Israel. It is likely, therefore, that no particular hopes of assistance will be held out, at least for the present.

3. Other Arab states are likely to accept the situation although Iraq is displeased as Shishakli does not lean towards the notion of the union as did the people's party.

A/G Min & Dept of E. A.

Defence.

P.M.'s. Dept.

14th December, 1951.

Name of Paper

File No.

Published at

Date

SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES

A Syrian newspaper's comment on the anti-Syrian "campaign" allegedly carried on by the Iraqi Press and radio has been given in the preceding section. Baghdad radio was not heard to comment on the situation in Syria. Comment by Iraqi Opposition politicians and the Press will appear in the next issue of this Summary.

Al-Shishikli's allegation that certain Syrian politicians had encouraged the late Semi Al-Hennawi to try to unite Syria with Iraq has also been reported in the preceding section (Al-Shishikli's Statements to a Press Conference). As appears below, an Egyptian broadcaster said that "the question of federation between Syria, Iraq and Jordan" had recently divided Syrian opinion, and that it had reportedly been "exploited" in the interest of Britain and France.

The Arab News Agency reported on 5th December that Shakr Al-Wadi, Iraq's acting Foreign Minister, had received the Egyptian, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian Ministers, and the Lebanese Charge d'Affaires, on the previous day; he was understood to have told them that his Government disapproved of the coup d'etat in Syria, and to have proposed that the Arab States should not recognise the present regime there. According to the Agency (4.12.51), this proposal was said to have been discussed at a meeting on the evening of the 3rd, which had been attended, among others, by Amir Zeid, the acting Regent, Nuri Al-Said, the Premier, and a number of Iraqi politicians. On the 5th, Cairo radio (18.30) reported Najib Al-Rawi, the Iraqi Minister to Egypt, as having said that he had informed Farag Pasha of the Iraqi Ministerial Council's decisions regarding Iraq's non-recognition of the present situation in Syria. The Arab News Agency (5.12.51) said Al-Rawi had seen both Nahas Pasha and Farag Pasha.

He had said afterwards that his purpose had been to inform them of his Government's decision "in connection with a recent move in Syria"; this decision would be conveyed to all Arab Governments.

Beirut radio said on the 5th (05.00) that, "according to a report released in Baghdad", the Syrian Legation there had not been officially informed of any decision by the Iraqi Government not to recognise the situation resulting from the coup d'etat; the "prevailing view" was that Iraq would not interfere in the Syrian affair. This station also reported (ibid) that the Syrian Foreign Ministry had sent memoranda to the foreign legations in Syria and the Lebanon, to the Arab Foreign Ministries and to Syria's permanent representative at the UN, informing them that "the recent move" had been "an internal affair", and that Hashim Al-Atassi's resignation would not affect the country's foreign policy. According to the Syrian Minister in Cairo, two Syrian Army officers, who saw Nahas Pasha and Farag Pasha on the 5th, also emphasised that Syria's policy towards the Egyptian cause and the four-Power proposals would remain the same (see below). Asked about Iraq's attitude, the Syrian Minister said: "This question only concerns Syria and no one will be allowed to interfere" (Cairo 18.30, 5.12.51). It was reported that the Army officers would leave Cairo for Saudi Arabia on the 7th. (ANA 5.12.51)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CANBERRA.

Name of Paper. *Livorn Radu's Pensadca* File No. *173/11/23*
Published at. Date. *5/9/57*

IRAQ WITHDRAWS FORCES FROM SYRIA--The Deputy Director General of Publicity announces that, at the request of the Syrian Government, the Iraqi Government has made the necessary arrangements to withdraw the Iraqi force which was sent to Syria in May to assist the Syrian Army during the Syrian-Israeli border incidents. (Baghdad, Home, in Arabic, Sept. 2, 1951 GMT--K) Lt. Col. Adib al-Shishikli gave a party yesterday at the Officers' Club in Damascus in honor of the Iraqi officers on the occasion of their return to Iraq. The Syrian Chief of Staff made a speech in which he thanked both the Government and people of Iraq for supporting Syria. (Baghdad, Home, in Arabic, Sept. 3, 1951, 1500 GMT--K)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CANBERRA.

Name of Paper. *Arab News Bulletin*, File No. *173/11/23*

Published at. Date. *3/9/57*

It has been announced in Baghdad that Iraq is withdrawing her military aid to Syria, some troops and aircraft units, which were sent to Syria about six months ago following clashes in the Syrian-Israeli border region. The Syrian Government, in a letter thanking Iraq for her help, said that the dispute was now being examined by the U.N. and the resumption of hostilities was not expected. (B.B.C)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *First Wave Bulletin*

File No. *173/11/23*

Published at.....

Date *17/07/57*

4. Middle Eastern News

The Prime Minister of Iraq has announced that his country has sent military help to Syria. Members of the Iraq Army Royal bodyguard, anti aircraft units and a number of air force squadrons were taking up positions at the request of the Syrian government to help to meet any new Israeli aggression. They would remain in Syria as long as they were needed.

King Abdullah of Jordan has arrived in Ankara on a three-week visit to Turkey. (B.B.C.)

file

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper. *The Sun* File No. *173/11/23*
Published at. *Sydney* Date. *18/11/57*

IRAK AID TO SYRIA UPSETS ARAB WORLD

From a Reuter Correspondent in Cairo.

Irak's military aid to Syria has upset the political structure of the Arab Middle East.

Although Israel remains the crux of the problem confronting the Arab League's seven-member States, distrust of some immediate Arab neighbor is of more significance to each nation than fear of outside aggression.

Some Arab quarters here saw in recent despatch of Iraqi Army and Air Force units ostensibly to help defend Syrian territory against Israeli attack—the first move towards realisation of the much-debated Greater Syria plan for union of Irak, Syria and Jordan.

This project has always aroused opposition in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

When fighting first flared on the Syrian-Israeli border, Egypt asked Britain, US and France to intervene in accordance with their 1951 declaration guaranteeing peace and security in the Middle East.

Syria has come out of the Palestine adventure greatly weakened and almost on the verge of political and economic bankruptcy.

She has been the theatre of three coups and constant strife.

Certain politicians and military leaders are known to favor amalgamation with Irak.

It is an open secret that

Irak and Jordan have designs for encroaching on this territory in easy stages under cover of anti-Zionism and anti-communism.

Balance of power

Egypt's resistance to outright union has the support of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, who is particularly anxious to maintain the present balance of power.

When Israeli-Syrian border incidents developed into pitched battles, Syria asked Egypt and Irak for military aid, particularly air protection.

Irak's armor rumbled across the frontier and took up position opposite the Israeli lines, while Iraqi fighters roared over the Syrian skies and ack-ack batteries mounted guard in the capital.

Jordan offered four companies of the Arab Legion.

Tension increased. The US instructed its envoys to "counsel moderation."

The Security Council ordered an immediate cease-fire.

Irak's quick response to Syria's call strengthened the hearts of Syrians, but caused a great stir in other Arab capitals.

Arab observers believe it will be difficult to get the troops out.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper. *Summary of World Broadcasts* File No. *173/11/23*
 Published at. *RF-1V* Date. *3/6/51*

Col. Al-Shishikli's Statement to Iraqi Officers

A party in honour of "the Iraqi officers on (a) visit to Damascus" was given by the Syrian Army GHQ. Welcoming and thanking the officers, Col. Al-Shishikli, the Syrian Chief of Staff, declared: "There is no doubt that the enemy living along the Syrian borders will feel weak and terrified to know that Syria is not alone in the battlefield and that the Arab sisters are always ready

to be in the firing line with Syria. This is a forerunner of Arab unity. In Syria, we advocate Arab unity, which will undoubtedly materialise. In order to be a genuine unity, it should be originated by the Arabs themselves. Thus it will be far from elements of dissension and foreign interference which do not wish any good to the Arabs or their unity." (Damascus 19.15, 30.5.51 - FBIS)

CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/23
24

CAUTION: The following Foreign Office telegram has been passed to us on a personal and unofficial basis. It is therefore desirable that it should not be quoted in communications to the United Kingdom nor referred to specifically in discussions with United Kingdom officials.

CLASSIFICATION: IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: DAMASCUS

REFERENCE NO.: 135

DATE OF DESPATCH: 15th May, 1951.

Saving to Jedda.

Your Telegram No. 199: Iraqi fighter aircraft for Syria.

I spoke to the Syrian Prime Minister on the lines of your telegram under reference this morning. The interview was brief as the Prime Minister is very busy with the Arab League meeting.

2. The Prime Minister said that he had two comments to make. First the despatch of Iraqi fighters to Syria was the first of series of routine courtesy visits which had been arranged between Iraqi and Syrian Army Commands and Syrian fighters would reciprocate the visit later on. It was by no means certain that Iraqi fighters would stay for long. If however it were decided they should remain in Syria, their sole purpose would be to help to protect Damascus from air raids by Jewish bombers. He repeated that the length of stay of the Iraqi fighters had not yet been decided. Secondly the Prime Minister commented that it was indeed "strange" for His Majesty's Government, who had refused to supply Syria with aircraft, to ask her to deprive herself of the urgently needed air support offered by a sister Arab country.

3. I repeated what I had told him and emphasised that it might well act as a provocation to the Israelis if Iraqi fighters were brought into the picture at a time when the situation seemed to be a good deal easier, and the prospects of a peaceful settlement were hopeful. The Prime Minister replied that was all very well, but the situation would remain dangerous as long as the United Nations did not go to the root of the trouble. Reports continued to reach him daily that the Jews were still carrying out drainage operations and as long as they were allowed to have things their own way, Syria must look to her self-defence.

4. The Prime Minister took your message as well as could be expected, but he clearly resented it.

5. I understand that the Iraqi fighters are due to arrive here on 17th May.

6. The Arab League Council met once yesterday, but referred the Syrian complaint against Israel to the Political Committee. Please see my telegram No. 134.

CONFIDENTIAL

PA on 173/11/23²³

CAUTION: The following Foreign Office telegram has been passed to us on a personal and unofficial basis. It is therefore desirable that it should not be quoted in communications to the United Kingdom nor referred to specifically in discussions with United Kingdom officials.

CLASSIFICATION: IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DAMASCUS

REFERENCE NO.: 199

DATE OF DESPATCH: 14th May, 1951.

Bagdad telegram No. 385 (of 13th May: Israel-Syria dispute).

Unless decisions taken today by Political Committee of Arab League are such as to render further action futile or undesirable, and provided you see no objection on other grounds, please impress upon Prime Minister our view that presence of Iraqi aircraft could only serve to prejudice the prospects of a peaceful settlement. You may use any other arguments which in your opinion may help.

2. If Prime Minister should raise the question foreshadowed in Paragraph 2 of Bagdad telegram under reference, you should say that to answer such a question would imply doubt on our part in the efficacy of the Security Council cease-fire resolution, which we sincerely believe both parties are anxious to implement. By withdrawing her request Syria would make a valuable contribution towards easing the tension.

C. J. Central

CONFIDENTIAL

22

CAUTION: The following Foreign Office telegram has been passed to us on a personal and unofficial basis. It is therefore desirable that it should not be quoted in communications to the United Kingdom nor referred to specifically in discussions with United Kingdom officials.

CLASSIFICATION: IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: BAGDAD

REFERENCE NO.: No. 385

DATE OF DESPATCH: 13th May, 1951.

Your telegram No. 459 : Israel - Syria dispute.

I gave the Iraqi Prime Minister your message. He replied that it was impossible for him to refuse the Syrian request. If he did so his position both in Iraq and in the whole Arab world would be undermined when the story got out. (It already appears to have leaked). But he emphasised that he had no intention of intervening in the dispute on the Israel-Syrian frontier. The Iraqi aircraft would be sent to Damascus (Rayak) and kept there solely to assist the Syrians should Syrian territory be attacked from the air. Actually the sending of these aircraft would be chiefly a moral gesture, and he was proposing for the present to send only one flight of say five aircraft.

2. In addition to the argument contained in your telegram under reference, I said that I noted that the Syrian request had been made on the very day of the Security Council's resolution and so presumably before the Syrian Government had been aware of it. Could he not now ask the Syrians whether in view of the resolution they still wanted his help? Nuri Pasha replied that he felt unable to make such an approach as it would give the impression that he was reluctant to support a fellow Arab. There was no reason however why His Majesty's Minister Damascus should not put the point to the Syrian Government. If, as a result, the Syrians informed him that they no longer needed Iraqi help, he would have nothing more to say. But he thought that they might ask the pertinent question of whether His Majesty's Government were prepared to guarantee them against air raids. This answers the last paragraph of your telegram under reference.

✓
Control

CONFIDENTIAL

CAUTION: The following Foreign Office telegram has been passed to us on a personal and unofficial basis. It is therefore desirable that it should not be quoted in communications to the United Kingdom nor referred to specifically in discussions with United Kingdom officials.

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: BAGDAD ? — Foreign Office

REFERENCE NO.: 459.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 12th May, 1951.

Your telegram No. 382 (of 11th May: Israel-Syria dispute).

I am much disturbed by the Iraqi Prime Minister's proposal, and more especially on the following grounds:

- (i) It is to be hoped that the Security Council cease fire resolution of 8th May will have the desired effect. Despatch of fighters at this juncture, by implying doubts on this score, can only undermine the authority of the United Nations and render a settlement more difficult.
- (ii) Iraq participation would give to what has so far been a series of local, if serious, frontier incidents the character of a new general war between Israel and the Arab states.
- (iii) I would not wish to doubt the Prime Minister's assurance that fighters would be used solely for defence purposes inside Syrian territory; but in area where boundaries are not very clearly defined, there is serious risk of unpremeditated clashes. Once blood was drawn, both sides would feel committed and there is no saying where the process would end.

2. Please speak urgently on the above lines to the Prime Minister and, while thanking him for his message, say that I appeal to him to reconsider a decision which can only have the effect of prejudicing the prospects of a peaceful settlement which, I am confident, he desires no less earnestly than I do myself.

Control
3. In view of the danger that the Prime Minister, may nevertheless, feel too deeply committed to be able to abandon his plan unless the Syrian Government first withdraw their request, I would wish to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Damascus to make similar representations. Please report urgently whether you see any objection.

....

CONFIDENTIAL

20

CAUTION: The following Foreign Office telegram has been passed to us on a personal and unofficial basis. It is therefore desirable that it should not be quoted in communications to the United Kingdom nor referred to specifically in discussions with United Kingdom officials.

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Bagdad.

REFERENCE NO.: 382.

DATE OF DESPATCH: 11th May, 1951.

Israel-Syria dispute.

Iraqi Prime Minister has asked me to inform you that in response to Syrian request for assistance he has agreed to send a Fighter Squadron to Damascus. He was at pains to emphasise that it will be used solely for defence purposes and will not go outside the Syrian Frontier. He added that in view of the security pact signed last February and of the innumerable assurances given to each other by the Arab States of mutual defence against the Jews, he could not have refused the Syrian request. The Syrians had also approached Egypt, with what results he did not know.

2. From questioning him I gathered that the initiative was, in fact, taken by the Iraqi Government which had asked the Syrians if they wanted any help after Israeli bombing of Syrian positions three weeks ago. The Syrian request had been made on the 8th of May and the Iraqi Government had at once sent an officer to Damascus to find out what was precisely required. He was due back tomorrow with a full report, in the light of which it might be decided to send some anti-aircraft guns in addition to Fighters.

3. Nuri Pasha said that it would be four days before the aircraft could leave and I begged him to keep them here at least until there was time to obtain your comments.

4. If you have any message to convey to Nuri Pasha I shall be grateful to receive it as soon as possible. From what he said I should doubt whether he could be induced to give up his plan to which he is apparently committed. On the other hand he begged me to believe that he had no intention of being drawn into any offensive action.

.....

↓
Control

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
CANBERRA,

Name of Paper *The Canberra Times*.....

File No. *173/11/23*.....

Published at *Canberra*.....

Date *18/5/51*.....

Iraq Sends Troops and Planes to Aid Syria

BAGHDAD, Thursday

Iraqi troops and planes have been sent to Syria to help meet the "threat of Israeli aggression," the Iraq Prime Minister, Nuries Said Pasha, announced last night.

He told a cheering Parliament that "Iraq will render the utmost military aid to Syria."

Air force squadrons, anti-aircraft units and troops had been sent to Syria and would remain there until they were no longer required, he said.

Iraq would send more troops and planes to defend Syrian territories, he added.

United Nations' officials have made repeated attempts to stop the fighting in the Syrian-Israeli border dispute.

Israel yesterday claimed that Syrian troops had fired on an Israeli fishing vessel on Lake Huleh.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CANBERRA.

Name of Paper. *D.M.R. (BBC)* File No. *173/1123*
 Published at. *Melbourne* Date. *17/5/57*

IRAQ SENDS MILITARY HELP TO SYRIA. The Prime Minister of Iraq has announced that his country has sent military help to Syria. He said in Baghdad that members of the Iraq Army Royal Body-Guard, anti-aircraft units, and a number of air force squadrons were taking up positions at the request of the Syrian Government to help to meet any Israel aggression. They would remain in Syria as long as they were needed.

BAC 176

N of Paper *D.M.R. (New York)* File No. *173/11/71*
Published at *Melbourne*
Date *14/4/57*

POINT FOUR AGREEMENT FOR IRAQ. The State Department has announced that Iraq and the U.S. have signed a general agreement covering Point Four technical aid. Under it American technical aid will be extended for the development of Iraq's agriculture and vocational education.

CONFIDENTIAL

173/11/24₁₆

CAUTION: The following Foreign Office telegram has been passed to us on a personal and unofficial basis. It is therefore desirable that it should not be quoted in communications to the United Kingdom nor referred to specifically in discussions with United Kingdom officials.

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: TEL AVIV

REFERENCE NO.: 92

DATE OF DESPATCH: 21st March, 1951.

My immediately preceding telegram: Iraqi Jews.

I promised the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would inform you without delay.

2. At the same time I remarked that in the matter of blocked Arab accounts here Israel Government were setting a bad example for Iraq which would not be slow to use it if aware of the fact reported in my telegram No. 10 Saving of March 6th. I then spoke generally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as I had done to Shiloah as reported in that telegram.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was clearly taken by surprise at my information and though arguing that the cases were different said he would certainly speak this morning with the Minister of Finance about blocked Arabic balances.


u



15
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Reference No. _____

MEMORANDUM NO. 1269/49.



MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A. C. T.,
Australia.

For your information we attach hereto a newspaper clipping from the New York "Times" of 24th October, 1949 in relation to a statement made by the Premier of Iraq, Nuri-Said, for a general union of the Arab states.

G. L. Davis,
First Secretary.

Copy on 181/2
Encl. 1

Mr. Hooper to see this
+ paper below.

2 H

M

ARAB STATES PLAN COLLECTIVE TREATY

Nuri as-Said Denies Union of
Iraq and Syria Is Planned
Outside of League

By ALBION ROSS

Special to The New York Times.

CAIRO, Oct. 23 — Nuri as-Said, Iraqi Premier, told Arab and foreign newspapermen here today that he knew nothing about negotiations for an Iraqi-Syrian union except what the newspapers had been writing.

The Iraqi Premier, author of the famous blue book on the Fertile Crescent project, which is based on an Iraqi-Syrian union, said:

"If the Syrian Government, after the coming elections, presents any plan, we are willing to study it. We are working for a general union of the Arab states, and we will not do anything that will create difficulties between Arab states or create such blocs as are referred to in the press, namely, an Iraqi-Jordan or an Egyptian-Saudi Arabian bloc."

For Collective Security Pact

He confirmed the fact that Arab statesmen gathered here had decided in principle on a collective security pact and that the details were being studied. There were reports today that the political committee of the Arab League might stay in session a month to deal with the proposed all-Arab mutual-defense military alliance and at least begin to prepare the draft of the treaty.

The practical effect of Nuri Pasha's statement on the proposal for Syrian-Iraqi federation will be to halt efforts by opponents of the proposal to find means of introducing the subject in the Arab League meeting. There now seems to be every indication that the matter will simply disappear from the League's discussions.

Behind the formal sessions, the significance of this Arab League meeting appears to be a rather unexpected tendency toward healing the split between the Hashemite dynasties of Iraq and Jordan on one hand and their opponents on the other.

All the groups involved have been engaged in a discussion of the Syrian-Iraqi federation proposal in terms of possibility of Hashemite and British hegemony in the rather unstable Arab quadrangle made up of Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

What seems to have emerged from the discussions has been the as yet not wholly consolidated conviction that this old bone of contention is not a vital or tragic issue, as had appeared in the past. The idea has steadily gained ground that more intimate agreements between two or more states in the Arab quadrangle would not necessarily create a barrier against an alliance and cooperation with Egypt, by far the largest and wealthiest of the Arab states.

ME SECTION

NOTE FOR FILE ..173/11/23

OF TOP SECRET MATERIAL LOCATED IN STRONG ROOM

Type of document *Minute*
To *b.g.*
From *PM's Dept.*
Date of Origin *28.10.49*
Subject Matter *Syria & Iraq relations*
.....
Folder
Document Serial No. *3*

Date.

Officer's Signature. *Haye*

.....ME..... SECTION

NOTE FOR FILE173/11/23.....

OF TOP SECRET MATERIAL LOCATED IN STRONG ROOM

Type of document *Minute*
To *6A*
From *PM dept.*
Date of Origin *25.10.49*
Subject Matter *Syria & Iraq relations*
.....
Folder
Document Serial No. *2*

Date.

Officer's Signature. *Haye*

CONFIDENTIAL.

49/3/1/56.

External Affairs Department,
Australia House,
London, W.C.2.



Departmental Despatch No. 45/49.

193/11/23.

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS OF SYRIAN-IRAQI UNION.

In my despatch No. 20/49 of 20th May 1949 I discussed at some length the Fertile Crescent and Greater Syria projects which contemplate a union of Syria with neighbouring countries. These projects are revived from time to time but at the moment, as I reported in my telegram No. 4152 of 6th October 1949, the movement for some form of union between Syria and Iraq is much stronger than it has been for some years. It is the purpose of this despatch to examine briefly the reasons why it has become so strong at the present time, the likely attitude of interested and neighbouring governments, and its particular implications for the United Kingdom.

PRESENT SYRIAN GOVERNMENT.

2. The Government which was set up following Colonel Zaim's execution on 14th August is a rather uneasy coalition. The Prime Minister Hashem Al-assi is not regarded as a strong leader and there are elements in the Cabinet which are distrusted both in Syria and in neighbouring countries. The re-appointment of General Abdullah Atji as Minister of Defence is unpopular with the army. Government administration is said to be at a standstill. The Government has been looking for some means of ensuring its own stability and protecting itself against further coups d'etat or loss of office to the Opposition. Apparently the movement for a union with Iraq, therefore, has roughly three bases:

- (i) the Government's anxiety for a spectacular move, which would appear to strengthen Syria, particularly in relation to Israel;

↓.
Offends
(2) ME
Defence ✓

- (ii) a recognition from all parties of Syria's essential weakness and the need for a strong alliance, particularly in view of difficulties with the Lebanon, Syria's western neighbour;
- (iii) the need to take up a seemingly popular opinion and make it its own.

3. An example of the ideas prevalent on the matter is a statement of the National Party in Syria, an Opposition party, issued on 29th September in Damascus. The following are its main points:-

- (1) Arabs are one nation and Syria is a part of that Nation.
- (2) In view of the Zionist menace, Syrian hands must be stretched out to the nearest Arab country. Syria alone is unable to face the dangers threatening her and union with Iraq is essential. Union should be on the following basis -
 - (a) Unity with regard to head of the state.
 - (b) Unity in military affairs.
 - (c) Unity in foreign affairs.
 - (d) Economic unity.
- (3) Present Syrian Government, which does not represent all parties, should have recalled old parliament.
- (4) The plan for union with Iraq should be adopted before the general elections so that Syrian people will know that they are voting for it. If present government acts accordingly National party will support that government.
- (5) National party welcomes any other union with independent Arab states and considers union between Iraq and Syria first step to Pan-Arab union.

ATTITUDE OF IRAQ.

4. It would seem that there is less spontaneous support for the idea in Iraq but the Government of Nuri Pasha found itself quite unable to work with Colonel Zaim but regards the present Syrian Government quite favourably. In fact Nuri Pasha when in London in August described it as the best Syrian Government for a long time. Nuri Pasha himself feels that it is possible to proceed in the direction of some kind of union with Syria though progress in his view must be slow and cautious to avoid provoking the hostility of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

On 25th August Nuri Pasha made an official statement which, after re-affirming his support for "full Arab unity and co-operation to be realised by legitimate means free of compulsion and enticement", he concluded:-

"I have always done all in my power to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood and co-operation between all Arab countries. I see nothing against special agreements between two or more Arab States to regulate their common and direct interests, so long as they (the agreements) do not affect the political entity of these States."

ATTITUDE OF OTHER POWERS.

5. The French attitude is quite reserved, as in any combination between Lebanon, Syria and Iraq with neighbouring or foreign powers the French are always disposed to see a threat to French interests and to imagine some connection between the powers concerned and their own expulsion from Syria and Lebanon. They do not, however, see any way of stopping a free union between Syria and Iraq, and so long as it proceeds constitutionally and without force will find it difficult to make any formal objections. Up to the present, so far as is known here, the United States Government has not expressed any firm ideas regarding the project but it is thought that its views may be conditioned by the reaction of Saudi Arabia. Of neighbouring countries it is thought that King Abdullah of Transjordan will resent the union as an alternative to other ideas of Greater Syria which he has always been thought to nourish with Transjordan as its head, involving for himself in a sense the role of his late brother Feisal. Although his general relations with the new Syrian Government are pleasant enough, he has informed the Iraq Government that he will oppose the Union with all means available to him. Egyptian irritation is likely, but with the failure of the Arab League, which is now regarded by most foreign observers, in spite of its formal survival, as complete, it can hardly object to the union of other Arab States, but might find it possible to co-operate in a way that has not been possible under the aegis of the Arab League. Israel will view the project with suspicion but presumably can afford to be indifferent so long as the Union is not the basis of a wider fusion of Arab States.

UNITED KINGDOM ATTITUDE.

6. The United Kingdom authorities have so far refrained from expressing opinions to either Iraq or Syria, despite the anxiety of both powers that it should tender advice. Generally speaking, the United Kingdom Government's view is that if the union is free, not accomplished by force, represents the will of the people of the two countries, and is on a workable basis, it might be of advantage to both Iraq and Syria. A major problem which it raises with the United Kingdom, however, is its effect on the Treaty of Alliance with Iraq. This is due to expire in 1956, though it may be revised any time after 1951. On the whole there is no reason to suppose that the extension of the general principles of the Treaty to Syria and Iraq combined would be opposed by the United Kingdom but the detailed implications would need to be very carefully examined.

TYPE OF UNION.

7. So far it appears that there has been no close discussion between the representatives of Iraq and Syria of the type of Union, but it may follow the general precedent of the British Commonwealth and have a common Head of State with wide co-operation in military, economic and foreign affairs, or it may become a federation with full powers in those matters controlled by the Federal Government, with the existing States being administered as they are at present in all other matters. Or again there is a possibility that some constitution might be devised on the basis of the relation between the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Government by which the constituent republics, at any rate according to the strict letter of the constitution, have the power to make separate laws in respect of a large range of matters, including foreign affairs and defence. Of these alternatives the first is perhaps the most likely to be adopted as raising fewer problems than the others.

CONCLUSION.

8. The advantages of some form of union between Iraq

and Syria, both of which at present have many financial and political difficulties which cause considerable instability, seem to lie largely in the strength which comes from any union. The union would, however, face difficulties in the following directions -

- (i) If a Central Government undertook too many powers there would be considerable administrative difficulty owing to physical features, especially the fact that so large a part of the new unit, including the geographical centre, would be substantially desert.
- (ii) The advantages of the Union, though they would give both parties to the Union strength presumably in dealing with Israel, may provoke hostility from other Arab States far more than the advantages were worth.
- (iii) The effect of any union on the membership of Syria and Iraq of international organisations, especially the United Nations, would have to be weighed.
- (iv) In both countries there is a basic nationalism which once roused could easily undermine the whole project.

External Affairs Officer.

12th October 1949.



6
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Reference No.

MEMORANDUM NO. 1149/49.




4th October, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A. C. T.,
Australia.

We are forwarding herewith for your information
a clipping from the New York "Times" of September 30, 1949,
entitled "Syrian Bloc Favors Union now with Iraq."


O. L. Davis,
First Secretary.

Encl. 1

df

PA

KFA 5

SYRIAN BLOC FAVORS UNION NOW WITH IRAQ

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Sept. 20.—A manifesto of the Syrian National Bloc, the party representing elements most firmly opposed to union with Iraq or Jordan, showed this morning that the party had gone all the way for unity with Iraq.

The party, after all its years of opposition to such a program, now calls for political, military and economic unity and a common executive head.

The manifesto removes all organized political opposition to union with Iraq. This opposition in the past has been a key circumstance in the political structure of the Arab Middle East. The People's party, the other large and now apparently dominant political group, has not yet taken a stand. However, the People's party has been the banner bearer of a program for unifying or federating Iraq and Syria under some form of Fertile Crescent plan.

The Lebanese Government has indicated that it does not consider the National Bloc party's manifesto important, as the party plays practically no role in the present transitional regime.

ACTION
COPY

I.14811

Dated: 6th October, 1949

2115

Australian High Commissioner's Recd.: 7th October, 1949
Office, 1110
LONDON.

4152. Confidential. From External.

IRAQ AND SYRIA:

Strong moves are afoot in both Iraq and Syria for some form of Union. In Syria all parties, including those in opposition, apparently support the project and a referendum is to be held on 5th November. Such a Union is not likely to be popular with some of the neighbouring Arab States, nor with France, though the United Kingdom attitude is favourable provided it is arranged constitutionally and as a result of popular feeling in both countries.

2. It would raise various difficulties, including the effect on the Anglo-Iraqi treaty.

5. Further comment by despatch.

MIN. AND DEPT. OF E.A.

7th October, 1949

FILE ~~173~~ 173/11/23.

(new file)

Copy on 173/11/2

was
RLH

3

180

Copies

Secretary	✓
AG(P)	✓
S	✓
SG	✓
A	✓
LD	✓
PI	✓
Pa	✓
CAF	✓
UN	✓
ER	
Adm	
A, or	
Exec	

PA

ME SECTION

NOTE FOR FILE 173/11/23

OF TOP SECRET MATERIAL LOCATED IN STRONG ROOM

Type of document Minute
To C.A.
From P.M. Dept.
Date of Origin 7.10.49
Subject Matter Syria & Iraq relations
.....

Folder
Document Serial No. 1:

Date.

Officer's Signature. Maye



2
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM NO. 1131/49.



29th September, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A. C. T.,
Australia.

Attached herewith for your information is a
newspaper article from the New York Times of September
28th, 1949, entitled, "Arab Federation Believed Aim of
Parleys in Damascus, Beirut."

O. L. Davis,
First Secretary.

Encl. 1

M

Arab Federation Relieved Of Parleys in Damascus, Beirut

**Iraqi-Syrian Agreement Held
Discussed With Possibility
of Jordan's Inclusion**

By ALBION ROSS

Special to The New York Times.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Sept. 27—Regent Abdul Ilah of Iraq, returning from London, is scheduled to make a stop-over in Damascus this week. His visit will top off the series of informal trips to Damascus by political personalities of the two Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan.

The presence in the Syrian capital of Omar Nazemi, Iraq's Foreign Minister, and visits yesterday by Jordan's Premier Tawfiq Abdul Huda Pasha and his Foreign Minister, Rohi Abdulhadi, are most significant. The Jordanian Premier and his suite of Ministers deputed through Damascus on the way to Beirut to meet King Abdullah and talk with the Syrian Ministers.

There is no doubt that these conversations concern working agreements between Iraq and Syria that would probably be preliminary steps toward eventual federation and perhaps unification and that, one way or another, Jordan may be brought into the picture.

Key to Conflicts

Efforts at federation in the past have been the key to conflicts among Arab nations. There is a great hesitancy on the part of everyone who has been consulted on the subject to believe that such a drawing together is finally coming to pass. To date, Egypt and her ally, Saudi Arabia, have always succeeded in halting similar moves. Now Egypt seems strangely quiet.

The Iraqi-Syrian plan, so far as is known, would provide primarily for a military alliance, with joint chiefs of staff, either a complete customs union or a modified system somewhat similar to that between Lebanon and Syria, abolition of the visa requirement citizens of the two states and possibly a political council made up of foreign ministers, finance ministers and economic ministers of the two countries.

The position of Jordan and Arab Palestine under this arrangement is not yet clear.

There are reports of more dramatic developments. One, which has been given some credence, is that



The New York Times Sept. 28, 1949

Syria and Iraq are believed moving toward federation as the result of talks that have been taking place in Damascus.

Regent Abdul Ilah of Iraq would become King of Syria while Faisal II would mount his Iraq throne and Abdullah would remain King of Jordan. The result would be a sort of three-headed Hashemite monarchy with a common foreign policy, customs union and financial and military system.

The most extreme plan, which is not being discussed at present, calls for the breaking up of all three countries into districts under a unified kingdom with the capital either at Damascus or Baghdad, or perhaps with a dual capital.

Two Major Hindrances

There are two major hindrances to any serious step toward the creation of an Arab federation in the Fertile Crescent area at this time. The first is money.

A measure for greatly expanding and re-equipping the Syrian army is coming up before the Government. Syria does not have the large sum required. It has been reported persistently that Egypt is prepared to give £2,000,000 and Saudi Arabia perhaps as high as \$6,000,000. Whatever sums are involved, if Egypt and Saudi Arabia paid, Syrian federation with Iraq would have to be sacrificed, it is alleged.

The other great difficulty is Iraq's treaty, which gives Britain certain military rights and bases in the country.

The Syrian army, it is stated, does not want to be linked to a country that still is subject to "treaty imperialism" and is therefore not wholly sovereign. An additional difficulty is the universal idea that Britain wants Syrian-Iraq unity. Arabs, with rare exceptions, are profoundly suspicious of anything that Britain wants.